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same time, both Peru and Colombia had in common the continuity of their trade policies 
through different administrations, their pledge to maintain structured consultation 
mechanisms with the private sector and non-government agents, and the vision to 
continue to build their institutional capacity. The signing, ratification and implementation 
of these FTAs  coincide with an expansion of non-traditional exports from the two 
Andean nations and an increase in inward FDI into sectors outside of commodities such 
as oil, natural gas and minerals. Although the external shocks and already established 
economic trends may play a big role in these increases, the extent to which they are 





FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PERU, COLOMBIA AND THE 
UNITED STATES: EFFECTS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION ON 








Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  






Professor Phillip L. Swagel, Chair 
Professor Todd Allee 
Professor. Philip G. Joyce  
Professor Susan W. Parker 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction………………………………………………………………1 
A. Research Question……………………………………………………………..7 
B. Economic Impact Hypotheses…………………………………………………7 
C. Channels by which Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) affect development……..8 
Box 1. Beyond Trade and Investment: Labor and  
Environmental Requirements of FTAs……………………………….11 
II. FTAs History and Motivation.………………………………………….12 
Box 2. Colombian and Peruvian Trade Relations with China………………20 
A. Economic background of partner countries…………………………………23 
1. Developing country-partners……………………………………………..23 
a. Import-substitution…………………………………………………...23 
b. The Washington Consensus, Economic Liberalization and  
Growing Pains………………………………………………………..25 
c. FTAs as tools for Sustainable Development…………………………26 
Box 3. Export and Investment Promotion Agencies…………………29 
2. Recent U.S. Trade Policy Trends ………………………………………..31 
Box 4. Efforts Towards New TPA Legislation…………………………..35 
III. Literature Review……………………………………………………….36 
A. Bilateral Trade Negotiations and their Impact………………………………36 
B. Export Diversification and its effects on Economic Growth………………..49 
C. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)……………………………………………52 
D. Effects of Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs) and FTA Investment 
Chapters on FDI……………………………………………………………..54 
1. General Background……………………………………………………...55 
2. Latin America…………………………………………………………….62 
Box 5. The role of Conflict resolution and Peace Agreements:………….63 
IV. Evidence Analysis ………………………………………………………65 












Box 6B. Revision section 301 on Intellectual Property………………….104 
B. Review and Description of BITs and FTA Investment Chapters and  
their apparent effect on FDI……………………………………………...105 
1. Colombia……………………………………………………………….107 
Box 7. Case Study: Cementos Argos…………………………………..112 
2. Peru……………………………………………………………………..112 
Box 8. Corporate Governance, M&A, and FDI………………………..116 
C. Quantitative Data  Analysis………………………………………………117 
D. Comparative Analysis of Institutional Differences………………………150 
E. 2017-18 FTA Recap: Exports and FDI…………………………………..158 
V. Conclusion……………………………………………………………..167 
Appendices 
1. Exploring the effects of the ATPA……………………………………173 
2. Exploring NAFTA…………………………………………………….178 
a. Trade and investment………………………………………………180 
b. Employment and wages……………………………………………182 
c. Dispute settlement………………………………………………… 185 
d. Labor and environment…………………………………………….186 
3. Trade Profiles and Analysis of the last two decades of trade relations.188 
a. Colombia…………………………………………………………...189 
b. Peru…………………………………………………………………190 
4. Foreign Investment Law Comparisons………………………………..193 
5. Visual Presentation of Research Question…………………………….194 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Colombian Exports by Destination, 2006-2013 (% of GDP)…………………..21 
Table 2.Colombian Imports by Origin (Annual Average, billions USD)………………..22 
Table 3. Peruvian Exports by Destination(millions of US$ FOB)………...…………….22 
Table 4. Peruvian Imports by Destination (millions of US$ CIF)…………...…………..22 
Table 5. Population (2001 and 2006, total and annual growth)……...…………………145 
Table 6. Colombian Total Exports (thousands of U.S. Dollars)…...…………………...188 
Table 7. Colombian Total Imports (thousands of U.S. Dollars)…...…………………...188 
Table 8. Peruvian Total Exports (thousands of U.S. Dollars)…..……………………...188 
Table 9. Peruvian Total Imports (thousands of U.S. Dollars)………..………………...188 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Exports from Peru to China (millions of US$)………………………………...22 
Figure 2. FDI in Colombia (US$ billions)………………...…………………………....108 
Figure 3. Bilateral Exchange Rate (vs US$)……………………………………………120 
Figure 4. Colombian Mild Coffee (U.S. cents/lb)……………………………...………120 
Figure 5. 15 Year Silver Price in USD/oz………………………………...……………121 
Figure 6. 15 Year Gold Price in USD/oz……………………………...………………..121 
Figure 7. Crude Oil Barrel US$.......................................................................................121 
Figure 8. Copper Price US$ per metric ton……………………………………………..121 
Figure 9. Exports of Good and Services (current US$)……………………………...…122 
Figure 10. Colombia – Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)………………………....123 
Figure 11. Colombia – Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)………………………....123 
Figure 12. Peru – Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)…………………….………...124 
Figure 13. Peru – Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)…………………….………...125 
Figure 14. Chile – Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)………………...….…..…….126 
Figure 15. Chile – Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)…………………….………..126 
Figure 16. Colombia – Traditional vs Non-Traditional Exports (thousands of US$)….128 
Figure 17. Colombia–Non-traditional Exports by Category (millions of US$)……..…129 
Figure 18. Colombia–Non-traditionalExports–Highlighted Categories,millions ofUS$130 
Figure 19. Colombia – Promising Exports (thousands of US$)……………….……….131 
Figure 20. Peru – Traditional vs Non-Traditional Exports (thousands of US$)…..……132 
Figure 21. Peru – Non-traditional Exports by Category (millions of US$)….…….…...133 
Figure 22. Peru – Non-traditional Exports by Category (millions of US$)….…….…...134 
Figure 23. Number of Products Exported………………………...………….…….…...135 
Figure 24. Number of Products Imported………………………...………….…….…...136 
Figure 25. Export Concentration Index…………………………………………....…...136 
Figure 26. Import Concentration Index…………………………………………….......137 
Figure 27. Export Diversification Index……………………………………...…....…...137 
Figure 28. Import Diversification Index……………………………………......….…...138 
Figure 29. FDI net inflows (BoP Current US$)…………………………………....…...139 
Figure 30. Colombia – FDI inflows by sector (millions of US$)…………………........141 
Figure 31. Peru – FDI stock by sector (millions of US$)…………………………........142 
Figure 32. Chile – FDI inflows by sector (millions of US$)…………...……...….…....143 
Figure 33. GDP PPP per capita……………...…………………………………….……144 
v 
 
Figure 34. GDP PPP growth……………………………………………………………144 
Figure 35. GDP PPP current international $........………………………………………145 
Figure 36. Government Effectiveness……...…………………………………………...146 
Figure 37. Bank Regulatory Capital vs. Risk-weighted Assets (%)………………...….147 
Figure 38. Bank Cost to Income Ratio (%)……………………………………………..147 
Figure 39. Labor Force with Basic Education (% Total)……………………………….148 
Figure 40. Labor Force with Intermediate Education (% Total)…………...……….….148 
Figure 41. Labor Force with Advanced Education (% Total)………………………….148 
Figure 42. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)……………...……………….150 
Figure 43. Labor Productivity (per hour worked)………………………………………150 
Figure 44. Internet Users (per hundred people)…………...……………………………150 
Figure 46. Oil Prices Trend 2013-2018…………………………………………...……160 
Figure 46. Peru – Traditional Exports by main sector (thousands of US$)………….…191 
Figure 47. Peru – Mining Exports (thousands of US$)……...…………………....……191 
Figure 48. Peru – Other Traditional Exports (thousands of US$)…………......….……192 
 
LIST OF ABBREAVIATIONS 
ALADI Asociación Latino Americana de Integración 
APEC  Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ATPA  Andean Trade Preference Act 
ATPDEA Andean Trade Partnership and Drug Eradication Agreement 
BIT  Bilateral Investment Treaty  
BoP  Balance of Payments 
CAFTA-DR Central American Free Trade Agreement (including Dominican Republic) 
CEPAL Consejo Económico para América Latina (UNECLAC – English acronym) 
CIF  Cost Insurance and Freight 
DANE   Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (Colombia) 
FARC  Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces  
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FOB  Free on Board 
FTA  Free Trade Agreement 
FTZ  Free Trade Zones 
GATT  General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IADB  Inter-American Development Bank 
ILO  International Labor Organization 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
ITC  International Trade Centre 
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PPK  Pedro Pablo Kuczynski – Peruanos por el Kambio (political party) 
PPP  Purchasing Power Parity 
R&D  Research and Development 
SUNAT Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de Administración Tributaria 
vi 
 
TPA  Trade Promotion Authority 
TPP  Trans Pacific Partnership 
TRIPS  Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO Agreement) 
UNECLAC United Nations Economic Council for Latin America and the Caribbean 
UNCTAD United Nations Commission for Trade and Development 
USTR  United States Trade Representative 
VAT  Value Added Tax  
WB  World Bank 
WDI  World Development Indicators 





ORIGIN AND MOTIVATION: For most emerging market nations obtaining the full 
economic benefits from FTAs requires broader reforms. Indeed, agreeing to an FTA may 
be seen as a way for a country to commit to these additional requirements—to make 
decisions that are politically difficult in a domestic context, but that can be justified for 
the purposes of signing onto an FTA. In a broader picture, political stability and a stable 
macroeconomic policy are key factors for U.S. trade partners to benefit from the 
opportunities arising from bilateral FTAs. A question assessed in this dissertation is 
whether such political and economic stability is a prerequisite for an agreement or instead 
whether the completion of an FTA can make a contribution to macroeconomic and 
political stability. I conclude that while some institutional capacity and political 
willingness are necessary ex ante, the commitments made in an FTA do propel 
fundamental changes that result in a more mature and sophisticated economy, as well as 
greater accountability from political actors. 
Abstract and Main Conclusions: 
This dissertation uses a mixed methodology that combines interviews and data 
analysis to evaluate the process of negotiating and implementing the U.S.-Peru and U.S.-
Colombia Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and to provide initial evidence on the impact 
of the respective agreements on foreign direct investment (FDI) and export 
diversification in the two Andean Countries. I find that institutional elements in each 
country impacted the process of negotiation and the outcomes of the two FTAs 
differently. Colombia had a relative initial advantage in institutional capacity and 
negotiating expertise, while Peru had a stronger leadership and commitment that made 
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the FTA a reality sooner. At the same time, both Peru and Colombia had in common the 
continuity of their trade policies through different administrations, their pledge to 
maintain structured consultation mechanisms with the private sector and non-government 
agents, and the vision to continue to build their institutional capacity. 
The key lessons of the process of negotiating and implementing the two FTAs 
include: 
• Peru and Colombia both exhibit two elements that made the negotiation and 
implementation of these FTAs possible: The FTAs were priorities for the Presidency 
and the Ministries of Commerce and Tourism; and both governments engaged in 
continuous and structured consultation with private sector and non-government 
agents. The agreements would have taken much longer (or not have been concluded 
at all) without both of these factors. 
• In the negotiation, Peru had in its favor that it absolutely prioritized the FTA and 
finished before Colombia. Peru was willing to go along with U.S. requirements 
sooner than Colombia. 
• In the negotiation, Colombia had in its favor the expertise of negotiators, and both 
during the negotiation and implementation its better institutional capacity compared 
with Peru 
• Both countries learned greatly from this process, but Peru climbed the learning curve 
faster in a shorter time. As a result, Peru has had faster negotiations of FTAs with 
other countries 
• These FTAs have helped FDI inflows by giving a boost to investors’ confidence, and 
bringing new and more diverse FDI. The confidence impact is just as important—if 
not more so—as the direct provisions of the FTA. Both countries are seen as open for 
business, and as gateways to the U.S. market in addition to their own. 
• Colombia has had better relative results with FDI because it has received investments 
in a great variety of economic sectors, in part due to its larger market size and 
strategic geographical position. 
• These FTAs also have been instrumental in increasing non-traditional exports and 
improving export diversification. This happened because the permanence of the FTA 
gave domestic and foreign investors the confidence to explore new lines of 
production, as well as the support to comply with complex technical requirements. 
• Peru has had better relative results with Export Diversification because it has been 
more successful finding new ways to effectively market their products, in particular 
those from agroindustry. 
While Peru and Colombia started the process of negotiating the FTA simultaneously 
(along with Ecuador at the same time), eventually the negotiations with Colombia were 
delayed for a variety of reasons, which are explored and analyzed in this dissertation.  
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A number of factors played a role in the rhythm of the negotiations:  the practical 
necessity for these agreements to replace the Andean Trade Partnership and Drug 
Eradication Agreement (ATPDEA) which was soon to expire pushed the negotiations to a 
conclusion; the relative lack of sophistication of the Colombian and Peruvian teams 
compared to the U.S. team at times held back the negotiations; the commitment of the 
each country’s Executive branches to see these agreements through ensured that the 
negotiations persevered over inevitable difficulties; the cooperation (or lack thereof) of 
the Legislative and Judicial branches and other domestic factors in Colombia and Peru 
such as national elections affected the negotiations, as did in the case of Colombia, the 
peace talks and eventual peace agreement. 
The differential success of the two agreements reflects both the particularities of each 
country and the global economic situation when they came into force. Though both 
agreements were largely reached in spring 2006, the Peru FTA was enacted in the U.S. 
Congress by the end of 2007 and the provisions took effect in February 2009. The 
Colombia FTA made it through the US Congress only in October 2011 and the treaty 
took effect in May 2012. The years that passed between these dates coincide with the 
global financial crisis and onset of the Great Recession in the U.S. Oil and other 
commodity prices plummeted as a result of the downturn, hindering FDI in these 
economic areas, and exchange rates became unfavorable for Peruvian and Colombian 
exporters. Nevertheless, when looking at subsections of investment and exporting, it is 
evident that there has been a long-term advance in both dimensions as the economies 
have moved past the crisis. 
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A final area of analysis is the difference between Peru and Colombia regarding 
implementation, defined as the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, as well as the 
creation, application and enforcement of the laws required by these FTAs. Colombia is 
arguably a more mature democracy than Peru in the sense that the Congress and courts 
can and do oppose the desires of the Executive. Although the demands of the U.S. were 
met when the FTA came into force, the Constitutional Court in Colombia revoked several 
of them, making it necessary to retool the laws and present them again to Congress. Their 
approval and passage has been extremely slow as a result. On the other hand, Peru is still 
a novice to the process of decentralization and regionalization. The difficulty in Peru has 
been more decentralized with gaps in applying FTA-related directives at the local level 
delaying the practical implementation of the agreement. 
The signing, ratification and implementation of these  FTAs coincide with an 
expansion of non-traditional exports from the two Andean nations and an increase in 
inward FDI into sectors outside of commodities such as oil, natural gas and minerals. 
Although the external shocks and already established economic trends may play a big 
role in these increases, the extent to which they are related with the FTAs is analyzed in 
this dissertation.  
CONTRIBUTION AND OBJECTIVE: This dissertation contributes to the research 
literature on the impacts of bilateral and multilateral agreements that liberalize trade and 
investment, focusing on the impacts of liberalization on developing countries. FTAs are 
important tools for economic development; through expanded trade and investment, they 
can stimulate economic growth. FTAs can also enhance national security and promote 
higher labor and environmental standards. This is especially the case for developing 
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countries, for which FTAs have the potential to put in motion profound changes to 
remove barriers to growth beyond just formal tariff levels, thereby enhancing 
productivity and welfare. Despite the potential gains, actually reaching agreements that 
fulfill this promise has proven extremely difficult.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to compare and contrast the agreements from an 
international development perspective assessing the process by which they were reached  
and their initial  impact, focusing especially on the effects of the agreements on FDI and 
non-traditional exports (those other than commodities). I assess both the results of the 
agreements to date and possibilities for future benefits, as well as political, economic and 
institutional challenges that have arisen.  These insights then inform my analysis of 
implications for future FTAs between the U.S. and  other developing countries. 
FACTS: The FTAs between the U.S. and Colombia and Peru are two of the most recent 
FTAs between the U.S. and Latin American countries, effective February 2009 and May 
2012.1 Even though the agreement with Peru was formally signed in April 12, 2006, and 
ratified by the Peruvian Congress in June 28, 2006, and the Colombian agreement was 
signed on November 22, 2006 and ratified by the Colombian Congress on June 14, 2007, 
and the terms of these FTAs were mostly agreed upon by the U.S. since July 1, 2007 
during the Bush administration, only the Peruvian agreement was ratified in the U.S. in 
the same terms negotiated during the Bush administration. For Colombia, the process 
lingered, and the Obama administration chose to wait until a politically acceptable 
moment to get it ratified.   
                                                      
1 The exact effective dates are: Peru, 2/1/09; Colombia, 5/15/12  
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Regarding the role of these and similar agreements between the U.S. and countries in the 
region, given that the initiative for the creation of a free trade zone encompassing all of 
the Americas did not succeed, the next workable strategy seemed to be to sign bilateral 
treaties among the countries capable and willing to take that step. More importantly, 
considering that Colombia and Peru were already receiving substantial benefits in their 
trade with the U.S., these FTAs were necessary to make permanent temporary benefits 
that had been extended for long periods of time. In addition, one could make the 
argument that these agreements should also be viewed as a tool signaling to trade and 
investment partners that these Latin American countries should be regarded as promising 
and safe destinations. An FTA would then amplify this signal by ensuring a permanent 
pro-investment regime. 
ORGANIZATION: In the following section the research question, the hypotheses to be 
tested, and the channels by which the FTAs affect development are presented. The 
history and motivation behind these FTAs then will be examined. Afterwards, the 
relevant literatures on export diversification, FDI and the effects of bilateral investment 
agreements (BITs, although in this case it refers particularly to the Investment Chapter in 
the FTA) on FDI will be reviewed. Finally, I describe three dimensions of analysis, 
starting with qualitative examination based on interviews and first-person accounts of the 
negotiation and implementation of these treaties. The second instance of analysis consists 
of a discussion of the BITs and FTA Investment Chapters signed by the countries under 
study. The final section presents quantitative testing of the proposed hypotheses for the 




A. Research Question: 
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate how the process of negotiating and 
implementing of the U.S.-Peru and U.S.-Colombia FTAs had an impact on FDI and 
export diversification in the two Andean Countries. 
B. Economic Impact Hypotheses: 
1. For the impact of FTAs on FDI and non-traditional exports, my main hypotheses are 
as follows: 
• These FTAs are beneficial to Colombia and Peru because their FDI 
flows/stock will grow as a result of the agreement implementation (when 
controlling for other factors)  
• These FTAs are beneficial to Colombia and Peru because trade increases 
(both exports – especially non-traditional exports -- and imports of 
industrial/complimentary merchandise) as a result of the agreement 
implementation (when controlling for other factors, including the ATPA) 
2. For the impact of FTAs on other macroeconomic indicators: 
• These FTAs are beneficial to Colombia and Peru because their overall economies 
will grow as a result of the agreement implementation (when controlling for other 
factors). This comes about both because of the direct liberalization involved in the 
FTAs and because of the ensuing changes sparked by the FTA.  (And of course 
there are negatives as well, since the FTAs involve broad changes and 
dislocations within the two countries’ economies and societies. Even so, the net is 
positive – perhaps even vastly so.) 
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• Among the ways in which these FTAs are beneficial to Colombia and Peru is 
because unemployment decreases (both skilled and unskilled) and labor 
productivity increases as a result of the agreement implementation (when 
controlling for other factors). 
 
C. Channels by which the FTAs affect the economies 
The hypotheses above include benefits from a range of channels by which FTAs 
affect the developing country partner nations. The dissertation looks at these mechanisms 
by which trade agreements influence domestic economies. 
Potential for increased exports of goods: Because Peru and Colombia already 
received many tariff benefits from temporary agreements, this channel may not be as 
substantial as with other partner countries. However, the certainty that arises from the 
FTA may result in a push for long-term investments toward new production destined to 
exporting. Also, the FTA opens the door to a clearer path for domestic firms to acquire 
licenses and know-how that may help a successful entrance in new markets. 
Potential for increased imports of goods: The effect of these FTAs may be 
positive for consumers in the developing countries because it improves the variety and 
the quality of the goods available in their local markets. A positive opportunity created by 
the FTAs is that it exposes local producers to increased competition and, provided they 
have access to adequate support to adapt, it may increase productivity. The FTAs may 
ease the acquisition of equipment needed to adjust to the new economic environment. 
Nevertheless, on the negative side, the exposure to new competition will result in some 
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firms and businesses exiting the market, creating unemployment and other dislocations, 
including challenges such as labor retraining. 
Potential for increased exports of services: For Colombia and Peru, this is an area 
in which positive changes are harder to visualize. However, given the growing Hispanic 
population in the U.S., one example of a potential positive effect is the market for call-
centers and other Spanish-spoken services that can be served remotely. Nonetheless, 
tourism and travel-related services should be a good potential source of additional 
income.2   
Potential for increased imports of services: Financial services are an area where 
the FTAs open brand-new opportunities for U.S. investors. While, Colombia and Peru 
opened their financial services markets to overseas investment since the 1990s, resulting 
in significant European investments (especially Spanish), before the bilateral FTAs 
complete foreign ownership was not permitted in this sector, and there were limits to the 
opening of branches and day-to-day operations (Haddad and Stephano, 2010). These 
hurdles disappeared for the U.S. financial firms with the implementation of the FTAs. 
Additionally, imports of tourism and travel-services from the U.S. could be somewhat 
enhanced by the agreements, although tourism to the U.S. is already well established. 
Finally, the higher education market (satellite campuses, executive degrees, test 
preparation institutes, and such) is another area for increased service opportunities for 
                                                      
2 According to the WTO, tourism and travel-related services includes services provided 
by hotels and restaurants (including catering), travel agencies and tour operator services, 
tourist guide services and other related services. International tourism facilitates for the 
cross-border movement of consumers. Therefore, even unskilled workers in remote areas, 
while engaging in the provision of these tourism and travel-related services, may become 




U.S. investors. This increased cross-border service activity would have benefits for both 
countries. 
Potential for higher inward investment: The implementation of the investment 
chapters of the FTAs should result in greater inward investment—indeed, this is a key 
motivation with pushing forward for the developing country partner countries. The 
benefits of such investment could include technology transfers and increased 
employment. 
Potential for higher outward investment: Thanks to the larger Hispanic market 
and South American immigrant population in the U.S., Peruvian and Colombian investors 
seeking to fulfill the demands of these immigrant populations could find valuable 
opportunities in the U.S. So far, other than financial flows in search of tax-free 
environments, Colombian and Peruvian outward investments have been directed to other 





Box 1. Beyond Trade and Investment: Labor and Environmental Requirements of FTAs  
Labor market improvements: The U.S.-Peru FTA was the first agreement in force (the 
FTA with Jordan took force after that with Peru) that includes provisions concerning the 
protection of the environment and labor rights, following the Bipartisan Agreement on 
Trade Policy developed by the Bush Administration on May 10, 2007. Nevertheless, 
Peruvian workers continue to suffer from practical restrictions to unionize, 
discrimination and child labor issues. In the case of Colombia, a Labor Action Plan3 with 
the U.S. was conceived in 2011 as a tool that would create structural changes for 
workers to improve their working conditions, in particular those related to systemic anti-
union violence. During its first year of implementation, the Colombian government 
created a stand-alone Ministry of Labor, hired new labor inspectors, and the number of 
trade unionists killed went down significantly.4 However, according to critics, progress 
stalled, especially because of lack of enforcement of fines and criminal penalties.5  
Even if the aftermath of the agreement implementation has not been stellar so far, the 
incorporation of new labor provisions in these FTA agreements, and the efforts to keep 
track of their application, are a first step in the right direction. It would be useful for 
future research to assess the outcomes of these provisions over time. 
 
Environmental improvements: The agreements commit partner countries to effectively 
enforce their own domestic environmental laws and to adopt, maintain and implement 
laws, regulations and all other measures to satisfy those responsibilities. The 
environment chapters include innovative measures for Forest Sector Governance, aimed 
to control illegal logging and illegal trade in wildlife. Nonetheless, protests denouncing 
misuse and dangerous exploitation of rainforests continue to be commonplace. 
As with the labor provisions, even if compliance with the environmental provision is not 
ideal, the mere fact that FTA negotiations bring issues to the table for public 
examination, and that the provisions’ implementation create mechanisms to deal with the 
problems, should be helpful in the long term—and again, provides a useful avenue for 
future research.  
 
  
                                                      
3 Intended to address the concerns about labor rights that long stalled the U.S. Congress's 






II. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: HISTORY AND MOTIVATION 
Well before the negotiation of these FTAs, both Colombia and Peru were benefiting 
from the Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991 (ATPA), which granted duty-free access 
in the U.S. market to a wide range of their products. The purpose of the ATPA was 
assisting four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) in their fight 
against illegal drug production and trafficking by multiplying their economic 
possibilities.6 Colombia and Peru desired to make permanent the trade benefits that they 
had been receiving from the U.S. on a temporary basis for a number of years. Therefore, 
in the short run, the incremental trade benefits of their FTAs coming into effect were 
lower compared to other countries implementing such treaties without pre-existing 
preferences.  
Before entering negotiations for FTAs, the Andean Trade Preference Act, the ATPA 
(which included Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador) was renewed as the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, the ATPDEA. When the ATPDEA was about to 
expire for a third time the U.S. decided to negotiate FTAs with these countries. Only 
Bolivia decided not to negotiate an FTA with the U.S., while Ecuador later was pulled 
out of the negotiations as its government priorities changed and it nationalized the 
interests of Occidental Oil Company in this country (for additional details on the ATPA 
and ATPDEA, please refer to appendix section 1).  
                                                      
6 The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), enacted on August 
6, 2002, renewed and amended the ATPA to provide duty-free treatment for certain 
products previously excluded under the ATPA.  The benefits are subject to the countries 




In addition, the finalization and ratification of these FTAs took place in the aftermath of 
the failed efforts to achieve an FTA of the Americas (FTAA) that attempted to come to 
an agreement between 34 countries of the Americas, based on the model of NAFTA. The 
FTAA would have been ground-breaking as it intended to apply “all the disciplines of the 
proposed services agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) - with the powers of the failed Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI), to create a new trade powerhouse with sweeping new 
authority over the Americas.”7 Since negotiations toward a FTAA were unsuccessful, the 
hemisphere is now divided between countries that have FTAs with the U.S. (NAFTA -- 
Canada and Mexico, CAFTA --Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua-- and the Dominican Republic,8 Panama, Peru, Colombia, and Chile) and 
those that do not (most importantly Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela).  
Given that the U.S. could not achieve a comprehensive FTAA, its best next strategy from 
the American perspective was to pursue bilateral FTAs. Bilateral FTAs are not optimal in 
terms of global welfare, because they create trade distortions as some countries are 
included and others are not, creating a “race-to-the-bottom” scenario. However, FTAs are 
still attractive from a bilateral perspective because they create short-term gain 
opportunities for the political actors in each country. As explained by Fandl (2007) and 
following the original argument by Braybrooke and Lindblom (2009), “the incremental 
                                                      
7 Public Citizen, Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (Overview), 
http://www.citizen.org/trade/ftaa/ 
8 The agreement entered into force for the United States and El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua during 2006, for the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007, 
and for Costa Rica on January 1, 2009. 
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approach does not see long-term gains as feasible during the political shelf life of most 
politicians. Rather, it identifies marginal gains loosely directed toward the achievement 
of some greater goal as the most productive approach, despite the possibility that long 
term goals might never be achieved.”(p.12) 
These bilateral agreements concluded with Colombia and Peru have been controversial 
and remain especially unpopular among significant portions of the general public of the 
respective Andean countries.  In particular, indigenous people, human rights activists, 
unions and environmentalists believed these agreements would solidify practices such as 
maquila-like enterprises which would standardize even lower wages and work-safety 
requirements, low standards for agroindustry, and reckless exploitation of natural 
resources. These concerns remain notwithstanding the higher standards for labor and the 
environment in these new FTAs intended to address those issues. Also, as new 
agricultural products would enter the Peruvian and Colombian markets, there were great 
fears among the general population for the quality and the market effects of the products 
coming in (based on an assumption that the availability of low-priced (and perhaps low 
quality) products would drive local production to bankruptcy—a normal concern for 
those economic sectors that would compete with new imports resulting from the FTAs. 
Efforts to educate the public on the notion of comparative advantage helped to quiet some 
of the fears, putting emphasis on how this was a chance to give a greater market to 
products that were really unique to the region (such as exotic fruits and vegetables, 
including sugar cane and bamboo). Still, some profound unease about globalization and 
about increased trade and investment linkages with the U.S. remains. 
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Finally, the global financial crisis of 2008 meant a sharp contraction of trade and thus a 
dip in the rate of economic growth for both countries. It could be that this slowdown, 
combining with the maturity date for the ATPA, actually provided an impetus for 
ratification of the FTAs in the sense of fueling a desire to try new alternatives for 
achieving stronger growth. Even if completing the FTAs with the U.S. was not the most 
important avenue through which to support stronger domestic growth, it was a readily-
available one and thus a natural focus for political and policy efforts. Although there was 
an economic recovery from 2009 to 2012, by the time agreements came into effect 
economic conditions had deteriorated again at the end of 2013, this time due to a sharp 
decline in commodity prices. Therefore, the overall macroeconomic effect of the 
agreements is still hard to assess by looking solely at macroeconomic indicators. 
 Colombia: 
For Colombia, losing any amount of support from the U.S. has never been an option. 
Guerrilla war and drug trafficking are still a current issue, as it has been for decades now. 
There is a widespread belief that if peace could be achieved, once and for all, and the 
economic consequences of illicit activities could be contained, there would be a real 
chance for greater long-lasting prosperity. As the dynamics of drug trafficking have 
changed, cities like Medellin and Cali have had a chance to recover their reputation as 
good places to live and invest. Nevertheless, prior to the ceasefire accomplished by the 
peace talks that succeeded in 2017, the countryside remained a battlefield of sorts, 
limiting the possibilities for more substantial changes in the agroindustry. Also, until the 
ceasefire, guerrilla operations made their way to the outskirts of big cities just as peasants 
continued to be displaced from their lands. Population displacement created in turn 
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higher rates of urban criminality. This combination of factors resulted in an increased 
perceived risk for several types of foreign investments, even into urban areas.  
Jeffrey Schott (2006) discussed how the U.S. wanted to show strong support for 
Colombia’s effort in the fight against illegal drug-production and trafficking. At that 
time, most narcotics production had shifted from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia.9 Also, at 
the time, guerrilla problems in Peru were no longer an issue, while the Colombian 
guerrillas kept growing stronger by getting involved in drug production and trafficking.  
This background explains why Colombia was eager to reach a trade and investment 
agreement with the U.S., both for the potential economic benefits and as a way to affirm 
an alliance that ensured continued U.S. support in the struggle against drug trafficking 
and leftist Guerrillas. 
Of course, a key piece in this puzzle was the Uribe administration and its 
accomplishments in regard to regaining control of the countryside, and making Colombia 
safer for all kinds of investments. Plan Colombia, a multiyear program implemented in 
1999 by President Bill Clinton and President Andres Pastrana, Uribe's predecessor, was 
fundamental for this process. This plan allowed the Colombian government to extend 
security beyond the main urban areas and into the countryside. The implementation and 
effect of these policies were particularly successful when President Uribe and his center-
                                                      





right, pro-U.S. administration took office in 2002.10 Uribe left office in 2010 after 
completing a second presidential term (the Colombian Constitution was actually modified 
to permit reelection), just as the last hurdles to the ratification of the U.S-Colombia FTA 
were surmounted.  
Peru: 
The success of the negotiation and ratification of the US- Peru FTA was due in great part 
to the work of the Toledo Administration, as well as the Garcia Administration that 
followed. Alejandro Toledo was president from 2001 to 2006, and Alan Garcia from 
2006 to 2011. Toledo implemented orthodox economic policies that aimed to control 
public spending and promote economic growth (Peru’s GDP rate of growth increased 
from 0.2% in 2001 to 8.0% in 2006). García then continued the pro-market economic 
policies of his predecessor.11 
Despite his defying campaign against Fujimori, Toledo continued many of the trade 
liberalization policies that were part of the neoliberal, Washington Consensus paradigm 
adopted by Fujimori. Toledo wanted to make the U.S.-Peru FTA a part of his presidential 
legacy and declared that the agreement would be signed no matter what (“sí o sí”).12 
Garcia, on the other hand, based his electoral campaign on leftist-leaning arguments and 
an ambiguous rhetoric regarding the future of the FTA with the U.S. However, in 
practice, he continued to facilitate negotiations and implementation, even adopting in 
                                                      
10 James Roberts, April 30, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-us-colombia-
free-trade-agreement-strengthening-good-friend-rough-neighborhood 
11 Villareal, 2007, p. 9 
12 Ferrero, 2010, p. 159 
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January 2009, a law that effectively created the opportunity for U.S. corporations to 
patent genes extracted from Peruvian flora while loosening the requirements for attaining 
a patent.13 
Philip Levy (2009) argues that the intention of this agreement was not to create new 
market access, but rather to promote investment by locking in Peru’s economic reforms 
and broader integration in the world economy. Levy came to this perspective by 
conducting interviews with Peruvian officials. 
Overall, and compared to Colombia, Peru has recently had a somewhat more peaceful 
outlook, having minimized the power of the Shining Path guerrillas many years ago, and 
reduced the economic incidence of narcotics production at least for some time. 
Furthermore, Peru covers a slightly bigger portion of the Amazonian region than 
Colombia (13 percent vs. 10 percent, correspondingly; 60 percent is Brazilian), but in the 
context of achieving certain economic goals this difference is substantial. A larger 
Amazonian region means greater possibilities for mining exploration, agroindustry, and 
tourism.  
However, this path has had its own set of challenges. Peru is still the main producer of 
coca leaves in the world, and saw an increase in production and distribution in the first 
decade of the 2000s, reaching 62.5 thousand hectares in 2011, as the efforts in Colombia 
have succeed in diminishing Colombian illegal drug-trafficking profitability. From 2012 
to 2016 the Peruvian government implemented an eradication policy that successfully 
                                                      
13 Council on Hemispheric Affairs “Ramming the Matter Home: Peru-U.S. FTA Rushed, 




reduced production to around 40 thousand hectares in 2015.14 At the same time, even 
with reduced production of coca leaves, there is some evidence that the Mexican and 
Brazilian crime cartels have increased their operations in Peru, taking refuge through 
strategic alliances with local producers.15 
Another challenging subject for economic policy in Peru is that Peruvian society has a 
much broader and stronger connection with its indigenous roots than in Colombia, with 
important consequences for policymaking. Any governmental plan had to address this 
cultural issue. Ex-President Ollanta Humala, who just stepped down in July 2016, was the 
FTA’s most outspoken opponent. Humala's party won 45 of 120 seats in Congress in 
2006, the largest share by a single party, prompting debate on ratification of the 
agreement before the new legislature was sworn in. Nevertheless, the agreement was 
ratified by the Peruvian Congress on June 28, 2006.  
A controversial issue at the time of ratification concerned land resources, and 
"Indigenous organizations warn[ed] that this ruling effectively open[ed] up 45 million 
hectares to foreign investment and timber, oil, and mining exploitation.” However, most 
of the concerns were directed to Peru's agricultural sector. Low-income farming families 
with scarce technical resources could not yield crops at low enough prices to export. In an 
effort to alleviate this deficiency, Peru created a Compensation Fund with a budget of 
                                                      
14 United Nations Peru Crop Monitoring Report 2016, 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Peru/Peru_monitoreo_coca_2016.pdf, 
p. 7 




$34 million per year to help cotton, maize/corn, and wheat producers for a five-year 
period, while they adjusted to the new competitive pressures. 
Box 2. Colombian and Peruvian Trade Relations with China 
At the time the FTA between Colombia and the U.S. entered in force in 2012, Colombia 
had just started talks with China, concluding a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
between both countries and creating a task force to consider next steps for an eventual 
FTA with China. However, as to this writing a final agreement is still pending.  China 
was Colombia’s second trading partner in 2011, demanding significant amounts of oil 
and coal and offering manufacturing in return, mostly machinery and equipment. In fact, 
by the time the Colombia-U.S. FTA entered into force, although China was still not a 
major source of FDI, it had quickly established itself as a primary trading partner (see 
tables below), surpassed only by the U.S. China is important for Colombia as an export 
destination (including in its generation of foreign exchange since the trade is largely 
conducted in dollars), and for channeling of resources to Colombia’s government. 
However, as mentioned above, these exports had been concentrated in the extractive 
sector; therefore, as oil prices decreased, the share of exports to China also declined.16  
The China–Peru FTA was signed the agreement in April 2009. The agreement was 
ratified by both countries governments on December 6, 2009 and came into effect on 
March 1, 2010. Since China first overtook the U.S. as Peru’s biggest trade partner in 
2011, thanks mostly to its demand for Peru’s metals exports, bilateral trade has surged, 
and diplomatic ties have tightened. Chinese appetite for commodities is credited with 
helping Peru survive the financial crisis of 2008. Peru is the leading location for Chinese 
mineral investment in Latin America, and Chinese firms hold around 30 percent of the 
country´s total mining investment portfolio. Chinese firms also have an important 
presence in Peru´s hydrocarbons and commercial fishing sectors.17 The majority of 
Chinese mineral investment is concentrated in copper and iron, and since 2007 this has 
involved primarily green field projects obtained through the takeover of Western-owned 
junior firms.18 The signing of a sanitary protocol between Peru and China in December 
2017 has been a trigger for a new rush in trade between the two countries. In fact, Peru 
could substantially move one of its most popular varieties of shrimp exports away from 
                                                      
16 Glenn Ojeda “Petroleum and Trade between Colombia and China”, Farmfolio, October 
26th, 2017 https://farmfolio.net/articles/petroleum-trade-colombia-china/  
 
17 Cynthia Sanborn and Victoria Chonn, “Chinese Investment in Peru’s Mining Industry: 
Blessing or Curse?”, BU Global Economic Governance Initiative, Discussion Paper 
2015-8, pp.3-4 https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/12/Peru2.pdf 
18 Ibid. p. 11 
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the U.S. and towards China as the agreement now allows Peruvian shrimp shipments into 
Chinese ports.19   
Table 1. Colombian Exports by Destination, 2006-2013 (% of GDP)    
  2006   2007   2008   2009   
1 U.S.A. 5.90% U.S.A. 5.00% U.S.A. 5.80% U.S.A. 5.50% 
2 Venezuela 1.70% Venezuela 2.50% Venezuela 2.50% Venezuela 1.70% 
3 Ecuador 0.80% Ecuador 0.60% Ecuador 0.60% Netherland 0.60% 
4 Peru 0.40% Netherlands 0.40% Peru 0.40% Ecuador 0.50% 
5 Dom.Rep  0.40% Peru 0.40% Chile 0.30% Switzerlan 0.40% 
6 Mexico 0.40% China 0.40% Netherlands 0.30% China 0.40% 
7 Spain 0.30% Dom.Rep  0.30% Dom.Rep  0.30% Peru 0.30% 
8 Netherlands 0.30% Spain 0.30% U.K. 0.30% U.K. 0.30% 
9 Italy 0.30% Italy 0.30% Brazil 0.30% Chile 0.30% 
10 China 0.30% Germany 0.30% Germany 0.30% Brazil 0.20% 
 Others 4.30% Others 4.00% Others 4.40% Others 3.70% 
  Total 15.00% Total 14.50% Total 15.4% Total 14.0% 
  2010   2011   2012   2013   
1 U.S.A. 5.80% U.S.A. 6.50% U.S.A. 5.90% U.S.A. 4.90% 
2 Ecuador 0.60% Netherlands 0.80% China 0.90% China 1.30% 
3 Netherlands 0.60% Chile 0.70% Spain 0.80% Spain 0.80% 
4 China 0.60% China 0.60% Venezuela 0.70% Netherlan. 0.60% 
5 Venezuela 0.50% Ecuador 0.60% Netherlands 0.70% Venezuela 0.60% 
6 Peru 0.40% Venezuela 0.50% Chile 0.60% Ecuador 0.50% 
7 Chile 0.40% Spain 0.50% Ecuador 0.50% Brazil 0.40% 
8 Brazil 0.40% Peru 0.40% Peru 0.40% Chile 0.40% 
9 Switzerland 0.30% Brazil 0.40% Brazil 0.30% Peru 0.30% 
10 U.K. 0.20% U.K. 0.40% U.K. 0.30% U.K. 0.30% 
 Others 4.10% Others 5.80% Others 5.10% Others 5.40% 
  Total 13.90% Total 17.10% Total 16.2% Total 15.50% 
Source: Rudas Lleras and Cabrera Leal 2015 - Author’s calculations based on DANE data 
         
Table 2.Colombian Imports by Origin (Annual Avrg, billions USD)    
  1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2013 
1 U.S.A. 4.7 U.S.A. 4.3 U.S.A. 8.5 U.S.A. 13.7 
2 Venezuela 1.3 Venezuela 0.9 China 3.1 China 8.5 
3 Japan 0.9 Mexico 0.7 Mexico 2.5 Mexico 5.5 
4 Germany 0.7 Brazil 0.7 Brazil 2 Brazil 2.6 
5 Mexico 0.5 China 0.6 Venezuela 1.2 Germany 2.1 
6 Brazil 0.5 Japan 0.6 Germany 1.2 Japan 1.4 
7 Spain 0.3 Germany 0.6 Japan 1 Ecuador 1 
8 Ecuador 0.3 Ecuador 0.4 Ecuador 0.7 Spain 0.7 





9 China 0.2 Spain 0.2 Spain 0.4 Venezuela 0.5 
 Others 4.2 Others 4.6 Others 10 Others 18 
  Total 13.6 Total 13.6 Total 30.6 Total 53.5 
Source: Rudas Lleras and Cabrera Leal 2015 - Author’s calculations based on DANE data 
 
Table 3. Peruvian Exports by Destination(millions of US$ FOB)  
    2016 2017 Variation % of  2017 
1 China 8382.9      11,589.41  38.25% 26.30% 
2 U.S.A. 6184.69        6,868.86  11.06% 15.59% 
3 Switzerland 2571.11        2,349.38  -8.62% 5.33% 
4 South Korea 1387.32        2,086.59  50.40% 4.74% 
5 India 924.07        1,954.74  111.54% 4.44% 
6 Japan 1260.09        1,878.39  49.07% 4.26% 
7 Spain 1210.85        1,849.46  52.74% 4.20% 
8 Brazil 1183.78        1,580.51  33.51% 3.59% 
9 Canada 1681.12        1,196.19  -28.85% 2.72% 
10 Netherlands 986.81        1,078.16  9.26% 2.45% 
 Others 10145.92      11,626.45  14.59% 26.39% 
  Total 35918.66 44058.14 22.66% 100.00% 
Source: Peruvian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Capechi   
 
Table 4. Peruvian Imports by Destination (millions of US$ CIF)  
    2016 2017 Variation % of 2017 
1 China 8227.79        8,850.10  7.56% 22.28% 
2 U.S.A. 7089.19        8,055.18  13.63% 20.28% 
3 Brazil 2127.88        2,448.61  15.07% 6.16% 
4 Mexico 1675.69        1,771.89  5.74% 4.46% 
5 Ecuador 1100.31        1,558.25  41.62% 3.92% 
6 Colombia 1178.11        1,477.33  25.40% 3.72% 
7 Chile 1152.66        1,200.64  4.16% 3.02% 
8 Argentina 909.19        1,170.51  28.74% 2.95% 
9 Germany 1121.23        1,062.91  -5.20% 2.68% 
10 Spain 644.17        1,054.21  63.65% 2.65% 
 Others 10933.72      11,078.75  1.33% 27.89% 
  Total   36,159.94       39,728.38  9.87% 100.00% 
Source: Peruvian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 





Source: Peruvian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Capechi 
 
A. Economic background of partner countries 
1) Peru and Colombia 
a. Import-substitution 
The move toward bilateral FTAs with several countries including the U.S. may be 
regarded as a final step of sorts in a series of reforms that sought to reverse several 
decades of development strategy based on import-substitution. These FTAs open the door 
to a larger variety and lower-cost imports from the U.S. (both goods and services). For 
Peru and Colombia, issues of competitiveness in agricultural and manufacturing products 
come into play. Still the import-substitution strategies implemented decades ago have a 
lingering impact on today’s markets. 
Many countries around the world implemented different industrialization strategies, in an 
effort to catchup to the more developed economies. In the Latin American context, the 
dominant policies were put forward starting in the 1950s, proposed primarily by 
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and the Caribbean, UNECLAC-CEPAL, Spanish acronym). He believed developing 
countries needed to build local vertical linkages, in order to create industries that used 
domestic primary products. Tariffs were supposed to permit domestic infant industries to 
thrive. 
Application of these policies to small economies, such Colombia and Peru, was limited, 
because their size did not allow for successful development of capital-intensive industries 
(such as cars and machinery). For these countries UNECLAC proposed a focus on 
redistributing income through agrarian reform, while expanding markets through limited 
trade associations (Latin American Free Trade Association - ALALC). 
This focus on import-substitution policies may be one of the main reasons proposed 
regional trade pacts between developing countries often failed.20 In addition, even as 
GATT negotiations progressed, until the Uruguay Round, many developing countries 
continued to protect their own markets. While emerging economies in Latin America 
were able to obtain improved, even if limited, access to industrial markets, their 
developed partners still had to accept the maintenance of high trade barriers to their most 
competitive agricultural and manufacturing exports - indeed, the agricultural provisions 
were among the most difficult to negotiate aspects of the later FTAs. Furthermore, these 
minimal contributions to GATT negotiations “did not prompt policy changes in 
developing countries that would induce adequate flows of investment and transfers of 
technology.”21 
                                                      
20 Schott, 2004, p.5 
21 Ibid, p. 9 
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b. The Washington Consensus,22 Economic Liberalization and Growing 
Pains 
Notwithstanding the theoretical benefits of lowering or abandoning trade barriers, 
liberalization was often seen by many Latin American countries as surrendering parts of 
their country’s economic opportunities because domestic firms could not compete with 
those from advanced areas. However, during the early 1990s, and after the so-called “lost 
decade” of the 1980s, most of the region started to move away from import-substitution 
strategies. It was then when many liberalization policies were implemented, starting by 
following the policies frequently listed as the “Washington Consensus”,23 namely: 
• Fiscal discipline: maintaining a low public deficit, responsible issuing of public 
debt (bonds) and borrowing 
• A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high 
economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as 
primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure 
• Tax reform, to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base 
• Interest rate liberalization, intended to promote investment and maintain a healthy 
inflation rate 
• A competitive exchange rate, to support trade and investment objectives 
• Trade liberalization 
• Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment 
• Privatization, in order to bring much needed resources to invest in infrastructure 
and achieve a healthy budget 
• Deregulation, to abolish barriers to entry and exit 
• Secure property rights 
• An export-oriented culture: economic actors should focus on investing in 
exporting industries, through the implementation of a variety of incentives, as 
well as export-promotion agencies 
 
                                                      
22 http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html 
23 John Williamson originally coined the phrase Washington Consensus in 1990 “to refer 
to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-
based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989” 
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The implementation of these policies in relatively short periods of time and the 
socioeconomic adjustments that followed gave rise to economic hardship among sectors 
of the population. Critics put forward as evidence the disappointing rates of growth from 
nations that followed this prescription. Furthermore, this adjustment period has fueled 
division within the countries themselves, and among Latin American countries. Some, 
like Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela have decided to step back from these liberal 
policies, even nationalizing companies that had already been privatized. The benefits of 
this retreat from the market, however, are dubious, notwithstanding the challenges 
involved with economic liberalization. 
c. FTAs as tools for Sustainable Development 
One theoretical framework that looks at sustainable development issues, proposed 
by Dani Rodrik, argues that trade and export policies can and should be chosen on the 
basis of their effects in promoting good national and regional development. Rodrik  
(2011) distinguishes between an “enlightened standard” and his own proposed alternative 
view. The former recognizes “that integration into the global economy is an essential 
determinant of economic growth. Successful integration in turn requires both enhanced 
market access in the advanced industrial countries and a range of institutional reforms at 
home…to render economic progress viable and growth promoting.”24 In his alternative 
view, a development-friendly international trade regime would focus not only on 
enhancing poor countries’ access to markets in the advanced industrialized countries (in 
                                                      
24 Rodrik, Dani, The Global Governance of Trade: As If Development Really Mattered, 




this case, the U.S.), but leaves room for experimentation and divergent solutions 
(institutionally-wise). 
Regarding exports, Beaton et al (2017) argue that “countries with a higher number of 
trade agreements have more positive growth outcomes. Increasing the number of trade 
agreements from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associated with a 1.5 
percentage point increase in average per capita growth.” (p.23) This finding is consistent 
with results presented by Hannan (2016), which shows how trade agreements may 
produce considerable increases in export performance (on average, an 80% export rise 
over ten years). These gains seem to be more substantial for emerging markets, and for 
trade agreements between emerging markets and advanced economies. 
Regarding FDI, there are certain requirements for sustainable development that may be 
satisfied by foreign investments: energy production, transportation, manufacturing and 
resource extraction. Therefore, creating a socio-economic environment that is hospitable 
to FDI should be a priority for developing countries. In this sense, these countries should 
focus on fulfilling the following prerequisites to attract such investments (Bernasconi-
Osterwalder et al., 2011): 
• Access to inputs and skilled labor 
• Access to markets for the products and services generated by 
investment 
• Existence of reliable infrastructure  
• Quality of services—communications, transportation, banking, 
insurance and government services 
• Stability of the economic and political environments  
• Offers of financial or fiscal incentives. 
In this context, investment treaties are another way, neither necessary nor sufficient, of 
attracting investment, because they provide an extra measure of legal protection to 
foreign investors. In other words, investment treaties give FDI legal guaranties and put 
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forward clear procedures to settle disputes, but these treaties by themselves are not 
enough to attract FDI; the basic requirements listed above take precedence.  
It is in this sense that Mayeda (Ch.22 in Cordonier et al. eds., 2011) points to the 
expectation that investment would be a one-way flow from firms in the wealthy home 
country to the poorer host country, especially when negotiations over trade and 
investment treaties begin with a “boiler-plate” text drafted by the home (wealthier) 
countries. His argument is that the initial text needs to be retailored explicitly toward the 
goal of sustainable development. (p. 535-536) Some of the great areas of concern are 
human rights and the environment. After reviewing theories put forward by Amartya Sen, 
Mayeda concludes that greater efforts should be taken for making treaty negotiators and 
arbitrators better understand the needs of developing countries. Nevertheless, such 
standardization of trade and investment agreements has a positive side, because it is 
precisely the expectation of a high standard of legal rights that gives investors the 
security and stability necessary for cross-border investment. 
Regarding the countries included in this study, David Crocker, from the standpoint of his 
Capability Approach, points out how “further work is needed to investigate the extent to 
which lowering trade barriers for producers in the South would lower prices for Northern 
consumers and enrich large transnational producers but fail to benefit local populations in 
developing countries.”25 One way of trying to amplify the positive impact of free trade on 
local populations is through the work of export promotion agencies. These agencies help 
educate the public and potential local investors about export opportunities, by creating a 
bridge to the understanding of specific markets and their requirements. A study from the 
                                                      
25 Crocker, 2008, p. 256 
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Inter-American Development Bank analyzed the effectiveness of these export promotion 
bodies in a group of countries that included Peru and Colombia, from 2000 to 2007. 
Overall, it found that such entities were relatively successful (see box 3 below).   
Box 3. Export and Investment Promotion Agencies 
Peru 
The Peruvian Export Promotion Agency, PromPeru (http://www.promperu.gob.pe) 
implements and programs to support exporters and tourism. Two of the most recent 
strategies are Super Foods Peru and Peru Service Summit. Through its Foods initiative, 
PromPeru has supported $3.5 billion in exports during 2017, an increase of 8.7% 
compared with the previous year. Overall, 7,415 businesses (187 more than in 2016) 
exported to 178 markets (3 more than in 2016).26 Peru Service Summit started in 2011 
and will host its eighth edition in August 2018. It brings together Peruvian service 
providers with potential customers from all over Latin America and the World.  In 2011, 
this summit aided the creation of $20 million in business commitments, and by 2017 this 
number had jumped to $95 million, for an overall commitment of $432 during the seven 
years.27 In its latest edition, the Summit supported many software and engineering 
businesses. In comparison, PromPeru planned for 2014 over 114 export promotion 
activities, in an effort to reach $1.3 billion in new export transactions.28  
Proinversion is the private investment promotion agency in Peru 
(www.proinversion.gob.pe). Agribusinesses are by far the most successful story in 
Peruvian innovation outside of the mining, construction and infrastructure sectors. 
Demand for a greater variety of fruits and vegetables worldwide, as well as greater 
attention to how these foods are produced (fair trade, organic), have created a niche 
market for certain Peruvian products such as asparagus, blueberries, avocados, 
artichokes, bananas, mangos, cacao and coffee (see Appendix 3). Joint ventures have 
made possible to harvest, process and package such products at their origin. This 
includes freezing, canning, pickling and production of different types of jellies and 
desserts. In an interview, Rosario Bazan, a CEO of one of such ventures highlighted how 
“having signed and executed the free trade agreements, which have given our country, 
and in the case of the export-oriented sector, the stability to develop long-term 
investment. The investment horizon regarding fruit is about 20 years at least; therefore, it 
                                                      
26 https://www.promperu.gob.pe/Repos/pdf_novedades/133201816351_580.pdf 
27 Exportando.pe, December 2017, p. 21 
http://www.siicex.gob.pe/siicex/documentosportal/630078659rad15465.pdf 




is important to be able to make projections over time, based on rules that need to be 
stable and observed throughout the project.”29 
Colombia 
ProColombia is the export, investment and tourism promotion agency in Colombia 
(http://www.colombiatrade.com.co/). In line with its purpose of facilitating the expansion 
of new markets, it has followed and aided in the understanding of the dismantling of 
trade barriers as agreed in FTAs. One of the products that will soon bring more export 
revenue for Colombia is avocados (Hass variety). This is a promising market. U.S. 
recently experienced a shortage of avocado as supplies did not respond quickly to 
surging demand that has led to a sharp increase in its price (as much as 200% in some 
markets). Overall, in the last five years, the average price per pound has risen 50%. In 
the last decade, per capita consumption of avocado increased significantly in the U.S.: in 
2005, the annual consumption per capita stood at 3.1 pounds and 2015 arrived at 7 
pounds. U.S. avocado imports almost doubled between 2012 and 2015, from $860 million 
to $1,600 million. Mexico, its main producer, has had supply problems, prompting 
Americans to allow for an increase in imports from other countries, including Colombia, 
in the very near future. In Colombia it is possible to grow Hass avocado most of the year, 
with peak production between October and March, which would favor constant supply, 
unlike other competing producers (this ability relates to biodiversity thermal floors in 
Colombia). Between 2012 and 2015 the Colombian production of Hass avocado  doubled 
from 29,000 tons in 2012 to 58,581 tons last year.30 In 2017, Colombia cleared its 
phytosanitary permit to export Hass avocado to the U.S. 
On the investment front, within the last 5 years, approximately 200 foreign companies 
began their operations in Colombia, building new plants, business offices, and 
subsidiaries – these developments reflect the impetus from the FTA along with a host of 
positive factors, notably end of conflict between the FARC and the Colombian 
government. Newcomers include Facebook, Chilean hotel chain Atton, Japanese fiber 
optics company Furukawa, and Hero MotoCorp from India started the construction of a 
new motorcycle assembly plant. Common selection factors listed by new investors are 
Colombia’s key strategic location, qualified human talent, and strong sectors including 
tourism, financial and business services, BPO operations, and agribusiness. Foreign 
companies also arrived through franchises, private operations, or by purchasing local 
companies, including the Starbucks Victoria’s Secret, Marriott, Versace, Dolce & 
Gabbana, GAP, Forever 21(U.S.), Itaú Bank (Brazil), Axa Seguros (France), Ripley 
(Chile), and Jerónimo Martins (Portugal).31 
“Foreign investment in BPO, Software and IT grew by 28% in the last five years. 
Starting in 2010, ProColombia's efforts brought 80 new BPO, Software and IT initiatives 
                                                      








with business operations worth $949 million that, according to entrepreneurs, are 
expected to create 53,433 new jobs," stated Maria Claudia Lacouture, then President of 
ProColombia. Spain is the top foreign investor, with 29.5% of the foreign companies 
operating in the sector, followed by the U.S. with 21.5%, France with 7.4%, and the U.K 
and Argentina with about 6% each. Success stories about new investors in this sector 
include IBM, and AIG, companies that installed shared service infrastructures or 
expanded their data centers, attracted by the quality and qualifications of its 
professionals, as well as the incentives and costs available in the country. Lacouture also 
said that Colombia, in addition to its call center capabilities, is creating custom products 
thanks to its highly qualified work force: “Human talent in Colombia is prepared to 
provide E-Commerce services, credit management, risk and collection services, helpdesk, 
back office, telemedicine as well as engineering and market surveys.”32 
In this endeavor, the Colombian Ministry of Information Technology and 
Communications, in an alliance with ProColombia, has dedicated resources to promote 
domestic IT and creative digital industries in the international market. Since this 
collaboration started in 2012, the exports of this sector have grown 371%; in 2017, up to 
the end of November, IT exports to U.S. alone were $53 million and creative digital 
industries exports to U.S. were $36 million. Other important markets for these products 
are México, Central América, Perú, Chile, Spain and Brazil. 
According to the most recent statement from ProColombia, 2017 was one of their best 
years since the agency was created 25 years ago. They believe the shock in the 
mineral/energy sector gave a boost to export and investment diversification. The agency 
reports a 27% increase in exports, 22% increase in investments, and 20% increase in 
tourism for the past year. According to their calculations, in 2017, they facilitated 
exports valued around $3 billion, and FDI valued in $335 million in agroindustry, $172 
million in tourism infrastructure, $147.8 million in metal-mechanics, $143 million in 
chemicals, and $140 million in other industries. 
Both Promperu and Procolombia have offices in Washington D.C., and throughout the 
U.S., reflecting both Peru’s and Colombia’s emphasis on a smooth trade relationship 
with the U.S.  
 
2) Recent U.S. Trade Policy Trends  
 
In its economic relations with developing countries, the U.S. has increasingly turned 
to bilateral FTAs since NAFTA. For the majority of countries, the Trade and Tariff Act 





of 198433 required that U.S. trading partners take the initiative, followed by a USTR 
selection process.  This condition was eliminated for most Andean countries with the 
2002 act that provided President Bush with Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). 
TPA allows U.S. trade agreements to be negotiated under special Congressional 
authorization that helps bridge the difficulties inherent in the U.S. separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches. The Trade Act of 200234 granted the 
President the so-called “fast track” authority to negotiate trade deals with other countries 
and allows Congress to only vote up or down on the agreement, without the possibility of 
amendments; the idea is that this makes it easier for the U.S. President to negotiate 
treaties. The agreements that resulted from this include the U.S.–Chile FTA, the U.S.–
Singapore FTA, the Australia–U.S. FTA, the U.S.–Morocco FTA, the Dominican 
Republic–Central America FTA, the U.S.–Bahrain FTA, the U.S.–Oman FTA, and the 
Peru–U.S. FTA. Before 2002, the last time the President was granted this “fast-track 
authority” was in 1988 to negotiate the Uruguay Round Agreement of the WTO, with the 
Uruguay Round completed just as fast-track authority expired in 1994. The 2002 trade 
promotion authority finished for new agreements in July 2007, but it continued to apply 
to agreements already concluded until they were eventually passed into law in October 
2011 (Colombia-U.S. FTA, South Korea–U.S. FTA, and Panama–U.S. FTA). An 
important part of the delay was the action taken by Speaker Nancy Pelosi in April 10, 
                                                      
33 Requires the president to inform the House Ways and Means Committee and the 
Senate Finance Committee before opening free trade negotiations. Each committee then 
has 60 legislative days to permit or deny the negotiations.  




2008 to create a rule that suspended the requirement that the Colombia FTA had to be 
considered within 60 legislative days in the House – giving Congress the prerogative in 
scheduling a vote.  The rule passed by a vote of 224 to 195.35 
In 2012, the Obama administration started looking into renewing the fast-track authority, 
which was granted with bipartisan support in late June 2015. President Obama used this 
authority to pursue completion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)36 and Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreements with U.S. trade partners in Asia 
and Europe. Peru is a member of the TPP, while Colombia is still a hopeful applicant. 
Labor unions, environmental groups, Internet freedom advocates and the overwhelming 
majority of congressional Democrats battled Obama over concerns that TPP and other 
pending trade agreements would aggravate income inequality and allow corporations to 
bypass important rules and regulations. The fast-track powers last for six years after 
granted, making them now available to President Trump. President Obama, Republican 
leaders and corporate interests, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, pressed hard 
for the fast-track bill, arguing that it would lead to trade deals that boost economic 
growth, even while both political candidates – Clinton and Trump – pledged not to go 
ahead with the agreement (though presumably Clinton, had she won, would have 
                                                      
35 Pelosi Floor Statement on Colombia Free Trade Agreement, April 10, 2008 
http://www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/pelosi-floor-statement-colombia-free-trade-
agreement/ 
36 The TPP includes 12 countries—Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam—and, if 
approved, would replace FTAs with those countries, as well as any other standing trade 
and investment agreements. Colombia is not considered in the TPP initiative, because, in 
practice, they would need to become member of the APEC first. 
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renegotiated and then move forward).37 A final agreement on the TPP was reached in 
early October 2015, but President Trump immediately after taking office announced that 
the U.S. would withdraw from the agreement (which had not yet been submitted to 
Congress for ratification), calling it “a potential disaster for our country.” The remaining 
members of the TPP negotiated the agreement without the U.S. In April 2018, Trump 
briefly expressed some interest in re-entering the agreement, with the caveat of wanting 
new terms more favorable to the U.S. needed to be negotiated. Very soon, it became 
apparent that a renegotiation was not a possibility. Earlier, in March, President Trump 
ignited a “trade war” with China, as he pledged to levy tariffs on Chinese products 
(which began to take effect in July 2018), and on steel and aluminum from a range of 
global suppliers. In fact, the increased tariff was effective for all countries without a FTA, 
with temporary exemptions for EU countries, as well as Canada and Mexico (while the 
renegotiation on NAFTA continues), permanent exemptions for Australia, and special 
quota conditions for Argentina, South Korea and Brazil.38 Also, the 2015 TPA is time-
limited and was set to expire on July 1, 2018 but it was granted renewal through July 1, 
2021.  
                                                      
37 The Huffington Post, Jun 24 2015, Senate grants Obama Fast Track Authority after 
Contentious Battle, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/24/obama-trade-
win_n_7655224.html 
38 In June 1, 2018 the U.S. introduced import quotas for steel from Argentina, Brazil and 
South Korea to replace tariffs, as well as an import quota for aluminum from Argentina. 
On this date too, Australia was permanently exempted from the steel and aluminum 





Although it remains unclear how these measures will affect trade and investment 
relations with Colombia and Peru, the FTAs with those two countries are complete and 
being implemented.  
 
Box 4. Efforts Towards New TPA Legislation:  
In January 2014 Finance, Ways & Means congressional committee leaders (Baucus, 
Hatch and Cam) introduced legislation that would establish rules for trade negotiations 
and Congressional approval of trade pacts. Their aim was “to deliver trade agreements 
that boost U.S. exports and create American jobs.”39 Known as the Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014 (TPA-2014), this bill dealt with issues key to 
U.S. challenges in the international trade arena, such as: competition from state-owned 
enterprises; localization barriers to trade; and restrictions on cross-border data flows.  
TPA-2014 aimed to update labor and environment provisions to reflect recent trade 
agreements, as well as set out market access priorities for goods and services.  The bill 
also provided for increased consultation and reporting requirements and harder rules 
against agreements that permitted the continuation of barriers to U.S. agriculture.  
Finally, TPA-2014 proposed for the first time a specific guideline on currency 
manipulation. 
Over a year later, in April 2015, congressional committee leaders (Hatch, Wyden and 
Ryan for the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee) and 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreements introduced the Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA-2015), S.995, which 
aimed to increase transparency by “requiring that Congress have access to important 
information surrounding pending trade deals and that the public receive detailed updates 
and see the full details of trade agreements well before they are signed…[When these 
conditions are met, it] allows for trade deals to be submitted to Congress for an up-or-
down vote…[Also] the bill creates a new mechanism to withdraw TPA procedures and 











III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Implementation and their Impact 
The literature on the negotiation and implementation trade agreements spans 
disciplinary lines across economics and political science. Within political science, the 
studies on trade negotiation by John Odell are especially relevant for this dissertation are 
those. Odell (2009) argues that much of the research on trade negotiation has centered 
around the larger states (U.S., EU, China, India and Brazil), and has mostly disregarded 
the advances made by smaller states. In particular, the literature on negotiation has not 
thoroughly studied the strategies and advantages used by this group of small countries. 
This dissertation thus represents a contribution filling in this gap. 
The conclusions of this literature review are that many Latin American countries have 
moved forward in their path to trade liberalization since the 2000s. However, they have 
done so with different levels of success. Although some have had “lucky breaks” related 
to resource endowments and timing, most of that success has been linked to increasing 
levels of commitment to institutional change, transparency, cooperation with the private 
sector and the civil society, and good leadership. 
Odell proposes a menu of ideas and best practices rather than a report on tested 
hypotheses. He starts by explaining what he calls the “moves away from the table.” The 
first one is building institutional capacity, while the second is to improve the number and 
quality of possible outcomes (alternative scenarios) in order to increase the small 
country’s bargaining power (the less constricted they seem by the outcome desired by the 
big country, the more power the small country gains). Odell gives the example of the 
success of Mexico leaving oil contract commitments outside the reach of NAFTA. 
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Having these covered by NAFTA rules would have made it more cumbersome to buy 
futures. Also, before sitting down to these negotiations, Mexico put together contingency 
plans for a scenario where an oil crisis that would propel Mexico to sell its oil only to the 
U.S.41 In other words, Mexico wanted the U.S. to see they could sell their oil freely, 
regardless of the outcome of NAFTA in that area. Odell explores how coalitions, both 
with other states and with transnational corporations, provide smaller nations with 
leverage in negotiating with the larger countries. Among the other “moves away from the 
table” that can be made by smaller nations is to frame public opinion and offset 
unfavorable framing.  
In considering “moves at the table” made by developing countries, Odell distinguishes 
between distributive (that is, zero-sum - a win for one part would mean a loss for the 
other) and integrative (win-win) strategies, explaining that each is the end of a 
continuum, and most countries should realistically aim to achieve mixed strategy that is 
in between. He sees Mexico as having used such a mixed strategy during the NAFTA 
negotiations. According to Odell, “over the past two decades, middle-income developing 
countries, large and small, have become better prepared technically and better organized 
politically for trade negotiations than ever before. Despite the realities of power 
                                                      
41 John Odell (editor), Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and 
NAFTA. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. In his chapter in this volume, 
Antonio Ortiz Mena  examines how Mexico was able to avoid any significant 
concessions relating to energy during the NAFTA negotiations. Despite the relentless 
effort by US negotiators, Mexico was able to avoid foreign participation in the oil 
industry and energy supply commitments with the US by employing a sequentially mixed 
strategy and clever framing tactics. Despite power asymmetries, the US was unable to 
win desired concessions. In the end, it would appear that domestic politics worked 
against US negotiators as President Bush sought to finalize the agreement in advance of 
his re-election campaign. 
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inequality, some weaker players have used a shifting combination of astute moves away 
from the table and moves at the table.”42 Finally, he points out that small and middle 
sized countries should invest in training their negotiators in bargaining techniques, just as 
much as they are trained in economics and other subjects. 
In the economics literature, a range of mostly econometric studies seek to assess the 
effects of potential agreements. These analyses are typically commissioned at the 
preliminary and negotiating stages as part of the effort to understand the implications of 
what is being considered. These studies use simulations, scenario analysis, partial and 
general equilibrium models to attempt to calculate the effect on economic growth (% 
growth expected on GDP), exports growth, and even jobs expected to be gained or lost.  
Among this second category, Eduardo Moron  (2006) looks at Peru’s potential economic 
outcomes in the context of the U.S.-Peru FTA using statistical models, scenario analysis 
and simulations. He presents calculations for when the FTA was announced, when it 
came into force, 1 year later, 5,10 and 20 years later. Overall, Moron’s predicted 
outcomes are positive for Peru – he expects modest but positive (between 1 and 5% 
depending on the scenario) growth in GDP and exports. Another study on Peru, an effort 
of University researchers in conjunction with the Ministry of Trade and Tourism and the 
InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB),43 concludes that given that most of Peruvian 
export products were already enjoying very low or no tariffs, then the impact of the FTA 
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with the U.S. would be very small (as the general and partial equilibrium models included 
in the study suggest), unless there are substantial changes to non-tariff barriers to trade 
faced by Peru, and there is a real effort to diversify and take advantage of the additional 
export options opened by the FTA. The same goes for anticipated changes in FDI and 
efforts to attract new investments. Regarding imports, the report indicates that the ideal 
from the point of view of Peruvian firms would be that the entrance of new imports 
would be slow and accompanied by policy efforts to support those who would suffer in 
the process. 
In the case of Colombia, a team of Colombia’s Central Bank44 evaluates the expected 
effects of the U.S.-Colombia FTA on exports of goods for the period 2007-2010 using a 
multisectoral general equilibrium model, and on services and FDI using projection 
methods. The study presents positive and promising projections, and implies that these 
numbers might be modest because they do not include the possible entrance in new 
economic activities allowed by the agreement. Toro also summarizes the results of other 
partial efforts done in this regard,45 and reports that additional GNP growth is calculated 
to be between 1 and 4%, and all other authors anticipate an slight trade deficit with the 
U.S., even if the overall value of trade increases. 
There are also studies from those agencies involved in the negotiation and 
implementation process that intend both to document the progression of events (including 
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CON ESTADOS UNIDOS (TLC) EN LA BALANZA DE PAGOS HASTA 2010, Banco 
de la Republica de Colombia, 2006 http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borra362.pdf 
45 DNP, “Efectos de un acuerdo bilateral de comercio con EEUU” Dirección de Estudios 




background and relevant data), and to present policy expectations and recommendations. 
In the case of Colombia, one study performed by the Ministry of Commerce46 explains 
how the negotiations were organized from the point of view of the Colombian 
government. This study details the channels between official organisms and industry 
groups, Congress, and others. It also discusses the competences of different negotiation 
“tables,” as well as the negotiation scheduled up to date. Finally, the report relates main 
interests for each big subject area, and details the government’s efforts to undertake this 
mission with the input of the civil society and with full transparency. 
From the U.S. perspective, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) produces 
comprehensive reports on the FTAs negotiated between the U.S. and other countries. The 
reports on the FTAs with Colombia and Peru have been already mentioned elsewhere in 
this dissertation and it is important to notice that in these cases, at least the initial reports, 
look mostly at political and socioeconomic conditions, using an international security 
perspective (aid packages, border issues, counternarcotic efforts, etc.). A complete and 
succinct report of this kind, this time on the CAFTA-DR, was produced in 2012 by J. F. 
Hornbeck.47 The main policy idea reinforced throughout this report is the correlation 
between growth and economic stability (and the policies that promote it), private 
investment in production, public investment in education, infrastructure, logistics, and 
                                                      
46 La Negociación del TLC de Colombia con Los Estados Unidos, Equipo Económico, 
Ministerio de Comercio, Turismo e Inversión & Comfecamaras, 2006 
http://www.tlc.gov.co/loader.php?lServicio=Documentos&lFuncion=verPdf&id=60490&
name=LA_NEGOCIACION.pdf&prefijo=file 
47 J. F. Hornbeck, The Dominican Republic-Central America United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA DR): Developments in Trade and Investment, Congressional 
Research Service, R42468, April 23, 2012 www.crs.gov  
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good governance in general. Hornbeck points out how worsening security and 
governance problems have make it difficult for some countries within CAFTA-DR to 
benefit from the agreements. 
Hornbeck also makes reference to value-added supply chain models, explaining how “the 
economic rationale rests on preferential access for agricultural and manufactured goods 
produced in the region. By removing regional barriers to trade, CAFTA-DR encouraged 
the development of specialized co-production in assembly manufacturing …based on 
comparative advantage and economies of scale.”48 The author also makes emphasis on 
productivity improvement though “an important public sector role in creating a solid 
business environment. Failure to do so may be equivalent to restricting many of the 
CAFTA-DR countries to a diminished development model of trade in which they are 
locked into low-level manufacturing and low-value agricultural production, competing 
with the poorest countries of the world.”49 He then excludes Costa Rica from this 
generalization. In addition to the analysis of growth rates, exports, and FDI, the report 
includes the following microeconomic indicators included for evaluation: Logistics 
Performance Index (LPI) Ranking from World Bank; Economic Freedom (The Heritage 
Foundation) and Corruption Perceptions (Transparency International); and Doing 
Business survey from the World Bank. 
IADB has produced another series of studies documenting the progression of events and 
presenting policy expectations and recommendations. Starting with a study on CAFTA, 
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49 Ibid., p.16 
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Anabel González produced a report just months after CAFTA was ratified.50 A good 
portion of the text is devoted to explaining the countless instances where the agreement 
was reviewed by legislators, and the creation of the initial legislation required to comply 
with the commitments included in the agreement. It ends with a chapter on lessons 
learned for implementation; a focus in this section is on the willingness of policymakers 
to invest political capital in seeing the agreement through. For Costa Rica this meant the 
full commitment of President Arias, which contrasted with the lack of direction exhibit 
by his predecessor. Another lesson is the importance of constant consultations with the 
legislative and the private sector. Gonzalez also highlights the role of time and timing: as 
much as drafting and passing laws takes time, it is vital not to let the momentum 
diminish. Additionally, cooperation with and assistance by the partner country, in this 
case the U.S., is fundamental during the implementation process; therefore, the channels 
of communication between the FTA partners must be kept open and nourished. The 
author also argues countries heading in this process must build institutional capacity and 
invest in better infrastructure ahead of time. These conclusions are in line with those in 
this dissertation. 
A second IADB reports by Luis Garcia,51 was also produced within a year after the U.S.-
Peru FTA was ratified. Therefore, most of the text is again dedicated to detailing 
                                                      
50 Gonzales, Anabel, La Implementación de Acuerdos Comerciales Preferenciales en 
América Latina: La Experiencia de Implementación del CAFTARD en Costa Rica, 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Vicepresidencia de Sectores y Conocimiento, Sector 
de Integración y Comercio DOCUMENTO DE POLÍTICAS #BID-DP-104 Diciembre 
2009 https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/1276  
51 García, Luis Alonso, Implementación de acuerdos comerciales preferenciales en 
América Latina La experiencia peruana en su TLC con Estados Unidos, Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo, Sector de Integración y Comercio DOCUMENTO DE 
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instances in which legislators reviewed the agreement, and to the explanation of the 
initial legislation required to fulfill with the commitments included in the agreement. In 
the case of Peru, the legislature granted the executive special powers to smoothly move 
the legislation forward. This report also closes with a chapter on lessons learned for 
implementation. Once more the importance of building institutional capacity and the 
cooperation with different public and private organisms (which Garcia calls “the 
multisectoral group”) is once more highlighted. Additionally, the report advises that the 
process of implementation must be structured and planned when the negotiation is in the 
finishing stages. Garcia also makes some closing remarks about clearly configuring the 
FTAs administration as an important next step. Finally, he observes that both the 
implementation and administration of the agreement requires cooperation with U.S. 
agencies.  
An IADB report on Chile52 in this same series was produced after those for CAFTA and 
Peru and naturally emphasizes in the differences in the Chilean experience compared to 
the other two FTAs. Given that a longer time has elapsed since the ratification of this 
FTA, Carlos Furche makes a greater emphasis on the administration of the agreement, 
and the application and enforcement of the related legislation. The author highlights the 
work of a permanent bilateral commission and nine permanent working groups or 
committees; he points out that the creation and continuity of these institutional instance 
                                                      
POLÍTICAS # IDB-PB-108 Abril 2010 
https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/1266  
52 Furche, Carlos, Experiencia de Chile en la implementación y administración de 
acuerdos comerciales Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Sector de Integración y 
Comercio RESUMEN DE POLÍTICAS # BID-PB-131 September 2011  
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has been instrumental for the success of the FTA. Regarding the lessons learned from 
implementation, Furche argues that the modernization of Chilean institutions cannot be 
simply attributed to the FTA. This modernization was part of a broader process of 
macroeconomic, that included  a conscious investment in human resources; the 
accountability required by the FTA helped this modernization process flourish, making 
new institutions perform at the highest level. In Chile, there has also been extensive 
cooperation between the private and public sector throughout the negotiation, 
implementation and administration stages. Finally, the author emphasizes the ability of 
the governments and private sector to take advantage of the opportunities provided the 
agreements, by creating, promoting and enlarging exports markets and new investments, 
should be kept in mind constantly during the administration stage. Having succeed in 
reaching commercial agreements with its main commercial partners,  Furche points out 
that the Chilean efforts regarding trade policy should be directed toward regionalization 
efforts in Latin America and the Pacific. 
A final report of this series combines the findings of the Chilean, CAFTA (particularly 
Costa Rica and El Salvador) and Peruvian reports.53 Juan Zuñiga and Brian Staples 
(2011) start by comparing the four countries by their Customs administration and 
legislation. Portions of this study are already covered in the individual country reports. 
However, the parts regarding El Salvador are new to this text, as is the comparison 
among countries. Starting with the adaptation of the Customs system, Zuniga and Staples 
                                                      
53 Zuñiga, Juan Luis and Brian Staples, La implementación de acuerdos comerciales 
preferenciales en América Latina: las experiencias de CH, CR, ES, PE en la 
implementación de las disposiciones sobre acceso a mercados en el marco de los tratados 
de libre comercio con Estados Unidos, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Sector de 
Integración y Comercio DOCUMENTO DE POLÍTICAS # IDB-PB-162 September 2011 
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state that the four countries started their customs’ modernization before the FTAs with 
the U.S. came into force, however, for Peru and El Salvador, however, the agreements 
gave a much-needed push to those efforts. Overall, Chile is the best adapted to the global 
customs standards, but all four countries still have ways to go. The authors explain how 
in CAFTA the process of implementation has been left to each particular country without 
any regard to uniformity or harmonization. Also, in the cases of Costa Rica and El 
Salvador the investment in human capital, through training for example, has been 
insufficient, even with the financial and technical assistance provided by international 
organisms and the U.S. Therefore, Zuniga and Staples propose there should be a regional 
effort that provides this training for all the countries with FTAs with the U.S. 
Occasionally academics perform these policy studies. Such is the case of Gonzalo Cea 
Novoa’s analysis on the Chilean experience,54 where he evaluates the impact of the 
Chilean FTAs with several countries in the Chilean manufacturing sector, analyzing the 
period between 1991 and 2011. Novoa does so by looking at average growth rates on 
manufacturing exports, before and after the FTAs came into effect. This study also 
performs an econometric regression. The author acknowledges the difficulties in isolating 
the effects of the agreements, and describes very modest positive outcomes. 
Finally, once there has been some time to evaluate some of the results, there are works 
that analyze the agreements’ performance. One of these analyses was curiously 
outsourced by the Dominican Republic government to evaluate the results of CAFTA ten 
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years after the agreement was signed.55 This study highlights how textiles lost its leading 
position in the exports basket to the U.S., as illustrated by the fact that the export value of 
textiles was about the same in 2005 and 2014. The reports shows that CAFTA has helped 
with diversification towards agricultural products, agroindustry, and other industrial 
products, and away from textiles. Of all the CAFTA-DR countries, only the Dominican 
Republic (DR) experienced negative average annual export growth during the 2005-2013 
period. The DR has also improved its rank in published competitiveness scores 
(particularly the WB, Doing Business Survey). There has also been an increase of trade 
relations with Haiti, which is taking advantage of its agreement with the DR to reach the 
U.S. market. Finally, there is some evidence of increased FDI, although not necessarily 
coming from the U.S. The report makes a series of policy recommendations, including: 
performing an agricultural census; diversification and assistance programs to farmers; 
increasing economies of scale; taking better advantage of subsidy mechanisms (not 
overruled by CAFTA, but still questionable under WTO rules); strengthening trade 
defense mechanisms (accepted by the WTO, such as compensation mechanisms, and 
anti-dumping rules); promoting linkages between free trade zones and service and 
national industries; strengthening production linkages with Haiti. 
Another study by the World Bank’s Costa Rican office presents a balance five years after 
CAFTA was signed.56 This report summarizes the negotiation process step-by-step, from 
                                                      
55 Evaluación del Desempeño Comercial y Retos Futuros en el DR-CAFTA a los 10 años 
de su Firma, Ministro de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo, Dominican Republic, 
Diciembre 2015 
http://www.tlc.estadonacion.or.cr/documentos/pdfs/54MIDEPLAN2015.pdf (DASA 
consulting produced a 130-page report). 
56 González, A. (2006). El proceso de negociación de un tratado de libre comercio con 
Estados Unidos: la experiencia del tratado de libre comercio entre Centroamérica, 
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the moment it was first discussed publicly to its ratification. It details the preliminary 
seminaries, the formal rounds of negotiation, the closing, and the consecutive evaluations 
by the legislatives for ratification. The description is very candid about the difficulties 
these Central American countries experienced in an asymmetric negotiation with the U.S. 
Also, given that this was not a bilateral negotiation strictly speaking, this study also 
explains the additional layer of complexity resulting from the necessary coordination 
between these Central American governments; early on the role of coordination and 
processing of documents was given to Costa Rica. The author closes with a series of  
practical lessons for future negotiations of trade agreements with the U.S., which from 
big-picture items to more mundane matters, such as studying previous FTAs, or 
establishing a physical presence in Washington D.C. exclusively dedicated to assist the 
negotiations. 
Other analyses of FTAs can be found in compendiums in which several authors offer 
their views and expertise on different aspects of trade agreements, including labor and 
poverty effects, and evaluations of their impact on specific economic sectors. This is the 
case of the volume edited by Moron and Perales (2010). This compilation of chapters by 
several authors includes a chapter on CAFTA, and chapters authored by Peru’s leading 
negotiators. These texts are compiled from a conference celebrated in Lima in August 
2008.  Worth highlighting are Chapter 557 by Carol Wise y Cintia Quilico and Chapter 6 
                                                      
Estados Unidos y República Dominicana. BID-INTAL, Washington, DC. 
https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/2313 
57  Titled “¿Coalición de voluntades? el impulso estadounidense a los acuerdos de 
comercio bilaterales con América Latina en la década de 2000”, Wise and Quilico are 
researchers from the University of Southern California 
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on the Political viability and popular appeal of FTAs in Latin America by Andy Baker.58 
The first of these chapters explains the theory supporting the U.S. change from 
multilateralism to bilateralism, touching on the theory of competitive liberalization, but 
primarily criticizing the lack of consistency among those processes. Baker on his part, 
presents an interesting political psychology perspective regarding the changing 
perception of the general public regarding FTAs. In short, when the general public 
regards itself as a consumer they are more likely to agree with liberalization. 
There are also volumes that examine the countries’ overall liberalization agenda and 
progress over a longer period of time, going beyond the scope of a particular agreement, 
but often putting those agreements in a greater policy context. In the case of Colombia, 
the OECD published a project of this kind in 2014.59 In this comprehensive study 
regarding all aspects of Colombia’s market openness since the 1990s, the FTAs with the 
U.S. and the European Union are mentioned in the context of the overall frame of trade 
reform. Therefore it does not dedicate substantial space to isolating the FTAS effects. 
This report evaluates and gives the recommendations within the context of the 
requirements of the OECD. This compendium is a valuable source for detailed and 
organized information regarding sequences of laws and new entities and processes.  
Another one of these volumes, this time for Mexico and edited by Beatriz Leycegui 
Gardoqui (2012), includes not only NAFTA issues, but trade agreements and policy 
                                                      
58 Department of Political Science in the University of Colorado in Baker 
59 OECD, Market Openness Review of Colombia, Trade and Agriculture Directorate 





strategies with other countries. Among the contributors are many high officials and well 
known academics. Chapter 3 is devoted to the analysis of the relationship with the U.S. 
and NAFTA. It presents Laycegui’s perspective followed by that of others such as Susan 
Schwab and Francisco Sanchez, former U.S. officials. This chapter presents a positive 
view of NAFTA and emphasizes the TPP as the next step. 
Finally, there is also an extensive literature studying all aspects of NAFTA, both in 
English and Spanish. One of the most comprehensive evaluations is Hufbauer and 
Schott’s “NAFTA Revisited”, published by the Institute for International Economics, and 
reviewed in a lengthier way in Appendix 2 of this dissertation. Other NAFTA studies 
include Lederman, Maloney, and Serven (2003) and López-Córdova (2001),  both on 
lessons learned from the Mexican experience, and on a more critical note Weisbrot et al 
(2017), which compares the performance of the Mexican economy with that of the rest of 
the region since NAFTA, based on the available economic and social indicators, and with 
its own past economic performance.  
B. Export Diversification and its effects on Economic Growth 
Export diversification is a policy strategy that aims to stabilize export earnings in the 
face of commodity-specific shocks, which might be a particularly useful alternative in 
developing countries where the share of commodities in its export basket is especially 
large. Therefore, export instability is often a precursor to export diversification, because 
policymakers are aware that commodity prices are volatile, discouraging long-term 
investments and increasing macroeconomic uncertainty. Export diversification may 




Also, according to conventional models of economic development, to achieve 
sustainable growth, countries should diversify from primary exports into manufactured 
exports (Chenery, 1979; Syrquin, 1989). However, starting in the 2000s the “resource 
curse” view has been reevaluated. Bonaglia and Fukasaku (2003) argue that resource-
rich, low-income countries should diversify into resource-based manufacturing or 
processing of primary commodities instead of following the conventional path of low-
skill manufacturing. According to their framework, for example, both mining and forestry 
are now knowledge-intense sectors with high technological content and upstream-
downstream branches. Also, fresh food production has become both a vertically (food 
processing) and horizontally diversified field (for example, stepping laterally into the cut 
flowers and specialty fresh vegetables markets). Therefore, the distinction between 
vertical and horizontal diversification should be further clarified. Vertical diversification 
is related to the move between different categories of goods (such as primary 
commodities to manufactures) through value added mechanisms. Horizontal 
diversification implies expanding the export basket, by “diversifying into goods within 
the same broad category of goods” (Agosin 2006, p. 7). The latter would be the case of 
shifting, for example, from coffee for the mass market to gourmet coffee. 
Additionally, export diversification could bring about knowledge spillovers from new 
production processes, management practices, or marketing techniques, perhaps even 
reaching other industries (Amin Gutierrez de Pineres and Ferrantino, 2000). Likewise, 
Van den Berg and Lewer (2007) argue that trade and accompanying activities such as 
international marketing, market research, product planning, and international travel help 
knowledge and technology transfers. A similar argument is that international trade can 
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accelerate the economic growth of small economies by facilitating the movement of 
technology, frequently embodied in products. The logic behind this argument is that it is 
easier to adopt existing technologies than to create new ones.  
While theory is reasonably clear on the relationship between trade and growth, 
empirical measurement and confirmation is more difficult. Because of possible 
endogeneity between trade and economic growth, the suitability of many methodologies 
to control for endogeneity and its substantial impact on the estimated relationship 
between trade and economic growth has been debated. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) and 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) argue that the effects of trade policy on growth 
appear to be intertwined with the effects of other policies usually implemented 
simultaneously finding that institutional endowments also determine this process. 
Nevertheless, a variety of recent papers tend to support a considerable role for trade in 
economic growth, such as Dollar and Kraay (2004), Loayza and Fajnzylber (2005), de la 
Torre et al (2015). 
Alternatively, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2006), 
and Hausmann and Klinger (2006) analyze the benefits of export diversification and 
exports in general for economic growth, both empirically and theoretically, arguing that 
economic growth is not driven by comparative advantage but by investment 
diversification into new activities. Entrepreneurial cost-discovery dynamics are key to 
this process. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) show how entrepreneurs evaluate uncertain 
costs while producing new goods: success will result in the socialization of such goods, 
while losses from failure are private. In this context, there is an important role for public 
agencies in contributing to industrial growth and structural transformation by promoting 
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entrepreneurship and offering incentives for business owners to engage in a new range of 
activities. 
C. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
As mentioned earlier in this study, in the case of Peru and Colombia, given that they 
already had access to the U.S. markets through a variety of trade preferences (even if not 
permanent), one area of potential benefits from and FTA was improving their position as 
recipients of FDI – investment as much as trade (and perhaps more) was seen as the 
incremental benefit for the two nations. The key determinants of FDI location in the 
developing world, as analyzed by many researchers, include: 
• Market size and quality: usually measured in quantitative studies through 
Gross Domestic Product –GDP (total, growth rate or per capita) and/or 
population  
• Factor endowments and prices: including natural resources and labor 
characteristics (wages, and availability of a variety of unskilled and skilled 
workers) 
• Macroeconomic stability: in particular, indicators associated with public debt, 
exchange rates, and inflation which indicate macro stability (or the lack of it) 
• Political stability: Including democratic transitions, peaceful elections and 
power transitions, effective checks-and-balances 
• Policy environment: consisting of trade regimes (tariffs and export-
orientation) and investment policies (tax rates, restrictions on capital 
repatriation, limitations on foreign participation in particular sectors), 
privatization strategies, and the general business operating environment 
• Geographical (distance from major markets) and infrastructural 
(transportation and communications) determinants. 
Increased FDI flows are usually seen as having the potential to increase economic 
growth, and through increased growth to improve on other dimensions of well-being.  
The microeconomic understanding of the effects of FDI includes the analysis of positive 
spillovers. The general argument is that the foreign investment presence creates forward 
and backward linkages to the domestic economy through supplier networks, and human 
and technological capital transfer through demonstration effects. 
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Moran (2006) argues that the so-called “Washington Consensus” promise that FDI is 
“good” in general for developing countries must be qualified after decades of research. 
He divides FDI into two categories: investment in manufacturing and assembly, and 
investment in natural resources and infrastructure. Within the first group:  
Foreign-owned plants that are built to penetrate international markets […] operate 
with the most advanced technologies and embody the most sophisticated quality 
control procedures. They pay wages higher than their local counterparts do, and 
[…] seek to attract and keep skilled workers by offering superior working 
conditions. They generate backward linkages to local firms if the host country 
business climate and worker training institutions are conducive to the emergence 
of suppliers. Foreign-owned plants that are built to serve protected host country 
markets, in contrast, consistently fail to live up to the infant-industry goal of 
creating internationally competitive operations. (p.2) 
FDI in infrastructure and natural resources is more susceptible to be undermined by 
corruption, and to face higher risk premiums from legal concerns such as breach-of-
contract fears. Such factors would dilute the benefits of investment liberalization. 
In line with this notion, Shatz (2001) argued that while levels of FDI towards Andean 
countries had been high in the 1990s, the composition of the activities of the foreign 
investment firms was heavily biased towards supplying the local market; he predicted 
that market size would become a major constraint for new manufacturing FDI. He also 
pointed out how infrastructure-oriented FDI, resulting mostly from privatizations, was a 
large contributor during this period. He identified trade agreements with developed 
countries as key to expand market size.  
 
D. Effect of BITs and FTA Investment Chapters on FDI 
FDI is generally seen as having a positive effect for economic development, as 
outlined just above, and the FTAs considered here include measures under their 
investment chapters to attract more FDI and to make this investment effective in 
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contributing to growth. BITs are the most common form of international investment 
agreements (IIAs).60 and the investment chapters in FTAs function in practice as BITs, 
replacing any existing BIT among the signing countries. BITs establish the terms and 
conditions for private investment by nationals and companies of one state in another 
state.61 BITs put in place actionable standards of conduct that apply to governments in 
their treatment of investors from other countries, including: fair and equitable treatment 
(usually national treatment or most favored nation treatment); protection from 
expropriation; and free transfer of means (refers to the foreign investors right to freely 
transfer resources associated to the investment into and out of the host country) and full 
protection and security (guarantees that the host country does everything within its power 
to preserve the investment’s physical and legal security). 
A distinctive feature of many BITs is that they allow for an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism, providing investors recourse to international arbitration (often through the 
ICSID - International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes), rather than 
pursuing legal action against the host country in its own courts. The importance of these 
mechanisms is explained in more detailed in the next section. 
                                                      
60 According to the UNCTAD, IIAs are divided into two types: (1) bilateral investment 
treaties and (2) Other IIAs. The great majority of IIAs are BITs (Total BITs: 2923; Total 
in force: 2223 -- Total Other IIAs: 345; Total in force: 275). 
61 The first generation of these treaties were Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
Treaties (FCNs), which required the host state to treat foreign investments on the same 
level as investments from any other state, including in some instances treatment that was 
as favorable as the host nation treated its own investments. FCNs also established the 
terms of trade and shipping between the parties, and the rights of foreigners to conduct 
business and own property in the host state. The second generation of these treaties are 




Additionally, one of the key issues when considering the effects of BITs on FDI is that in 
many cases the required insurance for private investments into developing states has 
become conditional on the presence of an investment treaty covering that investment. 
Finally, BITs can have positive spill-over effects, because the signing of BITs provides a 
signal to potential investors of the developing country’s determination for protecting 
foreign investment.  
1) General Background 
In the 1980s, tight budgets, the debt crisis, and an overall decreased interest in 
providing traditional development aid led to a decline in official development assistance 
from the developed world (Newmayer, 2005, p.1568). Since then, private international 
flows of financial resources, mainly in the form of FDI, have become increasingly 
important to developing countries as a strategy to achieve higher economic growth. The 
increased competition among developing countries for FDI from developed countries 
helps to explain the increased number of BITs. However, from one point of view, it is not 
necessarily the case that the growing number of investment treaties constitutes the best 
joint strategy for these countries. Although collectively it could be that each country 
would be better off not signing any BIT and retaining as much control over their assets as 
possible by negotiating an investment agreement in a multilateral forum that would 
capture their combined bargain power, individual countries benefit from being able to 
deliver credible commitments to investors.  Additionally, when a less developed 
country’s neighbor or economic competitor signs such an agreement, they might well feel 
pressure to sign one as well to remain competitive (thus providing a classic example of 
the prisoner’s dilemma - Newmayer, 2005, p.1570). In a similar fashion, regarding the 
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idea that signing BITs can be explained as a prisoner’s dilemma situation, Sasse (2011) 
describes how a treaty will still be a Pareto-improvement for the two treaty partners but 
may result in a Pareto-inferior situation for developing countries as a group. 
In addition, it is important to note that it was developing countries that vetoed the 
“multilateral agreement on investment” at the end of the 1990s. In particular, between 
1995 and 1997 there was an attempt to negotiate such agreement among the OECD 
countries, and there was a debate about whether this discussion should be part of the 
issues introduced to the WTO agenda at the December 1996 Ministerial Conference in 
Singapore (known as the Singapore issues). Then again, at the WTO Ministerial in 
Cancun in September 2003, the wealthier WTO members tried to introduce a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) through the "Singapore" issues. These efforts once 
again failed, as a group of more than twenty developing countries united to oppose it.62 
As Shawn Donnelly explains, “most OECD member nations seem, explicitly or 
implicitly, to have accepted the reality that, while multilateralism may be the optimal 
path, in the investment policy area, it is not, at least for now, a practical way forward.”63 
                                                      
62 Khor, Martin, The "Singapore Issues" in the WTO: Implications and Recent 
Developments, Third World Network, November 1, 2004 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01284 
Also: Bhagirath Lal Das, A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Investment Treaty in WTO, 
July 2003 https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/43724.html 
63 Shawn Donnelly, “Let’s get realistic about a multilateral investment agreement”, 
OECD Insights, February 2016 http://oecdinsights.org/2016/02/08/lets-get-realistic-
about-a-multilateral-investment-agreement/ Donnelly is a retired U.S. diplomat and trade 




As the number of investment agreements grows, so does the opportunity to 
evaluate their motivation and effects. The rest of this section reviews studies on the 
impacts of bilateral investment agreements. Since the mid-1990s the number of BITs has 
increased tremendously, as well as their level of sophistication. In the 80s and 90s the 
risk of expropriation seemed to be the main if not the only concern, and most of the 
studies that look at this earlier period do not address issues such as intellectual property 
rights, or environmental or labor standards. One of those studies, by Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2004), uses the knowledge capital model of multinationals to test the 
hypothesis that when investment treaties are implemented, they result in a significant 
positive effect on outward FDI. They find the expected positive result, for a sample of 
over 4,000 pairs of OECD and non-OECD countries, with BITs signed from 1982 to 
1997. Egger and Pfaffermayr include four types of variables to explain the stock of 
outward FDI at the bilateral level, namely, country size (GDP), factor endowments (ratio 
of unskilled to skilled labor), trade and FDI frictions (distinguishing between the 
anticipation effect and the ratification effect), and interaction terms. This 2004 study also 
finds that to some extent even just signing a treaty may have positive effects.  
Hallward-Driemeier (2003) finds that the existence of a BIT between two 
countries does not increase the flow of FDI from the developed to the developing 
signatory country. She looks at bilateral country data from 1980 to 2000 and finds that 
market size and macroeconomic stability are the key drivers of foreign investment. 
Interacting the BIT variable with various measures of institutional quality, she finds a 
positive coefficient of the interaction term that is often statistically significant in 
explaining the increased FDI flows from the developed to the developing country. 
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Therefore, her study stresses that BITs are no substitute for domestic institutions and that 
to the extent that they work to increase investment at all in developing countries, they act 
as a complement to the existence of strong institutions. 
Looking at the period 1970 to 2000, and covering up to 122 countries, Buthe and 
Miller (2008) find a positive correlation between BITs and subsequent FDI. Evaluating a 
similar time spam and number of countries, Neumayer and Spess (2005) also provide 
quantitative evidence that a higher number of BITs raises the FDI that flows to a 
developing country. They also evaluate if the signature of BITs has indeed a signaling 
effect, finding positive and significant results, and providing further evidence that BITs 
are likely to fulfill the dual function of both signaling and commitment. On their part, 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that the total number of BITs by a country has no 
independent significant impact on investment flows into the country, except when such 
countries are seen to be politically risky. In addition, they look at flows of FDI from the 
U.S. and BITs with the U.S., but fail to find any statistically significant effect. On the 
contrary, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) perform a fixed-effects estimation of the bilateral 
flow of FDI from the U.S. to 31 developing countries from 1991 to 2000, which finds 
that a U.S. BIT is significantly correlated with an increase in U.S. FDI. 
Desbordes and Vicard (2009) show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT 
crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it 
increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly 
countries. They also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are 
complementary. They look at two kinds of risks: systemic domestic risk, which is 
common to all investors, related to the quality of domestic institutions; and an 
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idiosyncratic risk specific to each pair of home and host countries, resulting from 
interstate political relations.  
Some studies’ conclusions are far less promising regarding the positive impact of 
investment agreements on FDI. In a cross-country comparison of FDI determinants, 
performed by UNCTAD (Sachs & Sauvant, Ch. 12, 2009) the overall conclusion is that 
BITs appear to play a minor and secondary role in influencing FDI flows. Also, in a 
replication of Newmayer and Spass study, Yacke (2007) finds that, after a series of 
relatively small methodological changes and a different model specification, the 
seemingly positive effect of BITs on FDI largely falls from statistical significance. In a 
similar way, looking at correlation vs. causation, Aisbett (2007) finds that the initially 
strong correlation between BITs and investment flows is not robust controlling for 
selection into BIT participation. These results highlight the importance of accounting for 
the endogeneity of adoption when assessing the benefits of investment liberalization 
policies. 
In a seeming twist, Swenson (Sachs & Sauvant, Ch. 16, 2009) examines the 
correlation between previous foreign investment and the signing of BITs to explore 
whether there is any evidence that the signing of BITs is investor-driven. She points out 
that although treaties are viewed as forward-looking tools signed to boost future 
investments, treaty signing also has a backward-looking element in the sense that 
established investors may be the ones who push for an investment agreement as a way to 
protect their current investments and set the stage for future expansion. In particular, 
countries that had already received larger stocks of foreign investment are more likely to 
sign BITs than countries that had been less successful in attracting foreign investment. 
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Furthermore, according to her results, BIT signing did help developing countries attract a 
larger volume of foreign investment. 
Yet other authors have indicated that different kinds of investment agreements 
should be evaluated differently, according to their specific contents and not as “black 
boxes.” Berger, Busse, Nunnenkamp, and Roy (2013) analyze how liberal investment 
admission -- one that follows most favored nation clauses and local treatment -- has 
different impacts when compared to the admission rules provided by agreements with 
more restrictive levels of investment openness, and also look into the impact of diverse 
dispute settlement mechanisms in both regional trade agreements (RTAs) and BITs, on 
bilateral FDI flows between 1978 and 2004. They find that FDI responds positively to 
RTAs only when they include most favored nation and local treatment rules (which the 
authors call “liberal admission”). Dispute settlement provisions are found to be much less 
important. In contrast, the implementation of any kind of BIT seems to be favorably 
perceived by investors. They recognize several institutional considerations that are 
especially important: first, whether foreign investors can sue host country governments 
before a transnational tribunal (for example, the majority of earlier BITs do not allow for 
strong investor-state dispute settlement-ISDS, before they became commonplace in the 
late 1980s and in the 1990s64); and second, since NAFTA, many RTAs contain 
investment provisions pre-establishing national treatment (NT), while liberal 
commitments of that level continue to be the exception in BITs. While both features have 
become standard in investment agreements with the U.S. and Canada, and among Latin 
                                                      
64 Many BITs signed in the late 1970s and early 1980s were between Developed and 
developing countries, or among developed countries. Only since the late 1990s the 
number of BITs among developing countries increased significantly.  
61 
 
American countries, this is not the case for agreements involving the European Union. 
This study by Berger et al. is based on a study by Yackee (2009). Yackee differentiates 
between three types of ISDS provisions (comprehensive, partial and promissory). Berger 
et al. extend this classification to RTAs. Additionally, they believe that “it is the 
[investment] provisions to which contracting parties bind themselves what matters most, 
not the type of agreement in which they are embedded.” (p.7) In this way, Berger et al. 
differentiate their study from those who have discriminated between BITs and investment 
chapters in bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
 
2) Latin America 
Historically, Latin American countries did not adhere to international mechanisms 
to resolve disputes with foreign investors. They followed what is known as the Calvo 
Doctrine, which forces foreign investors to rely on local courts in the event of a dispute.65  
During the 1990s, the attitude toward investment arbitration in the region began to 
change, with the process speeding up especially in the last decade. Nevertheless, this 
process has been uneven. On one side of the spectrum, while these agreements usually 
call for the ratification of the ICSID Convention, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela filed 
notices of renunciation in 2007, 2009 and 2012 respectively. On the other, the FTAs of 
                                                      
65 Definition of CALVO DOCTRINE (Black's Law Dictionary): The Calvo Doctrine is a 
foreign policy doctrine which holds that jurisdiction in international investment disputes 
lies with the country in which the investment is located. The Calvo Doctrine thus 
proposed to prohibit diplomatic protection or (armed) intervention before local resources 
were exhausted. An investor, under this doctrine, has no recourse but to use the local 
courts, rather than those of their home country. As a policy prescription, Calvo Doctrine 
is an expression a legal nationalism. The principle, named after Carlos Calvo, an 




the U.S. with Colombia and Peru include arbitration within the investment chapters 
(though the Trump administration has expressed qualms about this issue in its 
negotiations over revisions to NAFTA). 
A study by Gallagher and Birch (2006) on data from 1980 to 2003 finds that for the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, market size, trade orientation, and 
macroeconomic stability are the most important determinants of FDI. While the total 
number of BITs that a country has signed does have an independent and positive effect 
on FDI flows, having a BIT with the U.S. does not independently attract U.S. 
investments. Interestingly, Gallagher and Birch argue that econometric analysis is limited 
in its ability to capture the relative importance of factors such as political stability and the 
policy environment. Many of the more qualitative empirical studies where researchers 
interviewed firm representatives that make actual decisions about firm location found 
such factors to be very relevant. This suggests a qualitative study that examines the 
specific importance of an investment agreement would complement the quantitative 
analysis presented by their study – highlighting a key contribution of this dissertation.  
Box 5. The role of Conflict Resolution and Peace Agreements: 
Both the Colombian and Peruvian governments have undergone peace processes with 
their corresponding guerrilla opponents, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia – Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) and the Shining Path (Sendero 
Luminoso). Peace in Peru was reached about two decades ago. Foreign investment in 
Peru has grown exponentially since the defeat of the Shining Path guerrilla insurgency. 
In 1992, when Shining Path’s leader Abimael Guzman was captured along with other 
leaders, net investment cash flows to Peru were negative. By 2012, investment inflows 
had grown to almost $12 billion.66 Nevertheless, the defeat67 of the guerrillas in Peru did 
                                                      
66 De la Pedraja, 2016 
67 It has been argued that the Shining Path was never totally defeated, just weakened. 
There have been attacks linked to remaining the cells of this group, as recent as the last 
two years. However, its surviving members are calculated to be no more than a couple 
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not take place in a vacuum. It concurred with a major set of economic reforms was 
introduced in November 1991 and approved by the congress in the first four months of 
1992.   Among the most important were measures promoting foreign investment.  
Controls on foreign investment, including restrictions on profit remittances, were ended 
and equal treatment for foreign investors was guaranteed.   Also, financial-sector reform 
was introduced. 
In the case of Colombia, the government and the FARC reached a ceasefire agreement in 
June 23, 2016. The actual peace agreement was signed two months later, only to be 
disqualified by a “no” vote when submitted to popular vote in October 2. As the 
government continued its campaign to rescue and reframe the peace talks and 
agreement, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in mid-October. However, the momentum was not lost, and the agreement was 
salvaged and ratified in November 24,2016. To highlight, “one of the areas under 
negotiation as part of the peace process [was] comprehensive agricultural development. 
Therefore, a number of large agricultural development projects are planned as part of 
the government’s post-conflict strategy.” In this context, “U.S. agricultural equipment 
and service firms may find new business opportunities…[additionally], more 
opportunities may open up for businesses that provide value-add technologies to the 
sector, such as food processing and packaging companies.”68 Furthermore, Colombia’s 
post-peace development agenda includes 1450 “peace contracts”, representing an 
investment of $4.5 billion. Among the opportunities allowed by these contracts are: 
*Infrastructure: roads, airports, aqueducts, schools, hospitals, telecommunications 
infrastructure, and connectivity 
*Tourism: development of rural tourism and ecotourism 
*Logistics: storage centers and regional distribution centers 
*Agriculture: commercialization of family farming, increased agricultural productivity at 
small scale farms, and development of irrigation districts 
According with Grussendurf and Kurtz: 
Peace agreements involve not only the termination of armed conflict but also the 
implementation of broader peace processes that include the reconstruction of the 
economy and civil society as well as the construction of confidence-building measures 
and peaceful relations with adversaries. One major reason for such concerted efforts to 
conclude peace agreements is the economic benefits that derive from them…[including] 
increased opportunities in the forms of domestic investment in the civilian sector as well 
as more international trade, aid and investments.69 
                                                      
hundred, and are believed to have endured by cultivating and commercializing coca in 
small-scale operations. 
68 Armendiz, 2016 




In addition, Cate finds that there is a delay between the time a conflict ends and when 
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IV. EVIDENCE ANALYSIS 
 
A. Qualitative Analysis 
 
Interviews and institutional background Peru, Colombia and FTAs  
This dissertation follows a mixed methodology. As part of the empirical work, I 
conducted interviews with the purpose of getting first-person accounts of the negotiation 
and implementation processes, and, by documenting and analyzing them together, 
contribute to the literature in trade negotiations. The following is a list of the information 
sought after during through these interviews: 
Negotiations 
• Evidence of application of Competitive Liberalization framework (U.S.) 
• Any deviations from “boilerplate” (template) treaty delivered by the U.S. 
• Strategic behavior: Interactions with Legislative, Private Sector and Other Actors 
Implementation 
• Challenges for the creation and application of new laws to implement the FTA 
• Evidence of capacity-building in new agencies 
• Enforcement issues 
• Changes in political actors and consistency throughout the process 
These interviews were conducted in person, over the phone and via email, during the 
period from April 2017 to October 2017. Interviewees were chosen by their participation 
on the process of negotiating and implementing the FTAs in Peru and Colombia, or by 
their knowledge of the subject matter because of their research interests and standing in 
academic settings. The group selected included government officials, researchers at 
chambers of commerce and export associations, executives from exporting firms, and 
Economics professors, both in Colombia and Peru. I was able to also get the insights of 
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two U.S. negotiators, who confirmed the perceptions expressed by Colombian and 
Peruvian interviewees. 
Interviewees were contacted first via email, sending them a brief and open questionnaire 
(see Appendix 6 for English-language version) as a guideline. While several of the 
responses came via email, a few preferred to have a conversation over the phone, and 
some agreed to meet in person. The latter took place in Bogota in August 2017 and in 
Washington D.C. in October 0f 2018. The vast majority of these testimonies were 
gathered in Spanish and later translated. The following is a list of those who agreed to 







Occupation / Link to trade policy issues 
Jaime Dupuy Peru Former Ministry official, FTA negotiator  
Sociedad de Comercio Exterior del Peru 
(Economic Studies Directors), Promperu 
(Board of Directors) 
Javier Illescas Peru Former FTA chief negotiator Foreign Trade 
Society of Peru (Economic Studies Directors) 
Dr. Eduardo Moron Peru Has written extensively about the subject  
Professor - Economics Department – 
Universidad del Pacifico 
Dr. Noelia Bernal Peru Former Ministry official, assisted the analysis 
and negotiation of the Investment Chapter 
Professor - Economics Department – 
Universidad del Pacifico 
Carlos Gonzales Peru ADEX (Exporters Association) 
Director of Economic Studies 
Luz Barreto 
Montesinos 
Peru ADEX Project Manager, International 
Cooperation 
Paula Carrion Peru ADEX Agroexports Director 
Gonzalo Bonifaz Peru Embassy of Peru in Washington D.C. Head of 
the Political Department  
Nicolas Torres Colombia Investment chapter lead negotiator; Director 
of the International Legal Affairs for the 
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism 
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Dr. Luis Angel Madrid Colombia Former Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Tourism officer, Professor PhD Law, 
Universidad Sergio Arboleda, Bogota 
Dr. Gabriel Andre 
Duque 
Colombia FTA Lead Negotiator. Vice minister of 
Commerce, Industry and Tourism, 




Colombia Former Foreign Trade Ministry (participated 
in the negotiation that broadened the Andean 
Community to Peru, and in the FTAA 
negotiations); University professor and trade 
consulting business owner in Bogota 
Enrique Millan Colombia Colombian Embassy in D.C. Ministry of 
Commerce and Tourism lead representative 
Camilo Ayala Colombia Colombian Embassy in D.C. Ministry of 
Commerce and Tourism, Implementation 
expert 
Isabel Zamorano Colombia Colombian Embassy in D.C. Ministry of 
Commerce and Tourism, Statistics expert 
German Martinez Colombia Participated in “next room” talks during FTA 
CEO Ramo Food Industries, Former Financial 
VP Procafecol, Bavaria (director – merge 
with SABMiller) 
Dr. Marcela Eslava Colombia Professor - Economics Department – 
Universidad de los Andes 
Dr. Jairo Parada Colombia Professor - Economics Department – 
Universidad del Norte 
Amb. Susan Schwab U.S. Former USTR Representative – Peru and 
Colombia FTA negotiator 
University of Maryland Professor 
Not to be quoted U.S. Former Peru and Colombia FTA negotiator, 
currently at USTR 
 
In this section, first person accounts from official documents, articles, books and other 
(media) interviews will also be presented. Included in this group are Alfredo Ferrero Diez 
Canseco. Eduardo Ferreyros, and Pablo de la Flor -- Peruvian negotiators -- and Andres 
Espinosa Feinwarth, chief agricultural negotiator for Colombia. 
Both Colombian and Peruvian officials were very helpful at sharing their 
expertise. It is evident that promoting the FTAs and supporting mechanisms that aid their 
evaluation and analysis is a high priority for both countries’ Executive branches. They 
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were very candid about their experiences, which complemented quite well their openness 
about statistics and official documents (just about everything is kept up-to-date online in 
official websites). As can be expected, ex-negotiators and ex-officials, those who are no 
longer working in the public sector, were at times more critical of the negotiation process 
and the FTAs themselves. 
 
INTERVIEW SUMMARY AND FINDINGS: 
The interviews supported the idea of benefits along with risks from the FTAs. The 
interviews confirmed that the FTAs were considered, across the board, as necessary to 
secure the preferential access granted before by the ATPDEA without risking national 
output. Also, looking across the interviews, most officials and researchers regard FTAs 
not only as instruments that promote competitiveness and innovation, but also as tools for 
providing security to foreign investors; in their view, the commitments made under a 
FTA lead to new and better ways of doing business internationally. FTAs facilitate 
imports of capital goods (machinery), raw materials and intermediate goods required to 
enrich national production and exports. In this regard, Gabriel Duque71 explains how 
integration to the World Economy is a long term commitment, a choice for sustainable 
development that seeks to take advantage of global value chains. However, many 
interviewees recognize that FTAs may have negative effects if they are not used 
advantageously and national industries lack the support they require at a time they are 
vulnerable to an increase in imports. 
                                                      
71 FTA Lead Negotiator. Vice minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Ambassador 
to Japan and the WTO 
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It was surprising to realize how challenging the implementation process has been. 
As hard as the negotiation and ratification were, the implementation is proving to be the 
greater task to take advantage of the commitments signed. Finally, virtually all local 
officials highlight how the capabilities and organization created to negotiate and 
implement the FTA with the U.S., including negotiating team structures and themes, have 
been used to negotiate FTAs with other countries. There was a sense that the bureaucratic 
side of the agreements involved an investment that will have future payoffs. 
 
1. Colombia:  
a. Negotiation 
The Foreign Trade Ministry of Colombia started negotiations for its first FTA in 
1991, when it participated in the negotiations for a FTA with Mexico. During the second 
stage of this negotiation, the Mexican team, feeling empowered, started to impose the 
disciplines (model) from NAFTA to the negotiation with Colombia and Venezuela. 
Colombia wanted to use the G3 (“Group of the 3”, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, 
signed in 1994, implemented in 1995, but Venezuela left in 2006) as a bridge to NAFTA 
(and eventually the U.S.). However, the Mexican economic crisis in 1994 and 1995 
closed that possibility.72  
                                                      
72 Nicolas Torres –Colombian investment chapter leader negotiator. Later on, as director 
of the International Legal Affairs for the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, 
Torres coordinated the implementation of the normative modifications required by the 
agreement, including tariff reductions/removals, changes in custom controls, commerce 
instruments and commerce facilitation tools. He also led the normative modifications 




From an FTA advancement perspective, the Samper Administration (1994-1998) 
missed the opportunity. During that time, Colombia focused on Mercosur and ALADI 
(Latin American Integration Association). Subsequently, during the Pastrana 
Administration (1998-2002), there was little progress. At that time, the focus was on the 
FTAA (hemispheric negotiations). After that and given the lack of success with a 
regional approach, the U.S. turned its attention to the “willing countries”73 with Colombia 
on the sidelines. 
In 2003, then Vice-minister of Commerce, Claudia Uribe, was entrusted with 
preparing for a FTA negotiation with the U.S. Along with her team, she studied the FTAs 
between the U.S. and other countries. The U.S.-Chile FTA had just been finalized. Many 
of the detailed documents for these negotiations were not public, so the ministry 
performed a “complexity analysis” as best it could. There was some anticipation on what 
related to pharmaceuticals, but overall there was a sense that there was room to discuss 
many issues.  
In May 2004, U.S. sent the negotiating template, which turned out to be a big 
surprise for the Colombian negotiating team. In retrospect, the Andean countries were 
over-confident that their previous history with the ATPDEA would give them preferential 
treatment when negotiating the FTA. In truth, Colombia aspired to an FTA-light. 
Colombian officials started preparing their own text as a “counteroffer.” This text was 
prepared along with Peru and Ecuador, in collaboration with the business sector, and 
different official/public actors.  
                                                      
73 Dr. Luis Angel Madrid, Former Ministry of Commerce and tourism officer, PhD Law 
Universidad Sergio Arboleda, Bogota (Current Professor) 
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The sense of Carlos Ronderos,74 a former trade ministry official who participated 
in the negotiations, was that this was a very asymmetric negotiation, with Colombia at the 
weak end. Ronderos had the chance to speak with USTR chief Robert Zoellick (the U.S. 
trade representative from 2001 to 2005), and during that meeting he got the sense that the 
FTA between the U.S. and Colombia would follow the framework set up by the process 
with Chile, while furthering “new generation” advances including intellectual property 
issues, biodiversity, and such. Because the U.S. wanted to approach it as a “single 
undertaking”, meaning that all chapters of the agreement were to be ratified at the same 
time, the negotiation took longer, and in the meanwhile the U.S. government changed.  
From an agricultural perspective, the Ministry of Agriculture did not agree with 
letting the FTA with Chile be the only guideline to follow. It did not make sense at all to 
compare Colombia’s diverse and tropical agriculture to the Chilean agricultural sector, 
which is more seasonal and opposes the North’s in terms of seasonality (meaning that 
fresh Chilean products competed relatively little with those of U.S. farmers).75  
One of the main objectives of the negotiation was to achieve the best possible 
scenario for access to the U.S. markets regarding sanitary and phytosanitary standards, as 
well as to address any other non-tariff rules that could slow down or hinder the admission 
of Colombian exports to the U.S. The purpose of these efforts was to achieve real access 
                                                      
74 Carlos Eduardo Ronderos Torres – Colombia – Former Foreign Trade Ministry -- 
participated in the negotiation that broadened the Andean Community to Peru, and in the 
FTAA negotiations. He is now a university professor and owns a trade consulting 
business in Bogota. 
75 Andrés Espinosa Fenwarth Laura Pasculli Henao, “Visión agrícola del TLC entre 
Colombia y Estados Unidos: preparación, negociación, implementación y 
aprovechamiento”, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas, #25, CEPAL Office, Bogota, April 
2013, p. 16 
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to the U.S. Therefore, the Colombian team emphasized that standards and non-tariff 
matters were to be attended by the U.S. in a timely fashion, not only through the regular 
agencies in charge of these processes, but by the Special Committee created for this 
purpose by the agreement. Also, it was expected that the American authorities and 
agencies were to accept as sufficient the scientific evidence presented by the Colombian 
authorities for acquiring these certifications, speeding in that way the admissibility of 
Colombian products. That being said, at that time Colombians were even hopeful that 
exporters would also take advantage of products that were listed under the ATPDEA but 
that had never been exported. Nevertheless, analysts pointed out at the time that even 
with the best mechanisms crafted in the text of the agreement, Colombia had a long road 
of hard work achieving the technical and scientific capacities to comply with such 
requirements.76  
In a similar fashion, Colombia was more thorough than its neighbors when 
negotiating over Intellectual Property. These were risky issues to discuss, with very low 
political acceptance in Colombia. Mandatory patents for new uses of pharmaceuticals 
(countering Andean norms, and potentially affecting Colombian manufacturers), 
restrictions to mandatory licenses and restrictions to the exhaustion of patent rights 
(widely used in the U.S., but not internationally) were successfully excluded from the 
negotiation, because they were issues already included in the wider WTO framework. 
However, issues related to patent termination due to delays in sanitary permits, and data 
                                                      
76 Ibid. pp. 40-41 
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protection remained on the table.77 Colombian pharmaceutical companies strongly 
opposed signing the FTA. 
Once Ecuador walked away from the negotiation, the Colombian position was 
more vulnerable. Peru wanted to finish up faster. It was easier for them because their 
pharmaceutical industry was much less developed, and Peru was somewhat less 
vulnerable than Colombia in agriculture. Other sensitive issues were access to non-
agricultural markets, and norms of origin. But sensitivities in the agricultural sector 
ultimately determined the pace of the negotiation. 
Peru closed its FTA negotiations with the U.S. in 2005. Colombian negotiations 
were finalized at five in the morning on February 27th, 2006, in a marathon session 
closing the final packet of negotiations on sugar and tobacco, the two most sensitive 
products for the U.S. USTR chief Susan Schwab was in charge of the American team. 
From Colombia, Andrés Felipe Arias, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Jorge Humberto Botero, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Hernando José 
Gómez, Colombian chief negotiator, and Andrés Espinosa Fenwarth, head negotiator 
from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, maintained constant 
communication with the President Álvaro Uribe Vélez and concerted with representatives 
                                                      
77 Other sensitive IP issues that became part of the FTA included: Extension of patent 
terms (duration); linkage (common in U.S. from 1984 – orange book); and, non-
infringement complaints (U.S. has been trying to bring this issue to the WTO negotiating 
table. However, it violates the spirit of the treaty). Furthermore, the Investment Chapter 




from the private sector, 350 in total, who were waiting patiently in a nearby hotel, close 
to the Colombian trade office in Washington DC.78  
In November of 2006, a “Protocol of Amendment” was presented in the U.S., 
introducing changes in four subjects: Environmental, FDI, Intellectual Property, and 
Labor. This is where the delay of the Colombians proved costlier. These subjects 
reflected the priorities of the Democratic Party, which now had the Congressional 
majority. After President Obama took office in January 2009, it was not politically 
feasible for him to give the all-clear to the U.S.-Colombia FTA. During his campaign and 
the beginning of his administration he was very critical of the FTAs. Therefore, the 
agreement had to wait until October of 2011 after the negotiation of modest changes. 
The labor issues demanded by the Democrats were finalized by an agreement 
signed by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos de Colombia and U.S. President 
Barack Obama on April 6th, 2011. Internally, the FTA was incorporated to the 
Colombian legislation through the Law 1143 of 2007 and complemented by the 
Constitutional Court decision number C-750/08. The FTA’s Modifying Protocol was 
signed in Washington D.C. on June 28th, 2007 and approved in Colombia by the Law 
1166 of 2007, combined by the Constitutional Court decision C-751/08. The U.S. 
Congress approved the agreement on October 12, 2011, and the legislation was signed 
into law by President Obama on October 21, 2011.79  
Colombia had to put in place 58 norms before it could proceed to exchanging 
diplomatic notes with the U.S. Additionally, Colombia had to approve 11 more 
                                                      
78 Op.Cit. Fenwarth, p.48 
79 Ibid. p. 53 
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instruments, not taking into account the Labor commitments spelled by the Action Plan 
agreed upon in April 2011. The implementation of these 69 normative instruments 
required 23 laws, grouped in at least 6 different legislative acts, which were deemed 
“urgent” at the time.80  
According to Angel, the negotiation was a clear example of Realpolitik81. At the 
end, he estimates, about 90% of the original template was approved. When Peru finished 
its treaty, all the disciplines the Peruvians accepted were bound to be the same approved 
by Colombia. In practice, only certain details like the gradual removal of tariffs for 
sensitive products could be negotiated. Once the FTA was approved, some additional 
issues have been better understood and have caused much discussion. For example, the 
agreement on Digital Content Protection (Author rights),82 which applies to internet 
service providers, gives them a level of protection similar to the one granted in the U.S. 
(regarding responsibility limits). Angel explained how, at the time of the negotiation, 
there was not enough understanding by the Colombians of the limits Digital Content 
Protection posed to the rights of internet users, or how it could hinder Colombian 
capacity for technological conversion. 
 
                                                      
80 Ibid, p. 55 
81 From its German origins, it means politics based on practical and material factors 
rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives. The term is widely used today as a 
synonym for “power politics” and understood as the realist approach to foreign policy 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2017-04-14/realpolitik-history 
82 In Colombia, Project Law 241 of 2011 “Lleras Law” (nicknamed by his main 
proponent), was unsuccessful, but the commitments agreed upon with the U.S. were 




Implementation of the FTA should not be seen as a simple adaptation of internal 
norms. An efficient administration of the FTA is essential for taking advantage of all the 
opportunities it brings forward: increased investment and employment, infrastructure 
improvement, advances in terms of institutional sophistication, greater legal security for 
investors and businesses, among others. Part of the administration of the FTA is 
conducted by the office of the Ministry of Commerce and Tourism in the Colombian 
embassy in Washington DC. Enrique Millan, a lead representative of the Ministry at the 
DC embassy,83 explained the tasks of the DC office: 
• To identify barriers and make recommendations. For example: sanitary 
and phytosanitary certification (can take 4 to 5 years to get for one 
product), judicial requirements, services (such as requirement for 
professionals such as engineers and nurses) 
• To follow the FTA implementation  
• To follow the FTA performance  
Millan argues that when one thinks of the FTA as an excuse for modernizing the 
country, its effect has been very positive and global in the sense that the positive impacts 
are not limited to exports, but extended to issues such as budgeting and infrastructure. 
Also, from an export-oriented perspective, there has been a positive effect in non-
traditional and new exports, such as building materials, tilapia, body shapers, and dairy 
products. In fact, more than 500 “new” products have been identified as “booming” 
because of the FTA. There is a sense in which the agreement opened the horizon for what 
businesses in Columbia thought was possible. 
                                                      
83 Colombian Embassy. Ministry of Commerce and Tourism lead representative 
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Millan also highlights the importance of non-tariff barriers. An interesting case is 
electronic and electric equipment (transformers). Getting the necessary certifications to 
export them directly to the U.S. is very hard, but Colombia does have a comparative 
advantage in these kinds of products. So, the result has been a maquila-like scheme. An 
example of an opportunity to sell such products came in the context of the USDA’s Rural 
Utilities Services, or RUS. RUS electric program “provides capital and leadership to 
maintain, expand, upgrade and modernize America’s vast rural electric infrastructure. 
The loans and loan guarantees finance the construction or improvement of electric 
distribution, transmission and generation facilities in rural areas…Loans are made to 
cooperatives, corporations, states, territories, subdivisions, municipalities, utility districts 
and non-profit organizations.”84 Within this program there are opportunities for which 
smaller amounts of equipment can be imported with fewer restrictions. Colombian firms 
were selling into this market as a result of the FTA. 
Some contingent products –those for which the Colombian negotiators fought the 
most and maintained some temporary protection—include poultry (back quarters), corn 
and rice. In the case of rice, Fedearroz (Colombian Federation of Rice Farmers) has been 
able to modernize and even participate in international auctions through joint ventures.85 
Clothing confections is another relevant case. The industry has managed to recreate itself 
(to “stay in the game” as Mr. Millan put it). Before the FTA there were exports of certain 
kinds of products: formal suits, t-shirts, and socks. But the demand for these items has 
                                                      
84 https://www.rd.usda.gov/about-rd/agencies/rural-utilities-service 





shifted and/or has gone to cheaper providers in Central America and Asia. So now, there 
is a boom in the production of women’s undergarments, body shapers, swimsuits, and 
baby clothing that require higher levels of sophistication in their production or styling. 
Even if the FDI literature is not in agreement about the causal relationship 
between the subscription of FTAs and increases in FDI (noting that the political and 
economic stability of the country are important as well), my interviews across a wide 
range of officials in both countries indicated that the presence of the FTA is indeed an 
element that investors take into account (this would be a natural thing for an official to 
say since otherwise their efforts were in a sense wasted, but even officials who were 
critical of various aspects of the negotiations or outcome made this point that the FTA 
mattered). The FTA should not only have a positive effect on the inflows of capital 
coming from the partner country, but also on inbound capital from investors in third party 
countries who would like to use the FTA as an open door to a wider market. In this 
context, Millan believes there has been an increase in incoming FDI from the U.S. 
Although the amount for mineral and hydrocarbons (petroleum) has decreased, non-
traditional FDI is up. At the same time, there has been some FDI from Colombia to the 
U.S., notably in the areas of dairy and snack foods. Furthermore, there has been a boom 
in tourism related investments, with more airlines flying between more city-pairs with 
greater frequency, and more big chain hotels in Colombia’s largest cities. The peace 
agreement of course plays a part of this, but the officials I interviewed saw the FTA as 
important as well. 
When measuring the performance of the FTA, argues Camilo Ayala, an 
implementation expert in the Colombia embassy in Washington D.C., it is key to 
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differentiate the direct benefits from the tangential ones. The latter, such as the 
restructuring of domestic industries and firms, tend to be greater over time. Looking only 
to the balance of trade and export totals, it sometimes feels like nothing has been 
achieved. But it is key to take into account context and externalities (as he put it), and 
global realities such as the trends in commodity prices. When the FTA came into effect in 
2011 it was a good economic moment, with exports climbing rapidly. But then, in 2013-
2014 the global economy crashed, and exports took a dive.86 
When comparing Colombia to Peru, Ayala explained, politics play a big role. The 
strategic vision for the FTAs is an issue. Peru has the conviction of internationalization as 
a development model, and that was also the case in Chile and Mexico. In Colombia, the 
executive branch is convinced that this is the right path, but the legislature, the judicial 
branch (in particular the Constitutional Court, but also the entire overwhelmed judicial 
system), and special interest groups do not believe so. The challenge at hand is “real 
access” versus what is written in legal documents such as the FTA text, continued Ayala. 
There is a need for laws that go smoothly through Congress, and a priority place for 
modernization issues in budgeting, for example. A case in point is Customs. For exports 
and imports to flourish the customs system has to be on par with that of the industrialized 
countries. Ayala considers the customs system  is still a “work-in-progress” but has 
substantially improved because of the implementation of the FTA. 
In order to get the FTA approved in the U.S. and ready to enter into force, 
Colombian Congress passed an “Umbrella Law” that covered all the items required by 
                                                      
86 Camilo Ayala (Ministry of Commerce, Investments and Tourism, Washington D.C. 
Office, Implementation expert) 
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the U.S. However, later on, the Constitutional Court knocked that law down, and so 
began the process to pass 12 different laws that covered the same commitments, about 4 
of these laws remain to be approved. This challenge, in the context of the concurrent 
Peace Process, is not a small one. And on top of everything else, the presidential election 
just took place, and the new president, Ivan Duque, will be sworn into office in August 
2018.  
These trials and impasses highlight that to continue to take advantage of the FTA, 
the continual implementation of instruments and mechanisms is essential. This progress 
starts with the development of institutional capacities in the public sector and the creation 
of mechanisms, legal and technical, to allow for proper implementation. For Colombia, 
the main areas to move forward in a better implementation of the FTA are obtaining 
sanitary admissibility for all relevant agricultural exports, diversifying the export supply 
of non-traditional products (processed foods, clothing, electronics, etc.), increasing the 
capabilities of service providers so they may be recognized in the U.S. market, and 
creating and supporting adequate skills within public contracts providers.  
Finally, the time elapsed between the signature of the U.S.-Colombia FTA and its 
actual implementation could have been used better as an opportunity to build capacity 
and increase competitiveness. Instead, the attitude was to “wait and see.” This in-between 
period coincided with a boom in mineral exports, which explains but does not justify, the 
diminished interest in achieving a diversified export basket.87 To achieve this 
diversification, the government could have use export promotion agencies proactively to 
                                                      
87 Op.Cit., Fenwarth, p. 44 
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create a better understanding of the new rules that at that point were expected to be 
implemented, for example.  
 
c. Challenges: 
Colombia has a compelling and attractive domestic market with a large 
population and level of sophistication and income that should be attractive to 
multinational firms. Significant changes already had started within the economy since the 
FTA with the European Union came into force in 2009. The real challenge, according to 
the officials I interviewed, is to create an exporting culture among Colombia’s business 
community.88 
In this regard, Marcela Eslava89 believes that the FTA would only provide a level 
playing field if there was a proper export infrastructure and a supportive regulatory 
framework. Since Colombia lags behind so badly on both dimensions, she explains, it has 
been and will continue to be difficult for Colombian firms to take advantage of the FTA. 
On the positive side, Eslava highlights the greater government efforts to provide product-
specific regulations to improve competition. By a proper export infrastructure, she means 
that the government should modernize most of the Colombian highway system, take a 
better advantage of the exiting railroad system, and invest in world-class port facilities 
and customs (unfortunately, many of these improvements have been indeed planned but 
                                                      
88 Isabel Zamorano (Ministry of Commerce and Tourism, Washington D.C. Office, 
Statistics expert)  
89 Economics Professor – Universidad de Los Andes - Colombia 
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stayed on paper or resulted in failed efforts, in great part due to unacceptable levels of 
corruption).  
In her view, and in agreement with the challenges explained by officials in DC, 
the negative effects of the FTA have been mostly political. There has been an increased 
opposition to open trade and competition on the basis that Colombian exports to the U.S. 
have not been growing dramatically. Additionally, Eslava believes that even if the 
process of negotiation and implementation of the FTA created some expertise to 
negotiate additional treaties, unless clear positive impacts on exports can be shown, the 
FTA with the U.S. is unlikely to generate general support for new treaties.  
In a similar critical view, Jairo Parada90 argues that to date, effects of the FTA for 
Colombia have been poor, with a positive balance for the U.S. (in his argument, the 
outcome does not need to be zero sum, but if one side comes away with considerably 
greater benefits than the other, inevitably this will look like a failure). The hoped-for 
export surge from Colombia to the U.S. has not happened. The main positive effect, for 
Colombia, has been to facilitate imports of goods from the U.S. – good of course for 
consumer welfare but not as easily a motivation among the business community for 
further liberalization. The negative impact remains in the agricultural sector, which 
continues to struggle regardless of the deadlines established. Such is the case of dairy and 
some cereals (corn, sorghum and rice), which, in spite of the FTA provision for duty free 
tariff rate quotas (along with other products such as standard beef, chicken leg quarters, 
animal feeds and soybean oil) still have long ways to go to be able to compete with the 
U.S. imports. However, Parada continued to explain, the flood of American products that 
                                                      
90 Economics Professor – Universidad del Norte - Colombia 
83 
 
some feared has not happened either due to the depreciation of the Colombian peso. 
Therefore, until growth of trade resumes, the FTA will remain in the realm of 
expectations. Many businesses keep exploring possibilities to export, but up to the 
moment the export effect has not been what had been expected. Regarding FDI, Parada 
believes that this is still moving on the previous trends and responding to internal 
conditions, rather than having anything changed by the FTA.  
 
Somewhat in agreement with these critical views, Ronderos argues that, as it is 
being implemented, the FTA has not been very useful from a trade perspective. Overall, 
Colombia has been more closed than countries like Peru and Chile in its approach to 
trade policy because it is not truly convinced of the advantages of having an open 
economy. Colombia does have comparative advantages in the agricultural sector but has 
not been able to comply with many phytosanitary norms. For example, Colombia got the 
approval for exporting avocados in 2017,91 which took too long, but at the same time 
there is no chance to export beef, pork or lamb due to the “aftosa” fever (hoof-and-mouth 
disease). Pitaya (a cactus fruit, similar to dragon fruit) is a product that is promising but 
has not delivered yet, again because of the lack of the required phytosanitary licenses. 
From Ronderos’ perspective, Colombia did not benefit from supply chain linkages such 
as surging use of local raw material provisions for maquila-like companies that Mexico 
got in NAFTA, and that makes a big difference. 
 
                                                      
91 Furthermore, he considers it is absurd and shameful that even the president makes such 
a big deal for something as basic as the recent phytosanitary certification for exporting 
avocados, when it should have been achieved without fanfare so long ago. 
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Also, the implementation of industrial rules of origin are yet to materialize for the 
most part.  This lack of rules of origin implementation limits the country’s use of its 
logistical advantages. For example, the Caribbean city of Barranquilla port is very close 
to Florida and yet it has not taken adequate advantage of its already declared Free Trade 
zone (FTZ) for export-oriented manufacturing. In principle, Colombia’s FTZ regime 
allows for:92  
• Single 20% income tax rate 
• No customs taxes (VAT and custom duties) triggered when raw materials are 
introduced to the FTZ from abroad 
• VAT exemption for raw materials, inputs and finished goods sold from the national 
customs territory to FTZs 
• Exports made from FTZ to foreign countries, may apply the benefits of international 
trade agreements signed by Colombia 
• Possibility of performing partial processing outside of the FTZ for up to 9 months 
• Possibility of selling to the national territory the goods or services without restrictions 
or quotas, paying the applicable custom duties on the imported goods 
 
However, Ronderos explains that these tax provisions are still a sensitive issue and that 
FTZs are plagued by judicial instability, which explain why they have failed to attract 
more investors.  
In addition, Ronderos once more points to a trade deficit as the result of the FTA. 
He believes the effect of traditional export product, in particular those of hydrocarbons 
(Oil), is much too distorting to be ignored. In his opinion, there is a lack of solid long 
term foreign investment policy, and other countries have designed better investment 
policies. Ronderos thinks that for this situation to improve, Colombia needs to take 
seriously commitments such as the phytosanitary required certifications, and subjects 





such as judicial validity/security and tax issues. In his view, there is a role for 
government planning along with business operations, and for better coordination between 
the two. 
Overall, Ronderos believes any additional advantages for Colombia gained 
through negotiations were small. Finally, he considers the labor obligations as explosive 
to say the least, and that given the obvious lack of commitment to see them through, they 
put Colombia in a vulnerable position when and if the U.S. calls for an evaluation of their 
fulfillment.  
From the perspective of the private sector, food industry CEO German Martinez93 
highlights the clear gains from this painful process such as better U.S. market access for 
both current products and newcomers, even while he is quick to point out to the high cost, 
in practical terms, and to the mixed results for Colombian companies. Martinez blames 
internal structural faults within both business (chambers of commerce, industry groups) 
and government agencies, and the limited and volatile “exports basket” – that is, 
Colombia’s exports relies heavily on commodities and other products with little value 
added. He believes Colombia did not prepare properly to face this new openness: its 
policy involved a lack of retraining and conversion programs for uncompetitive sectors, 
and did not ensure enough promotion of alternative exports with higher value added. 
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negotiating team, and, on occasion, have exchanges with the other countries’ negotiating 




Nevertheless, he saw it is as promising that micro, small and medium companies have 
had preferential and equitable access to the new market. 
He recognizes this is an ongoing process, and he commends how as a member of 
the private sector he has had the opportunity to participate in the legal developments 
related to the FTA implementation, where public officials consult with interest groups 
looking for comments and opinions. Also, he identifies the positive impact of the FTA 
commitments on FDI, but worries that public officials might not do enough to harness 
that capital and bring about real economic and social development at the local level. Even 
if there is a new institutional framework of security and guaranties, the Colombian 
government is still lacking in the implementation abilities that would allow the most 
advantageous use of the incoming resources including technological transfers, and 
learning from the experiences of individuals and companies to strengthen entrepreneurial 
competitiveness. This is obviously the perspective of private businesses. He is looking for 
the government to help business with the necessary adjustments. 
Martinez argues that overall there is an imbalance that hinders the chance to take 
advantage of the inflow of foreign capital, greater job opportunities, and better services 
and product variety. This is not a shortcoming of the FTA itself, but a product of 
structural weaknesses not properly addressed by the country. Only by surpassing these 
limitations will there be a better outlook for the FTA in the next 5 to 10 years. 
Furthermore, he expresses how Colombia entrepreneurs should get over their fear to 




Martinez highlights how the private sector is now an integral part of the process, 
as it should be. New themes need to be included, such as additional cooperation between 
the public and private sectors, strengthening of the service sector to better support 
exporters, and the inclusion of norms that allow for and regulate the transit of individuals 
among countries. He believes these new themes are the natural next step in economic 
integration between Colombia and its trade partners, and were not included with enough 
force in the current FTA. He also stresses the need for lesser rigidity in the negotiation 
framework, allowing for a deeper inclusion of other sectors in the process. 
 
Box 6A. U.S. Section 301 Report on Intellectual Property:94 Implications for 
Colombia 
FROM THE USTR REPORT: The 2018 U.S. 301 Report provides a warning for 
Colombia, which is placed on the Priority Watch List in 2018 with an Out-of-Cycle 
Review focused on certain provisions of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement (CTPA) and monitoring the implementation of Colombia’s National 
Development Plan (NDP). The report states that Colombia’s lack of meaningful 
progress, particularly in relation to its CTPA obligations, warrants its elevation to the 
Priority Watch List. In 2018, Colombia will be subject to an Out-of-Cycle Review on the 
same issues to determine whether a change in status to Watch List would be appropriate. 
In 2017, Colombia took steps toward completing implementation of certain provisions of 
the CTPA, including by introducing into the legislature copyright law amendments that 
would address certain provisions of the CTPA. The United States urges Colombia to 
move quickly to enact the recently introduced copyright law amendments. Colombia also 
still needs to make other improvements with respect to implementation of significant IP-
related commitments under the CTPA, including commitments to address the challenges 
of online piracy and accession to UPOV 91. The United States urges Colombia to begin 
working on necessary provisions regarding ISPs. The United States also urges Colombia 
to increase its IP enforcement efforts. As online piracy, particularly via mobile devices, 
continues to grow, Colombian law enforcement authorities with relevant jurisdiction, 
including the National Police and the Attorney General, have yet to conduct meaningful 
and sustained investigations and prosecutions against the operators of large pirate 
websites and mobile applications based in Colombia. Colombia has also not been able to 
reduce significantly the large number of pirated and counterfeit goods crossing the 
                                                      
94 Includes consultation with the private sector (May of every year by USTR – a checking 
list of implementation). There are submissions by stakeholders (pharmaceutical 
companies, business alliance). 
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border or being sold at Bogota’s San Andresitos markets, on the street, and at other 
distribution hubs around the country. The United States recommends that Colombia 
increase efforts to address online and mobile piracy, and to focus on disrupting 
organized trafficking in illicit goods, including at the border and in free trade zone (FTZ) 
areas. Finally, the United States continues to monitor Colombia’s implementation of 
certain provisions of the NDP that could undermine innovation and IP systems, 
particularly those that would condition pharmaceutical regulatory approvals on factors 
other than safety or efficacy. In March 2018, Colombia issued Decree 433 to partially 
implement NDP Article 72, although questions remain as to whether the decree would 
condition regulatory approvals on factors other than safety and efficacy. The United 
States urges Colombia to take necessary steps to clarify such provisions and implement 
them in such a way as to ensure that they do not undermine innovation and IP 
systems…Noteworthy [is] Colombia’s inclusion of new IP-related provisions in a revised 
police code that was introduced in January 2017. That code tightened requirements for 
public performances, requiring event organizers to submit proof of authorization for 
works to be performed before a permit can be approved. 
 
2. Peru: 
The approach to the FTA negotiation and implementation in Peru was different from 
that in Colombia in ways that have mattered for both reaching the agreement and for 
garnering its benefits and maintaining support for liberalization. Although both countries 
had full commitment of the Executive branch to this process, Peru found its legislative 
requirements easier to navigate. Nevertheless, Peru had a longer learning curve to 
escalate, and it has done so with remarkable speed. As an anecdote, when this process 
started, the Ministry of Commerce did not have an office dedicated to U.S. issues, there 
were some IP specialists, but that was the extent of it.95 However, as Pablo de la Flor 
relates, once the FTA was signed and in order to be ratified Peru was ahead than 
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entre Peru y Estados Unidos, Chapter 2, 2008, Op. Cit. p. 5 
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Colombia in legislation regarding trans-border services, financial services, and 
telecommunications.96 
a. Negotiation: 
The Peruvian negotiating team was very comprehensive and fully backed not only 
by the Executive branch but by a diverse representation of public and private actors. 
Alfonso Ferrero, who was a chief Peruvian negotiator, relates how Peruvian unity was 
represented in the Business Council for International Negotiations (CENI - Consejo 
Empresarial para las Negociaciones Internacionales). The negotiating team embodied 
numerous institutions, including 35 regional governments, 12 ministries, 18 public 
organisms, 38 business associations, 11 universities and graduate schools, 3 labor unions, 
4 professional associations, and a diversity of research centers and foundations.97 
When questioned about the “excessive determination” (meaning the very 
outspoken commitment to see the FTA come through) portrayed by the Peruvian team, 
and the role of the Executive, Jaime Dupuy98 argues it is inaccurate to believe that FTAs 
are subscribed for electoral reasons. In Peru, the Toledo administration (2001 – 2006) 
                                                      
96 Pablo de la Flor, La Economia Politica del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Peru y 
Estados Unidos, Chapter 8, 2008, Chapter 8, Op. Cit. p. 67 
97 Alfredo Ferrero Diez Canseco, Historia de un desafío: a la conquista de EE.UU. y el 
mundo, Planeta, 2010 (p.160). 
98 Jaime Dupuy Ortiz de Zevallos worked at the Ministry of Commerce and Tourism of 
Peru, in the U.S. Directorate from 2003, participating directly in the negotiations of the 
FTA with the U.S. Initially seeking the final extension of the ATPDEA, later as a part of 
the Coordination team, in particular dealing with the Peruvian Congress. As the process 
advanced, Dupuy was part of the negotiating team at the Investment table. Once 
negotiations were over, he worked on the FTA juridical revision and eventual 
implementation, as it became effective in 2009. He continued to work on the FTA 
administration until 2012, when he retired from the Ministry. Dupuy is now a member of 
a group entrusted with the FTAs implementation. 
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started and finished the negotiations and the García administration (2006 – 2011) 
implemented it. Although the two presidents had different views and agendas, they 
shared the view that the FTA would favor Peru’s economic development. Diaz Canseco 
narrates the difficult time during the round of negotiations that took place in June 2005 in 
Washington D.C. During this time, Peruvian vice-president David Waisman stated 
publicly that the negotiation team had traveled to D.C. “to get on their knees in front of 
the U.S. and to beg for a softening of their position, and ask for the charity of signing the 
agreement.”  
Waisman’s declaration put the Peruvian team in a very uncomfortable situation. 
Their response was to explain that 2006 was an electoral year and that somewhat 
complicated internal negotiations, but the team continued to declare how “even if the 
negotiation is difficult in the agricultural products table, we are working to keep the 
export basket already available with ATPDEA and nothing less will be accepted. Unless 
this demand is granted, there will not be a FTA.” Furthermore, Waisman’s statement was 
unfortunate because it led the U.S. negotiators to wonder if there was a lack of 
commitment with the FTA as a State policy. To this, the Peruvian team counterargued 
that “if we were on our knees, we would not have negotiated for ten rounds, defining our 
points of view and putting forward our disagreements with some North American 
proposals. One round would suffice someone who is negotiating while kneeling.” 99 
Perhaps, however, the President’s “battle cry” of “we will sign the agreement no matter 
what” was misunderstood by the public as a directive to the negotiating team to reach an 
agreement without argument. If that were the case, then “the intense negotiation that took 
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place for 19 months, 14 rounds, issue by issue, table by table, in a constant tug-of-war 
would have been unnecessary.”100 
Gonzalo Bonifaz explained the FTA as a process rather than a “once-and-done” 
deal.101 In his opinion, it is important to consider the political dimension of the FTA as 
well. These agreements are not signed solely out of economic calculation. Comparative 
and competitive advantages are important, but are not the decisive elements, if that was 
the case there would be an agreement with Ecuador already, without regard to their 
political status, Bonifaz argued.  
Regarding the investment Chapter (Chapter 10 of the FTA), Bonifaz explained 
how there was no lengthy negotiation, so there is not much to find in the minutes. The 
template was the one in the FTA between Chile and the U.S. This was the first FTA for 
Peru. Peru did have BITs with a number of countries, starting in the 1990s, but they 
responded more to political imperatives than anything else, such as the BIT with Cuba. 
The FTA with the U.S. became the model for all the FTAs to come, with small variations 
case-by-case.102 Concerning Intellectual Property, prescription drugs were the main issue 
to discuss, especially issues relating to generics, patent duration, and ancestral knowledge 
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(meaning the recognition of knowledge passed through generations of indigenous people 
of the medical use of certain plants and other natural elements). 
In an ideal world, a country would create an investment regime from the inside 
out, putting in place the mechanisms and securities that allow for and attract investment 
by its own initiative. But political circumstances do not allow for this to happen. As 
Bonifaz argued, attaching an investment regime reform to a FTA was much 
straightforward, giving a “ready-to-wear” standard that was easier to present to the 
public. Peru just needed then to adapt its institutions to the commitments spelled by the 
U.S.—that is, to bring its government up to the American standard.  
Finally, the Peruvian Ministry of Commerce did an impressive job trying to bring 
the message of the benefits of the FTA to all the corners of the country. Ferreyros reports 
how by 2008, the ministry have well over 700 informational meetings and seminars both 
in rural and urban areas.103 
 
b. Implementation: 
According to Javier Illescas,104 who was on the Technical Committee of the U.S.-
Peru FTA negotiation, the two main positive effects the U.S.-Peru FTA have been to 
                                                      
103 Ferreyros, 2008, Op.Cit 
104 Javier Illescas – Economic Studies Directors – Foreign Trade Society of Peru. Illescas 
was Technical negotiator under the direction of Chief Negotiator Pablo de la Flor. 
Illescas also was Chief Negotiator of the Financial Services table, Coordinator of the 
State Purchases, Services and Investment tables, and member of the negotiating team in 
the Industrial Goods and Agriculture Market Access. He additionally served as the 
General Director for International Economic Issues at the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance (MEF). In that capacity, he participated in preparing the Law for the State 
Defense in Investor-State Dispute, and its rule book, anticipating the requirements of this 
commitment. Similarly, the Annual Budget Law was overhauled to include the thresholds 
for public contracting by process type established by the FTA. As a General Director, he 
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consolidate the unilateral preferences granted by the U.S. to Peru through the ATPDEA, 
and to consolidate the Peruvian unilateral trade liberalization that started in the early 
1990s mainly in goods, services, investments, and state purchases. Other reforms were 
proceeding as well, including with fiscal and monetary policy discipline; trade 
liberalization, and market rules domination; the FTA with the U.S. was not only 
consistent with such reforms but also aided in their consolidation. These unilateral 
reforms and their consolidation have been fundamental for Peruvian prosperity in the last 
25 years – even with the slowdown of global economic activity after the FTA took even, 
which had a less critical impact on Peru than on other countries in the region. 
Illescas found it hard to pinpoint strongly negative effects of the FTA. Fears 
regarding the agricultural sector, for example, never realized. Furthermore, the positive 
tendencies in agricultural prices starting in 2007 – the FTA took effect in February 2009 
– not only stimulated traditional agriculture products such as mangos, grapes, asparagus, 
and peppers, but also started to replace traditionally protected harvests that did not have 
comparative advantage such as wheat, rice, and cotton. This change reached the point that 
the law that provided subsidies to these products was dismantled without great political 
resistance. Another example is with medication; it was thought that the FTA would result 
in a massive hikes of medication prices, and that was not the case. It is possible that it 
happened with a few selected products, but it was not a generalized effect.  
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Unless the American government starts considering a revision to the FTA, as it 
has expressed regarding NAFTA – although it seems improbable since Peru seems to be 
off the U.S. radar screen – Illescas thinks that the FTA will allow for a continued trade 
creation among the two countries in the near future. The possibility for trade diversion 
attributable to the treaty should be minimal, considering that Peru has signed FTAs with 
all its main commercial partners. Additionally, the greater dynamism imposed by the U.S. 
in bilateral trade negotiations has meant that agreements among other countries use the 
basic structure of U.S. treaties as a guideline, though with some adjustments (e.g. with 
China there is no government purchase chapter, and there is no liberalization of certain 
goods).  
At the implementation level, and continuing with the explanation of the perceived 
excessive Executive leadership in Peru, Illescas argues that trade policies and new 
legislation in Peru were not adopted to favor a particular electoral outcome. These policy 
changes needed to be permanent and regarded from a long-term commitment. 
Furthermore, government entities as well as private parties needed to enter, at the point of 
the negotiation, a learning process and acquire capabilities that would lead to the creation 
of frameworks that could be reused and adapted in other agreements Peru would sign in 
the future (for example, data protection of testing for pharmaceutical products, 
agrochemicals, or the commitments for customs facilitation).  
Dupuy explained how the FTA has been a key piece to ignite Peruvian exports, 
and he reported these numbers to show it: between 2009 and 2016, exports to the U.S. 
market grew at an average rate of 3.8% annually, becoming the second largest destination 
for Peruvian exports in 2016 (22% of total exports). Even more, he argues, during the 
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same period, U.S. became the most relevant trade partner for Peru’s non-traditional 
exports, which account for greater value-added and generate the most employment. This 
increased 97% cumulatively going from US$1,568 million in 2009 to $3,090 million in 
2016, an annual average growth rate of 10.2%. Among nontraditional exports, those in 
agriculture deserve special mention: they represent 49% of all nontraditional exports 
from Peru to the U.S. and growing steadily. From a mere $580 million in 2009 they 
increased to $1,541 million in 2016, an annual average growth rate of 14.7%, well above 
the growth of all nontraditional exports, and a 161.1% cumulative increase for the same 
period. Additionally, in 2008 – before the treaty came into effect – Peru exported 2101 
categories of items, and in 2016 the number of categories reached 2376, of which 2322 
are non-traditional exports. Also, 14.3% of capital goods imports destined for industry 
were coming from the U.S. tariff free due to the FTA. 
Furthermore, the FTA allowed thousands of Peruvian businesses to access better 
technologies to improve their productivity and reduce costs. In its first two years, the 
FTA reduced Peruvian import customs tariff revenue by 47%. As of 2016, 21.3% of 
capital goods imports destined to agriculture were coming from the U.S., and between 
2009 and 2016 increased from $14.8 million to $42.7 million, growing 189.5%. 
Similarly, raw material imports from the U.S. grew between 2009 and 2016. As an 
example, raw materials for industry started at $1.6 billion to $2.3 billion, a cumulative 
growth rate of 41.7%. In turn, raw materials for agriculture increased 56.3%, from $186 
million to $291 million. 
Additionally, Dupuy points out, permanent supervision and implementation 
analysis will ensure that the FTA runs in accordance to its original objectives, providing 
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guidelines for its eventual revision, modification, or amendment. For the FTA between 
Peru and the U.S., the signing parties agreed to create a “Free Trade Commission” 
entrusted with the agreement’s administration. The Ministry of Commerce and Tourism 
(on the Peruvian side) and United States Trade Representative are the members of this 
Commission, with the private sector part of these processes. Legal reforms, new 
regulations and administrative procedures have been key for this adaptation of the 
Peruvian economy to the FTA. Government entities are compelled to coordinate their 
processes, creating specific linkages between parts of the government including 
notification mechanisms, and norms and procedures that above all highlight their 
transparency. In Peru, implementation actions were approached from a horizontal 
perspective, including all the entities directly and indirectly related to the different 
chapters of the agreements. This was especially the case for those responsible of 
formulating and applying trade policies. The point is that in Peru, according to Dupuy, 
policies were designed taking into account not only the recommendations of high-level 
officials and experts, but also the input of local and regional actors, as well as the private 
businesses affected by these policies. 
Regarding FDI in particular, Dupuy pointed to the increase in FDI flows to Peru 
starting in 2008 in energy, finance, industry and mining, perhaps indicating a greater vote 
of confidence by foreign investors in the country’s long-term future. In contrast to the 
ATPDEA, which was unilateral and had a fixed duration, the FTA gives a greater 
certainty and practicability, because it creates an indefinite judicial framework. 
The investment chapter properly is being developed in Peru through the Law 
28933, which established a "State Coordination and Response System for International 
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Investment Controversies" as a complement to the state-wide policy directed at 
promoting both national and foreign private investments. This law’s objective was to 
regulate the coordination among public entities in case of eventual controversies against 
foreign investors. This is very important in the case of “concession” (bid-awarded) 
contracts, which, in the current decentralization framework, increasingly take place 
between regional or local governments and foreign investors. The law also applies to any 
contract taking place among a public entity and an investor, foreign or domestic, 
whenever it calls for international arbitrage mechanisms.  
If there is any question of where the arbitration should take place in the event of a 
dispute, it is important to empower the Peruvian response capabilities ex ante, Dupuy 
argued, by establishing a coordination system that runs transversally across the three 
levels of government. The latter would process and formulate strategies to act whenever 
these disputes take place, centralizing relevant information on government commitments 
(such as regarding dispute resolution mechanisms) that originated in international treaties 
or other investment contracts. Such a coordination system would also alert authorities as 
quickly as possible in case of a dispute. The law named the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance as coordinator and created a multisector collegial organ within the government 
called the Special Commission to be part of the Economic and Finance Ministry to 
represent the State in international investment disputes. The Special Commission would 
also evaluate options and establish strategies in such cases.  The point is that Peru put in 




Years after the FTA ratification, there are areas that are yet to be implemented, 
such as the legal extent of environmental commitments and the litigation of State-to-state 
treaty disputes. This reflects that so far there has not been the need to do so. There have 
been more arbitration cases for contract violations related to particular clauses, but few 
instances of violations of the treaty itself, such as cases of expropriations. The parties to 
these disputes have worked out their problems with a direct agreement and compensation 
without involving the courts. The statistics related to the judicial proceedings and 
outcomes of contract disputes covered by the FA investment chapter resolution 
mechanisms are limited. Therefore, according to Bonifaz, it would be hard to perform a 
complete analysis of the dispute-settlement mechanisms based on judicial statistics that 
are simply not reliable. This is why the issue of information transparency is so important; 
the actualization of mechanisms to carry out the agreement is fundamental to an effective 
implementation of the investment regime. In the case of arbitrations, these are very costly 
for the State, because of the budgeting consequences, and because it puts into question 
the prioritizing of social and economic development. Moreover, an arbitration proceeding 
that seems to allow foreigners to circumvent domestic laws (even if this is just the 
appearance and not the reality) is difficult to justify politically and socially.  It thus takes 
strong political support to make this mechanism effective. 
Regarding FDI and the investment chapter in the FTA, and according to Bonifaz, 
FDI still comes predominantly and overwhelmingly to the mineral industry. There are 
long-standing players and some newcomers. Although it is not the deciding factor, having 
in place all the controversy solution mechanisms may make a difference in the increase in 
investment since the FTA signing. In particular, having spelled out the conditions for 
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going to the courts or seeking arbitration makes the cost-benefit analysis of a direct 
solution such as a negotiation even more clear. From 2004 to 2014 there was a boom in 
the mineral extraction industry, and that, paired with the ever-present internal and social 
conflicts, gave place to some resounding cases (such as the well-denounced cases of 
mining wrong-practices in Yanacocha and Tambogrande). There is also investment in 
agroindustry, tourism, and hydroelectric energy (in the Cajamarca region), all of which 
also have the potential to raise social concerns given the indigenous populations of those 
regions and the poverty issues to consider. Once again, having in place well-established 
arbitration procedures and additional experience make the investment process more 
transparent and fair to the eyes of the public, while giving an extra level of confidence to 
investors. 
The increase in FDI from China is undeniable since the FTA and bears 
consideration. These investments are going into a variety of sectors, but mostly into 
mining. China is making large investments in Peruvian infrastructure too such as ports, 
piers, and roads.105 China also became Peru’s main export partner in recent years (see 
statistics above – Box 2); most exports to China were mining products and agricultural 
items. Historically, most foreign investment came from Spain, such as the privatization of 
telephone utilities through a purchase by Spanish Telefonica. Traditionally, investment 
from the U.S. has gone into mining. Although the idea of adding value to their products is 
becoming a priority to Peruvians, such as in the case of copper, there is a long way to go. 
Even with increased investment in R&D-related activities than in the past, the reality is 
that there is a gap in the qualified labor needed to perform the kind of work required to 
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move beyond extraction of commodities. According to Bonifaz, accomplishing this 
objective is not the main realm of the FTA.  
Additionally, the process of fiscal regionalization (a particular type of fiscal 
decentralization) that started within Peru in 2002 has great implications for the 
implementation of the FTA. Before those efforts started, Peru was even more centralized 
than Colombia. Regional and local elections are still a novelty (in Colombia they started 
in the 1980s), and regional and local authorities have now extended jurisdiction over all 
kinds of economic and social activities. This brings into play the coordination of 
authorizations, permits, licenses, and similar requirements for investment and production. 
Such coordination has the potential to become very complex, offsetting or at least 
complicating gains from the FTA. In this area, an adaptation and evaluation exercise are 
gravely needed. For example, a local authority might implement an order that ultimately 
becomes an expropriation without even realizing it and without supervision or even 
knowledge of the central government – at least, until the foreign investors turns to the 
dispute resolution mechanism. There is still too much improvisation and catching-up, 
said Bonifaz.  
Also, Peru needs to be tougher regarding compliance with labor and 
environmental standards, and needs to focus more on the creation of institutional 
capacities to ensure compliance. Fair and efficient administration of justice is an urgent 
institutional challenge. One current example is the exploitation of forests for exporting 
lumber.106 There is an international standard for sustainable logging, and there is an issue 
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in this area: logging happens in very remote zones, often under unsafe circumstances, 
meaning that there is a need to coordinate with the police and the army. Yet there is a 
lack of infrastructure to share that sort of information reliably.  
Progress with the implementation of the FTA will also affect other multilateral 
commitments. For example, Peru has been invited to be a member of the OECD. In 
achieved, entering the OECD would be a further positive signal to global investors that 
Peru is a mature market. Right now, the nation is in the “Country Program”, which is a 
precursor to full membership into the OECD. The Sustainable Development Objectives 
(SDOs) are also one of the main national policy focuses right now. In some ways, 
complying with the FTA makes it possible to reach many SDOs as well. The same with 
the OECD process of recognition. The essential point is that all these mandates help to 
reach a better institutional framework – a benefit of the FTA that will appear over time is 
improvement along such dimensions. 
Overall, from 2006 to the present-day things have evolved tremendously. As an 
anecdote, Bonifaz explained, there were members supporting the original negotiating 
team that did not even speak English. That is not the case anymore, but there is much 
way to travel still, he says.  
c. Challenges: 
Luz Barreto107 strongly believes that the FTA with the U.S. has been very 
beneficial for Peru because small and medium companies (SMEs) have had an 
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opportunity to sell their products to one of the largest countries in the world. She argues 
that while it is true that SMEs have to work very hard to meet the requirements of the 
U.S. market, pushing themselves to incorporate better processes, to properly label their 
products, and to innovate in the development of products is a very valuable process. 
Barreto also believes that U.S. companies have benefited as well from the FTA. They 
have an interesting market in Peru that can continue to grow, even though it represents a 
small market for the U.S. Since the implementation of the FTA, Peru has had to 
implement measures to take care of the environment that would otherwise been delayed. 
Also, embracing the strict requirements of U.S., SMEs in Peru have started to enter other 
global markets comfortably. 
Nevertheless, Barreto also recognizes that the FTA has affected a group of SMEs. 
She argues that comparing the size of the countries and their development, FTAs with the 
U.S. pushed Peru and Colombia to prepare their economies for the modernization of the 
government (even if at times perhaps at an uncomfortable pace). Also, liberalization of 
trade and investment has led to decreasing salaries in some sectors—a normal albeit 
uncomfortable impact of globalization. However, she brings attention to the related 
actions from the government to increase the inflows of FDI. The restructuration of the 
Trade offices aimed at changing the scope of their activities, promoting even more 
exports, imports and promotion of investments. 
                                                      
funded by Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to support companies from garment 
and agribusiness sector in the compliance of the U.S. requirements. Also, with this project 
her office developed market studies, commercial sheets and the companies participated in 
trade shows in the U.S.  
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Finally, Barreto points out how bilateral agreements may be the predominant 
trend in the future, in the light of events such as the failure of multilateral trade 
agreements and Brexit. Lastly, discussing a specific example, she explains how Peruvian 
companies, especially garment and textile sector must innovate in products, processes 
and trends. Nowadays, there is a relevant problem in the sector, because of the increased 
presence of competitors from China, Bangladesh, and Vietnam, among others. 
Unfortunately, argued Carlos Gonzales,108 the financial crisis in the U.S. had 
made it difficult to clearly evaluate the impact of the relevance. Since the agreement 
came into effect, there has been a decline in the volume of trade Peru and the U.S. 
However, exports of nontraditional products to the U.S. have grown substantially, 
especially non-traditional agricultural products. Also, in a positive development, after the 
FTA, Peruvian public bonds achieved investment grade by Moody’s and Standard & 
Poors (credit rating agencies109) because of the normative changes that provide more 
guaranties to foreign investors.  
Nevertheless, Gonzales pointed out that the proliferation of FTAs has made their 
own agreement with the U.S. less “preferential.” Therefore, Gonzales was optimistic in 
the work in progress to reach a deeper integration with the Pacific Alliance. In this area, 
and regarding the legacy of the FTA negotiations, he believed their structure served as a 
good point of reference during the talks for the Transpacific Partnership (TPP). In this 
                                                      
108 Carlos Gonzales, Director of Economic Studies, ADEX Peru. Gonzales was advisor to 
the Minister of Production, at the markets’ table during the FTA negotiation between 
Peru and the U.S. Gonzales also worked in the modifications to Customs Law  
109 A bond is considered investment grade if its credit rating is BBB- or higher by 
Standard & Poor's, or Baa3 or higher by Moody's. 
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realm, he points out how the CAN (Andean Countries) could not present an integrated 
front during the TPP meetings, and how even within the Peruvian group not all economic 
sectors had the same representation. But he considers these to secondary and solvable 
issues not related to the structure of the negotiations. 
Noelia Lobato110 had an altogether good impression of the negotiation process 
even while believing that some aspects could have gone better. In her particular area of 
expertise, Pensions, she has not noticed any improvement since the implementation of the 
FTA. Overall, she considers all that can be expected is for the implementation of the 
legislation created to fulfill the FTA obligations to continue and to further diffuse its 
reach.  
According to Dupuy, in the next 5 to 10 years, as the U.S. economy continues to 
improve, there will be more opportunities for exporters, especially for the Peruvian 
agricultural sector. Additional, it would be savvy to expand and improve the FTA, to 
include areas provisions similar to those in the TPP, such as strengthened sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues, and rules of origin issues.  
Box 6B. U.S. Section 301 report on Intellectual Property - Peru: 
FROM THE USTR REPORT. Peru remains on the Watch List in 2018. Peru took 
a number of positive steps relating to IP protection and enforcement in 2017. Peru 
successfully seized and shuttered several Spanish language websites known to host large 
volumes of pirated content. Peru has improved interagency coordination with respect to 
IP enforcement. Peru also established new specialized IP prosecutors in both the 
Ventanilla and Tumbes regions in 2017, although there are still many areas of the 
country where this expertise is unavailable. The United States remains concerned about 
the widespread availability of counterfeit and pirated products in Peru. Rights holders 
continue to report that Peru is a major source of unauthorized videos of copyrighted 
                                                      
110 Noelia Bernal Lobato – Economics Professor – Universidad del Pacifico – Peru - She 
assisted the analysis and negotiation of the Investment Chapter, particularly related to the 
Pension system in Peru. She worked in this capacity from May to July of 2005. This 
resolution contains the exact dates: http://spij.minjus.gob.pe/Normas/textos/050605T.pdf. 
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material (often taken with camcorders) and is the base of administrators of Spanish-
language websites that offer or facilitate the use or sale of pirated content and counterfeit 
goods, although Peru has begun to suspend the domains of some of these sites. The 
United States urges Peru to devote additional resources for IP enforcement, enhance its 
border controls, and build the technical IP-related capacity of its law enforcement 
officials, prosecutors, and judges. The United States also encourages Peru to undertake 
appropriate legislative reforms, such as by criminalizing camcording in a manner that 
allows for effective enforcement; to pursue prosecutions under the law that criminalizes 
the sale of counterfeit medicines; and to increase the imposition of deterrent-level fines 
and penalties for counterfeiting more broadly. In addition, the United States urges Peru 
to fully implement its obligations under the United States-Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement (PTPA), including by providing statutory damages and establishing limited 
liability for ISPs within the parameters of the PTPA. Stakeholders have raised concerns 
about two recent Indecopi decisions that limit the right to collect royalties for the public 
performance of musical works contained in audiovisual works.  
 
 
B. Review and Description of Peru and Colombia FTA Investment Chapters 
and their impact on FDI 
 
As mentioned before, in the case of Colombia and Peru, there are no longer free-
standing BITs with the U.S., but rather investment chapters embedded in the FTAs 
themselves. FTAs appear to have had substantial impacts in terms of increasing FDI 
flows to the Latin American countries under study. The FTAs established a secure, 
predictable legal framework for U.S. investors operating in these countries, and many of 
these benefits are arguably extended to investors from other countries. These results 
appear to be primary achievements of the FTAs. 
Generally, FTAs with the U.S. give investors the right to establish, acquire, and operate 
investments on an equal footing with local investors and investors of other countries with 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or investment chapters in FTAs with said countries. 
They also provide U.S. investors abroad safeguards that foreign investors have under the 
U.S. legal system, including due process and the right to receive fair market value for 
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property in the event of an expropriation. Investor-state arbitration is available for 
breaches of investment agreements. 
Looking into each country’s investment regimes in relation with the FTA stipulations 
(see details in Appendix 4), sectors with additional FDI potential include: financial, fast-
food and restaurant chains, education (Satellite higher-education campuses, professional 
education, tutoring and enrichment, and language and test-preparation centers), clothing 
manufacturing and retail, courier/delivery services, accounting and tourism (including 
increased airline transit, number of airlines, and hotels). Investments in media and 
broadcasting are usually restricted. Telecommunications, transportation, infrastructure, 
utilities, mining, oil and forestry are usually covered by special investment regimes 
designed to secure national interests and social needs to certain extent. 
Colombia and Peru have enjoyed, until recently, an investment environment with 
favorable external conditions including significant increases in commodity prices and a 
sustained fall in real world interest rates. These two countries have achieved growth rates 
higher than the rest of Latin America and have even been called the “Andean idols” as 
they have engaged in a growth race of sorts.111 Overall, Latin America benefited from a 
commodity price boom in the decade from 2004 to 2013, which was longer than previous 
episodes, and connected with strong income gains. After the decline suffered during 2014 
and 2015, so-called “second-round structural reforms” and public investment in 
complementary goods and services should now be the main policy tools for jumpstarting 
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private investment. Such second-round  reforms include continued export diversification, 
increases in education and R&D spending, and reduction of bureaucratic red-tape.112 
These reforms would jumpstart investment by moving the economy as a whole from 




Colombia has experienced substantial growth in the inflows of FDI during the last decade 
and a half. The extent to which this is directly the result of the FTA with the U.S. needs 
to be further evaluated. Overall, FDI in Colombia has grown more than 500 percent 
between 2001 and 2013, mainly pushed by the rapidly expanding oil and mining industry 
in the country. In 2001 total FDI was $2.5 billion and in 2013 it totaled $16.8 billion. In 
turn, U.S. FDI to Colombia jumped from just over $800 million in 2001 to almost $3 
billion in 2013. However, FDI inflows have slowed in the last few years, due to lower oil 
prices (at least until recently) and slower growth prospects. FDI fell to $12.1 billion in 
2015 but improved in 2016 partly due to the sale of a state-owned electricity utility 
company. About $13.6 billion in FDI entered the country in 2016. FDI increased almost 
5% in 2017, according to Colombia’s central bank. Companies from 46 countries 
invested a total of $14.5 billion in 2017. 
                                                      




Source: Banco de la Republica de Colombia 
The infrastructure sector is particularly promising as Colombia is undergoing an 
extensive infrastructure expansion (an investment of about $5.5 billion).  Although the 
greatest recipients of FDI by sector continue to be the oil industry and mining, 
investments in other sectors including manufacturing, commerce, telecommunications 
and transportation, and financial services are on the rise.113 In particular, Colombia 
experienced relevant developments in other economic areas:114  
• Retail Trade: Cencosud, Falabella and Parque Arauco, all Chilean groups, are 
investing to expand and upgrade their facilities in the country  
• Hotel Sector: the Spanish group NH acquired 87% of Hoteles Royal for around 
$96 million 
• Transportation (Ports): the Danish firm APM Terminals, the port operator of the 
Maersk Group, is planning to invest some $200 million in the port of Cartagena, 
after signing an agreement with the Compañía de Puertos Asociados, Compas 
S.A. This move shows confidence in a recovery in international trade 
• Vehicle Manufacturing: U.S. General Motors announced its intention to invest 
some $100 million in its Colombian plant in the next few years 
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http://www.banrep.gov.co/en/balance-of-payments  















































































































• Construction Materials (Cement): the Spanish firm Cementos Molins and the 
Colombian group Corona agreed to the joint production of cement in Colombia, 
announcing investments of $370 million 
Colombia is part of thirteen FTAs or agreements of economic cooperation including 
investment chapters: with the U.S., European Union, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Cuba, 
Andean Community of Nations (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru), European Free Trade Area 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela), the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala), South Korea, Costa Rica, and the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Mexico, and 
Peru). Colombia signed trade agreements with Israel and Panama in 2013, which are still 
awaiting final ratification. Additionally, Colombia is in FTA negotiations with Japan and 
Turkey. Five more agreements are in the early exploration stages: with Australia, China, 
the Dominican Republic, India, and Singapore. Colombia also is part of stand-alone BITs 
in force with China, India, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Japan.115 
Up to 2011, no international arbitral claim had been brought against Colombia under an 
international investment protection treaty, because: 
a. The limited number of international investment agreements in force 
b. Most of such agreements were fairly recent (late 2000s or later) 
c. Colombia’s earlier investment frameworks were limited in scope (not including 
fair and equitable treatment, for example) 
                                                      






d. A number of Colombia’s most attractive investing sectors were liberalized only 
recently (unbundling of state monopolies and privatizations). This is particularly 
true for the hydrocarbons sector. 
However, in October 2012 the new National and International Arbitration Statute (Law 
1563 of 2012) entered into force, in an effort to streamline the arbitration process and 
make the enforcement of awards more reliable. In early 2016, three different cases were 
brought against Colombia for international arbitration by mining companies (one of them 
from the U.S.) alleging damages due to expropriation and other issues regarding the 
definition of national/public territory.116 
Through the Colombia-U.S. FTA, Colombia allows for substantial market access across 
its entire services sector. It also agreed to eliminate measures that prevented U.S. firms 
from hiring U.S. professionals, and will phase out market restrictions in cable television. 
Colombia will also offer improved access for U.S. suppliers of portfolio management 
services. The agreement contains some other important regulations, many of them quite 
more liberal than those included in previous agreements: 
• Most-favored nation treatment: Does not encompass dispute resolution 
mechanisms (Art. 10.4.2 n.2); and limits exemptions, allowing them only for 
procurement, subsidies and grants, guarantees and insurance (Art.10.13) 
• Free transfers of capital: In contrast to other bilateral agreements, the U.S. FTA 
does not make an exception for macroeconomic or balance of payment difficulties  
• Expropriation: In contrast to other bilateral agreements, the U.S. FTA clearly 
links the definition of public purpose to customary/public international law 
(Art.10.7.1(a)n.5) 
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• Performance requirements: although they are included in most of Colombia’s 
international investment agreements, some remarkable exceptions appear in the 
investment chapter of the U.S.-FTA (Arts. 10.9, 10.10) 
• Dispute resolution and “essential security interest”: in the Colombia-U.S. FTA, if 
in an arbitral proceeding, a State party invokes an essential security interest as an 
exception to its treaty obligations, such exception shall apply (Ch.22.2 n.2) 
 
Finally, the Colombia-U.S. FTA addresses intellectual property right violations that had 
been flagrant in the past.117 Enhancements include advanced protections for digital 
products such as software, music, text, and videos, stronger protection for U.S. patents, 
trademarks, and test data, including an electronic system for the registration and 
maintenance of trademarks, and discouragement of piracy and counterfeiting by 
criminalizing “end-use” piracy (see more details on changes in appendix 4). 
Looking forward, as President Juan Manuel Santos leaves office and a new president 
enters office in August 2018, the continued implementation of the peace agreement that 
was signed with left-wing rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) -- but not readily accepted by the Colombian people via referendum -- would 
enable the government to expand the rule of law, deepen rural development, and attract 
investors worried about security. However, the continuity of this peace treaty 
implementation remains under question. Depending on the election outcome, political 
conflicts may destabilize the business environment.  The Santos administration and 
conservative opposition leaders largely agree on economic policy. If the leftist candidate 
wins the election, however, then important changes for investors are to be expected. 
                                                      
117 Optical disc piracy of music and film entertainment product is widespread. The 
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Box 7. Case Study: Cementos Argos 
Argos is a Colombian construction materials producer, with the largest share in the 
cement market in Colombia; it is also the second largest cement producer in the South-
East U.S. region and has investments in Panama, Honduras, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. It is the second largest concrete producer in the U.S. and it also exports cement 
and clinker to 27 countries around the world. While Colombia is where Argos produces 
the most cement, the U.S. is where Argos has its largest concrete production capacity 
(8.9 million cubic meters per year). There are 134 concrete production plants and 1,350 
mixers. Argos' concrete production capacity in Colombia is only 1.7 million cubic meters 
per year, with 40 plants and 230 mixers. 
Argos is set to benefit from the greatest emphasis in infrastructure investment by the 
Trump administration. Also, the firm planned to invest at least $120 million during 2017 
and 2018 in innovation and technology, in an effort to increase its capacity.118 
Argos case is a very particular instance where an Andean-based company expands in 
such magnitude to a Northern market. While Argos strategy was set to be fulfilled in spite 
of the ups-and-downs of the FTA negotiations, the company recognized the unique 




Peru has also received larger inflows of FDI during most of the last decade. Again, the 
extent to which this is directly the result of the FTA with the U.S. still needs to be further 
evaluated. While FDI flows into Peru attained a record level in 2007-2008, they fell in 
2009 due to the global recession. FDI inflows then rebounded in 2010 and the following 
years, reflecting the region's economic growth, reaching close to US$12 billion in 2012 
before starting to decline in 2013. According to a study by the IMF and looking at the 
decade between 2004 and 2013, real GDP growth averaged 6.4 percent, with investment 
accounting for about 3 percentage points of this growth.119 Peru enjoyed a cumulative 
income growth of around 85 percent of GDP since 2003, with a larger portion of this 
                                                      
118 http://www.portafolio.co/negocios/empresas/cemargos-la-empresa-que-se-
beneficiaria-con-las-politicas-de-trump-501825 
119 IMF, 2015, p.4 
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bonanza allocated to domestic investment than in previous periods of rapid economic 
growth. Falling real world interest rates combined with Peru’s improved credit rating also 
gave Peruvian firms increased access to inexpensive external financing.120 However, such 
external financing often takes the shape of private corporate bonds, are subject to the 
vulnerabilities of changes in exchange rates, and are not a realistic form of financing for 
small and medium enterprises in Peru.   
Compared to 2015, FDI into Peru dropped by 17% in 2017, totaling US$ 6.9 
billion. According to the Peru’s Central Bank the FDI inflow in 2017 contracted 1.36% 
compared to 2016, totaling USD 6.7 billion. Peru's FDI comes primarily from Spain (the 
largest investor), the rest of the European Union, the United States and Great Britain. 
Chile, Brazil and the Netherlands are also among the major investors. In general, Peru’s 
best qualities for investors are its attractive legislative and fiscal framework, and a 
dynamic mining sector. Most FDI goes into the extractive industry sector. Peru is the fifth 
global destination for exploration of nonferrous metals.121 
As explained above, FDI inflows towards the mining sector now constitute a somewhat 
smaller proportion of all FDI inflows. Among the developments in other sectors 
include:122 
• Power Generation: A consortium headed by Chilean company Colbún bought 
power generator Fénix Power for $786 million. This was in one of the biggest 
cross-border M&A transactions recorded in Latin America and the Caribbean in 
2015.  
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121 ECLAC, 2017, p.61 
122 ECLAC, 2016, p.53 
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• Beverages: At the beginning of 2016, the Mexican firm Arca Continental, Coca 
Cola’s second-largest bottling company in Latin America, completed its purchase 
of 48% of Corporación Lindley, with a transaction of $760 million.  
• Banking: Following its regional expansion policy —focused on Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru— Canada’s Scotiabank acquired the Peruvian assets of U.S.-
based Citibank for $295 million. 
• Construction (cement): the Chinese firm Tangshan Jidong Cement Co., the 
world’s sixth-largest cement maker, announced its intention to buy Cementos 
Interoceánicos.  
• Telecommunications: following the acquisition of Nextel in 2013, the Chilean 
firm Entel has invested around $500 million to upgrade its network. Spain’s 
Telefónica has invested some $8.5 billion in recent years and has announced new 
investments amounting to $2 billion for the period 2015-2017. 
• Tourism (Hotels): According to the Sociedad Hoteles del Perú (SHP), hotel 
investment in that country should amount to $1.2 billion between 2015 and 2018 
(concerning 102 projects adding about 7,676 rooms in 3-, 4- and 5-star hotels). In 
contrast to the investments of $550 million. made from 2010 to 2014.  
• Petroleum (Refinery): the Spanish oil company Repsol invested $215 million in 
modernizing the La Pampilla refinery. 
• Energy: Norway’s Statkraft inaugurated the new Cheves hydroelectric plant, after 
investing $636 million. 
A number of copper mines are set to start production between 2015 and 2022, thereby 
expanding copper production significantly.123  
A multi-agency commission (the negotiating Commission on Investment Promotion and 
Mutual Protection Conventions) was created in 2003 with the only purpose of negotiating 
BITs and investment chapters within FTAs. The commission includes a representative 
from Proinversion (the private investment promotion agency), the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Of the two countries, Peru has the most BITs and FTAs with investment 
chapters. Additionally, a new Arbitration law passed in 2006 as part of the preparation for 
the U.S. FTA. Therefore, Peru has already been involved in a number of investment 
                                                      
123 IMF, 2015, p.6 
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disputes, a few of which have resulted in granting of awards (mostly partial) requested by 
the claimant. 
The Peru-U.S. FTA compels Peru to respect the ILO-defined core rights of its labor 
force. On January 15, 2010, Congress approved a new labor procedure law (No. 29497) 
to advance the efficiency of resolving labor disputes. Also, in January 2010, Peru and the 
U.S. created the bilateral Labor Affairs Council as mandated in Article 17.5 of the FTA. 
The agreement also contains requirements to improve IPR protection124 and government 
procurement practices (one of several laws passed with the specific intention to 
implement the FTA was the Government Procurement Law - Legislative Decree No. 
1017, DL 1017). 
In addition, the agreement, in its investment chapter, contains the following 
relevant regulations: 
• National treatment and most-favored-nation: In the U.S.-FTA a “Non-
Conforming Measures” section has been included as an exception (Art.10-
13). 
• Free Transfer of Capital: The U.S.-FTA establishes that the freedom to 
transfer funds is limited by the rules on bankruptcy, insolvency, or 
protection of creditors’ rights; transactions with future securities, options, 
or derivatives; criminal or penal infringements; good faith enforcement of 
Arbitration awards or Judgments (Art.10.8). 
• Performance requirements: The U.S.-FTA prohibits most forms of 
performance requirements, except in compliance with articles 31 and 39 of 
the WTO agreement on TRIPS or if ordered by a court to remedy 
uncompetitive practices (Art.10.9(2)). Additionally, parties are not 
prohibited from conditioning receipt or continued receipt of an advantage 
on compliance with a requirement to locate production, supply a service, 
train or employ workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or carry 
out R&D, in its territory (Art.10.9(3)). Furthermore, commitments of such 
                                                      
124 Improvements include protections for digital products such as U.S. software, music, 
text, and video; protection for U.S. patents, trademarks and pharmaceutical and 
agrochemical test data; legal penalties to deter piracy; and an electronic system to register 
and maintain trademarks. 
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type are enforceable if necessary to comply with environmental and labor 
laws, provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable way. 
• Dispute resolution: The U.S.-FTA requires a 90-day written notice before 
any claim can be submitted to arbitration, and only if the dispute is still 
not resolved after six months have elapsed since the event giving rise to 
the claim, legal arbitration may be pursued (Art.10.16(2&3)). 
Finally, new laws promoting in-house R&D through tax concessions are being 
implemented (Law 30056, of July 2013). 
Box 8. Corporate Governance, M&A, and FDI 
As mentioned above, a significant amount of the FDI coming into Colombia and Peru is 
destined to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Some researchers have argued that FDI 
operations involving cross-border M&A have positive spillover effects for the sector in 
which the target firm operates, regarding corporate governance, market valuation and 
productivity of rival firms.125 At the same time, it has been suggested that international 
mergers and acquisitions benefit from better corporate governance regimes provided by 
the local governments. The evidence indicates that the volume of M&A activity is 
relatively higher in countries with stronger shareholder protection and better accounting 
standards.126 
The Economic Commission of Latin American Countries, ECLAC, developed a 
benchmark indicator that measures the level of corporate governance in corporate debt 
issuance, for selected countries127. That benchmark was adapted to analyze the level of a 
country’s regulation over corporate governance in the case of M&As. Interestingly, per 
this indicator, between 2004 and 2015, Colombia made the greatest number of 
improvements to its corporate governance regulations (jumping from 0.93 in 2004 to 
7.66 in 2015, in a scale from 0 to 10). Also, of the seven countries considered, Peru 
showed the highest level of corporate governance (7.76 in 2015). In general, between 
2013 and 2014 there were significant changes in corporate governance regulations in the 
four member countries of the Integrated Latin American Market (MILA, which includes 
Colombia and Peru, along with Mexico and Chile) probably in the context of 
harmonizing capital markets legislation between the countries that are part of the 
securities markets integration initiative. 
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As this last section on FDI conditions in Peru and Colombia show, both countries are 
benefiting from a more comprehensive investment regime as imposed by the FTAs. Not 
only has FDI diversified in a seemingly significant way, both in terms of countries of 
origin as well as economic sectors, but the guarantees provided for foreign investors are 
bound to achieve a level similar to OECD countries, once and if the provisions on the 
FTAs are fully and satisfactorily implemented.  
C. Quantitative Analysis:  
Methodology: 
One of the purposes of this study is to explore the possible impact of these FTAs on non-
traditional exports (export diversification) and FDI inflows to the developing countries 
under study. My goal is to analyze whether the FTAs have had an observable association 
with exports and FDI, and if it indeed took the expected positive direction. Additionally, 
looking at social and macroeconomic indicators of the last few decades, I briefly analyze 
how much the implementation of these FTAs is correlated with outcomes such as  
economic growth, overall export growth, and employment growth. For this purpose, 
relevant statistics for Chile (whose FTA with U.S. came into effect in 2004) and Ecuador 
(without an FTA with the U.S.) are included for comparison purposes. 
From a financial market perspective, there are conditions that may ease the process 
of implementation of investment provisions of an FTA such as the degree of financial 
sophistication, openness, and accountability. These conditions matter because, as many of 
the researchers presented in the literature review above believe, FTAs seem to have 
positive effects on FDI mostly when the macroeconomic policy environment is favorable. 
And lastly, from an educational point of view, access to skilled labor is also a 
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determinant for increased FDI inflows. In other words, an FTA will have the largest 
positive impact on the partners of the U.S. if the developing countries already have 
considerable amounts of skilled labor, and are successful in attracting investments that 
contribute to increase the percentage of skilled workers. 
The quantitative portion of this analysis evaluates the changes in non-traditional exports 
and FDI inflows occurring before and after the signing and implementation of these 
FTAs, as well as their correlation with relevant macroeconomic and socioeconomic 
indicators. To document the increases in FDI that may be attributed to the negotiation and 
implementation of both FTAs, available data is examined at the industry level whenever 
possible.  
Considering the available sources of data,  the following is a detailed list of sources: 
• Investment Map: Source from the International Trade Centre. Provides detailed 
sectoral FDI data (stock and flows) and trade data. Preferential access to this 
website was granted for a month in 2016 to capture the most detailed available 
data. http://www.investmentmap.org/prioritySector.aspx 
• Trade sources: 
o Trade Map (www.trademap.com): Source from the International Trade 
Centre. Sectoral data (2-digit group, 99 categories) from 2001 to 2016, at 
country level 
o ALADI – Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración. Provides detailed 
trade data for Colombia and Peru, including by sector (8 categories) 
starting in 2002. 
http://consultawebv2.aladi.org/sicoexV2/jsf/totales_comercio_exterior.sea
m?cid=39106 
o World Trade Organization - WTO: Global data, country profiles, overall 
tariff averages. http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm 
• First-hand data from country agencies. 
o Colombia: The National Administrative Department of Statistics -DANE- 
is the entity responsible for the planning, collection, processing, analysis, 
and dissemination of Colombia’s official statistics. Labor indicators 
(productivity), trade, balance of payments, social indicators 
http://dane.gov.co/index.php/about-dane  
o Peru : Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, INEI 
http://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 
Statistics (labor, balance of payments, prices) 
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https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y 
de Administración Tributaria – SUNAT – Foreign trade statistics 
http://www.sunat.gob.pe/estad-comExt/modelo_web/web_estadistica.htm 
• World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/) for other relevant explanatory and 
control variables (economic growth, GDP, population, FDI -- country level-
bilateral--, foreign aid, educational levels and other social indicators) and for the 
“Doing Business” survey. 
• The Conference Board: Output, Labor and Labor Productivity Data. The 
Conference Board Total Economy Database (Adjusted version), March 2018, 
http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/ 
• International Monetary Fund, Financial Soundness Indicators (http://data.imf.org). 
The key FSI indicator is “bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%).” 
Other interesting data from the IMF is the Financial Development Indexes, which 
measure depth, access, and efficiency of the financial institutions and the financial 
markets.128 The World Bank also compiles a global financial development 
database (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/global-financial-
development/Type/TABLE/preview/on) where similar indicators are available129 
• Governance Indicators from the World Bank, including the Government 
Effectiveness indicator130 
                                                      
128 The financial development index (FD) is a relative ranking of the countries. It is an 
aggregate of the financial institutions index (FI) and financial markets (FM) index. 
FI is an aggregate of Depth (FID – complies data on bank credit to the private sector in 
GDP%, pension fund assets to GDP, mutual fund assets to GDP, and insurance 
premiums, life and non-life to GDP), Access (FIA – compiles data on bank branches per 
100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults), and Efficiency (FIE – compiles data on 
banking sector net margin, lending-deposits spread, non-interest income to total income, 
overhead costs to total assets, return to assets and return to equity). 
FM is an aggregate of Depth (FMD – complies data on stock capitalization to GDP, 
stocks traded to GDP, international debt securities of government to GDP, and total 
securities of financial and nonfinancial corporations to GDP), Access (FMA – compiles 
data on % of market capitalization outside the top 10 largest companies and total number 
of issuers of debt per 100,000 adults), and Efficiency (FME – compiles data on stock 
market turnover ratio, which is stocks traded to capitalization). 
129 Of particular interest are those provided by Bankscope, Bureau van Dijk. These 
include 5-bank asset concentration, Bank Z-score (captures the probability of default of a 
country's banking system), Boone indicator (a measure of degree of competition, 
calculated as the elasticity of profits to marginal costs; the more negative the Boone 
indicator, the higher the degree of competition is because the effect of reallocation is 
stronger), and the Lerner index (a measure of market power in the banking market). 
130 Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
120 
 
 Data Analysis: 
Data are available for Colombia, Peru, Chile and Ecuador from about 2001 to 2017. I am 
looking at total FDI inflows to Peru and Colombia from all over the world, and also to 
sectoral FDI data. For trade data, I am considering three groups of data. The first includes 
only a simple differentiation between traditional and non-traditional exports. The second 
includes broad export categories provided by the ALADI. The third is a dataset with 
exports sectoral data (2-digit trade categories), with about 100 categories for each 
country. 
In order to start this analysis, it is important to have as a reference the evolution of 
bilateral exchange rate (not included for Ecuador because it is a dollarized economy) and 
relevant commodity prices during this period. While Peru’s and Colombia’s currencies 
appreciated against the U.S. dollar between 2006 and 2014, hurting the prospects of 
exporters, Chile’s currency followed a somewhat opposite pattern. Interestingly, the 
prices of crude oil, copper, silver, gold and coffee all peaked around 2011, with dips 
around 2008 that coincide with the global financial crises (except for coffee): 
  
Source: Central Banks, IMF    Source: International Coffee Organization 
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Correlation with Non-traditional Exports 
To begin with, looking at the statistics for overall exports of goods and services, it 
becomes apparent that they follow very similar trends in all four countries (Chile and 
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Source: World Bank, WDI 
However, looking at exports by category for each country, more particular trends stand 
out. In the chart below, for Colombia, the weight of fuel exports is very clear. However, 
it is noticeable how other export categories, manufactures in particular, begin to increase 
between 2005 and 2007, coinciding with the signature of the FTA. This makes sense 
because it was a time of high expectations and favorable exchange rates for exporters. 
Then there is the dip after 2008 that coincides with the global financial crisis and less 
favorable exchange rates, but in spite of the latter not depreciating until 2014 or so, there 
is some stability for non-mineral and non-fuel exports that surrounds the year when the 












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 9. Exports of goods and services (current US$)




Looking at the bottom three more closely: 
 
Minerals and metals respond mostly to commodity prices, loosely following the trend of 
fuels, but also not majorly affected by the 2008 financial crisis. The evolution of 
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FIGURE 10. COLOMBIA - Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)
Beverage, food and tobacco Agricultural Raw Materials
Minerals and metals Manufactures
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FIGURE 11. COLOMBIA - Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)









anticipation of the FTA signing and ratification, with the 2008 financial crisis in between. 
As mentioned in the interviews’ portion of this study, there have been successes in snack 
and dairy industries exporting their products; also included in this category are gourmet 
coffee products and other fruit-based specialty beverages (counting concentrates and fruit 
pulps). Agricultural raw materials encompasses traditional exports such as unprocessed 
coffee and cereals. 
In the case of Peru: 
 
Once again, most categories follow the trend of anticipation of the FTA signing and 
ratification, with the 2008 financial crisis in between. However, as mentioned before, 
minerals and metals exports respond to commodity prices and to previously outlined 
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FIGURE 12. PERU - Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)
Beverage, food and tobacco Agricultural Raw Materials









It is interesting how manufactures, and beverages, food and tobacco increase more 
rapidly starting in 2004 and through 2008, and once the FTA is ratified they take off. 
Curiously, the fuel category follows a similar trend. Peru is not a vast petroleum 
producer, but since 2004 it has benefit from natural gas exploitation.  
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FIGURE 13. PERU - Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)
Beverage, food and tobacco Agricultural Raw Materials








At first glance, the minerals and metals category follows a curve almost identical to 
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FIGURE 14. CHILE - Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)
Beverage, food and tobacco Agricultural Raw Materials
Fuel, mineral lubricants, and related products Minerals and metals
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FIGURE 15. CHILE - Exports by Sector (thousands of US$)
Beverage, food and tobacco
Agricultural Raw Materials
Fuel, mineral lubricants, and related products
Manufactures




The increases in manufactures, and beverages, food and tobacco seem smoother from 
2002 to 2008 than those in Peru and Colombia, with no apparent evidence of accelerated 
growth in 2006. However, the Chilean peso had appreciated against the U.S.$ around that 
time, so this fact might explain at least part of the slower growth. Overall, 2009 is a 
rebound year in most cases, but comparing Chile to Peru the increases from that point 
forward are also less sharp, even taking into account the exchange rate behavior. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting how the agricultural raw materials is a more sizable 
category for Chile, reflecting its focus in agricultural exports of a variety of fruits (taking 
advantage of its seasonal availability, which is opposite to that of the northern 
hemisphere). Finally for Chile, the most remarkable increases in exports from 2012 (the 
year of the Colombia-U.S. FTA) is in the beverage, food and tobacco category, which 
overall has the most positive trend for Chile, and responds to an export policy that seeks 
to increase the forward linkages of its agricultural production. 
Comparing now traditional versus non-traditional exports exclusively for Peru and 





Both traditional and non-traditional exports were slowly climbing at the time the FTA 
with the U.S. was signed. As mentioned above, traditional exports, mainly consisting of 
petroleum, kept their momentum and then some all the way to 2013, only with a small 
dip in 2008. As explained above for the categories other than Petroleum, non-traditional 
exports did not seem to get a boost after the FTA was ratified, but they have managed to 
remain at levels higher than those registered before the FTA started being negotiated in 
2004. In spite of less favorable exchange rates. Nevertheless, not all non-traditional 












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
FIGURE 16. COLOMBIA - Traditional vs Non-Traditional 
Exports (thousands of US$)







Observe how the trend of overall non-traditional exports follows that of Industrial non-
traditional exports. Agriculture by itself has managed to maintain a modest growth and 
remain at levels higher than those of the early 2000s. This is significant, because, again, 
the Colombian peso appreciated against the U.S. dollar from about 2008 to 2014, and just 
recently have exporters started to benefit again form a depreciated exchange rate. This 
means non-traditional agricultural exports managed to keep their gained ground in spite 
of adverse external conditions.   
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FIGURE 17. COLOMBIA - Non-traditional Exports by 
category (Millions of U.S.$)







Source: Banco de la Republica de Colombia 
Of the categories above only gold seems to follow an anti-cyclical pattern. Indeed, the 
price of gold consistently climbed during the year in between the signature and the 
ratification of the FTA. The chemical industry and other industries show sizable increases 
both around 2006 and 2012. Of course, as mentioned repeatedly, there was the 2008 
financial crisis in between, but the correlation with the ratification of the FTA is apparent 
because, as stated above, exporters were facing an appreciated exchange rate at the time. 
Flowers and bananas follow the trend explained earlier for the non-traditional agriculture 
sector. Interestingly, textiles and paper are categories that exhibited increases right after 
the signing of the FTA, but not after its ratification, perhaps due to increased competition. 
Finally, because “other industry” is such a large sub-category, it is worth looking into 
those HS 2-digit codes that have reached the top ten list of exports in recent years: 
plastics, motor vehicles and parts, and industrial machinery:131 
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FIGURE 18. COLOMBIA - Non-traditional Exports -
Highlighted categories (Millions of U.S.$)
Bananas Flowers Other agriculture Gold








Source; International Trade Centre 
Of the three categories, plastics has been evolving particularly well. In particular, 
production of plastic packages and containers has boomed, with investments from 
Kimberly-Clark (U.S.), Unilever (U.K.) and Procter and Gamble (U.K). and exports to 
not only the Andean region and the U.S., but also to Brazil and Chile132. Overall, plastics 
went from exporting about U.S.$400 million in 2001 to over U.S.$1.2 billion, with a peak 
of U.S.$1.6 billion in 2014, a 400% increase. Motor vehicles and parts is a category that 
correlates particularly well with the signing and ratification of the FTA. Colombia’s 
motor vehicle industry is not new. During the time of import-substitutions policy, 
Colombia’s motor vehicle assembly industry grew stronger. With the entry of more 
competition as the economy opened, Colombia specialized in motorcycles, light vehicles, 
trucks and buses, Investments in this sector come from Renault (France, longest standing 












2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
FIGURE 19. COLOMBIA - Promising exports
(thousands of U.S.$)







assembling plant in the city of Medellin), Suzuki and Toyota (Japan), Hero (India), Foton 
(China), and GM and Johnsons Controls (U.S.).133  
Regarding the case of Peru: 
 
Source: SUNAT (Statistics Division) 
Traditional exports are still the largest and follow the trend of total exports (to see the 
evolution of traditional exports in detail, including all commodities and fish products, go 
to figures 46 to 48 in Appendix 3). Traditional exports respond to commodity prices and 
to the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008. Nevertheless, there is a possible effect 
hard to separate from those overpowering factors: There have been more foreign 
investments in mining, and natural gas and petroleum exploration. To the extent that 
these investors feel any additional confidence because of the commitments to the 
investment chapters in the FTAs, then the increases in traditional exports can also be 
explained, at least in part, by the signing and ratifying of the FTA. 













2000 2001 20022003 2004 20052006 2007 2008 20092010 2011 20122013 2014 20152016 2017
FIGURE 20. PERU - Traditional vs Nontraditional Exports
(Thousands of US$)
Traditional nontraditional Total
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Looking closely now at Peru’s non-traditional exports, the top curve in chart below 
exhibits once again the pattern of fast growing exports in the years surrounding the FTA 
signing and ratification, with the adjustment in 2008. Textiles and agriculture and 
livestock are the most salient categories within non-traditional exports. However, while 
textiles seem to lose momentum after 2012 (perhaps due to increased competition), 
agriculture and livestock continue to grow consistently (2017 statistics are preliminary 
and/or might not include all year): 
  
Source: Peru – SUNAT (Statistics Division) 
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FIGURE 21. PERU - Non-traditional exports 
(thousands of U.S.$)
Agriculture & Livestock TEXTILE Fishing
Chamicals METAL-MECHANIC Metal-Iron & Steel








Source: Peru – SUNAT (Statistics Division) 
These five subcategories start to grow slowly in the years from 2000 to 2004. Iron and 
Steel exports grow very rapidly in 2006, but it is unlikely that this spike has too much 
relation to the FTA; it is more likely related to demand from China. Chemical exports on 
the other part increase rapidly between 2006 and 2008 and once again between 2009 and 
2012. Chemical industry is one of the areas where middle income countries like Peru can 
take advantage of FTAs benefits. Fishing related products is a category that is particular 
to Peru in its potential to create additional exports, because Peru is naturally a fishing 
exporting country, and going further in the value-chain by exported processed fish 
products makes sense. Although wood and paper grow throughout the period, but they do 
not do as well as the other non-traditional exports. Finally, metal-mechanic exports 
exhibit a moderate but constantly growing trend until about 2015; this is another area 
where Peru can take advantage of adding to value-chains and seems to be doing so. 
As an additional approach to analyzing the trade issue quantitatively, the following charts 
show how merchandise trade concentration changed over the period over study, including 
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FIGURE 22. PERU - Non-traditional exports 
(thousands of U.S.$)







Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Regarding the number of products exported, notice how Chile, Colombia and Peru, the 
countries with FTAs and liberalized trade, have reached an almost identical level, closer 
to 240 products. In particular, while Peru was in a similar starting level with Ecuador in 
1995, it climbed very quickly in the 2000s. 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Curiously, for the number of products imported, the levels for Chile, Colombia and Peru, 









Figure 23. Number or Products Exported

































































































Figure 24. Number of Products Imported




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
The concentration index, also named Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (Product HHI), is a 
measure of the degree of product concentration. An index value closer to 1 indicates a 
country's exports or imports are highly concentrated in a few products while values closer 
to 0 reflect more diversified trade. In the graphic above note how overall, Ecuador’s 
index is always above that of Chile, Colombia and Peru. However, during the 20-year 
period all indexes move up and down, perhaps cyclically following resource price booms 
and drops, all landing in indexes comparable to the starting ones.  
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Overall, for all four countries the import concentration index is low. This illustrates the 































































































Figure 25. Export Concentration Index
































































































Figure 26. Import Concentration Index




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
The diversification index is computed by measuring the absolute deviation of the trade 
structure of a country from world structure, taking values between 0 and 1. A value closer 
to 1 indicates greater divergence from the world pattern. Looking at this index, Chile, 
Ecuador and Peru stay at similar higher levels, in the 0.7-0.8 range. Colombia’s index 
remains lower at all times, although above 0.55 at all times, declining particularly swiftly 
between 2003 and 2008 (the years leading to the when the FTA with the U.S. was first 
signed). Peru follows a slower yet steadier decline between 2003 and 2014. This 
difference between the countries may be regarded as evidence that, while in Colombia 
there was a lot of anticipation for the possibilities of the FTA that came to a halt once it 
was signed but not ratified, in Peru the same anticipation only gained momentum as the 

































































































Figure 27. Export Diversification Index




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
In the graphic above, once again, Ecuador’s index is consistently above that of Chile, 
Colombia and Peru. Chile’s is the lowest, perhaps denoting a greater integration with the 
World economy. Also, notice how the Peruvian and Colombian indexes seem to be in a 
constant decline all through the 2000s, again signaling their greater trade integration and 
their commitment to a more open economy. 
Correlation with FDI: 
Looking at the changes on FDI in total and disaggregated by economic sectors (charts 
below), it is evident than in the last twelve years or so FDI in tertiary activities has 
increased significantly. This represents a move from a strong dependence in 






























































































Figure 28. Import Diversification Index




Source: World Bank, WDI 
Observing the chart above, Colombia and Peru show positive trends in FDI inflows both 
at the time the FTAs were signed as well as the time they were ratified. In Peru, however, 
there was an ongoing positive trend that does not seem to accelerate dramatically 
between 2002 and 2010. In Colombia, on the other hand, the years before 2006 were only 
disturbed by a spike in 2005 due to the acquisition of the largest Colombian brewery, 
Bavaria, by SAB Miller (South Africa),134 which was a one-time event involving one of 
Colombia’s most successful companies. At the time, Bavaria was the second largest 
brewery in South America, and had a market share of 99% in Colombia and Peru, 93% in 
Ecuador and 79% in Panama. In 2007 and 2008, Colombia received an increasing 
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Figure 29. FDI, net inflows (BoP, current US$)

















number of greenfield projects, attracting 66 and 73 greenfield projects, respectively.135 
FDI inflows in 2009 reflect the effects of the financial crisis of 2008, with all countries in 
the chart experiencing decreasing inflows of FDI. The years between 2009 and 2012 
exhibit clear positive trends for the three countries with a signed FTA. However, 
Colombia presents a continuing decline up to 2010, followed by a sharp increase in 2011, 
which could possibly reflect Obama’s commitment towards ratifying the FTA, expressed 
in April of that year136. This positive trend continues in Colombia through 2013, which 
does not seem apparent in Peru and Chile.  
In order to further evaluate the possible factors affecting these trends, I evaluate FDI by 
sector in the next three charts: 
                                                      







Source: Investment Map, International Trade Centre 
In the chart above, 2017 shows preliminary data. Looking at Petroleum, it is apparent that 
the positive trend that was already ongoing in 2003 was not changed by the FTA signing 
in 2006. Also, the increases from 2009 to 2012 coincide with very high oil prices, and as 
these prices fell, so did FDI in Petroleum. Unspecified secondary (manufacturing and 
industry) investments, wholesale and retail trade, and finance show trends that seem to be 
more responding to the signing and ratifying of the FTA. Electricity, gas and water is a 
category that reflects Colombia’s efforts in privatizing its public utilities (including a 
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FIGURE 30. COLOMBIA - FDI inflows by sector  (millions of 
US$)
Petroleum Mining and quarrying
Unspecified secondary Transport, storage and communications
Finance Wholesale and retail trade








Source: Investment Map, International Trade Centre 
The chart above shows Peruvian FDI inward stocks. Peruvian authorities do not report 
FDI inflows by sector. However, to the extent that stocks follow inflow trends, some 
sectoral trends are apparent in this chart. Until 2009, most of FDI stocks were attracted 
by the service industries (communications, finance, and transportation). Between 2006 
and 2009 investments in mining and also in utilities (electricity, gas and water) took off. 
This reflects a conscious effort from the government to increase the profile of the 
extractive industries that started in the later 1990s, and to universalize the access to 
power, gas and water through public-private partnerships, in which FDI is welcome. 
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FIGURE 31. PERU FDI Stock by Sector (millions of US$)
Mining and quarrying Transport, storage and communications
Post and communications Finance
Unspecified secondary Electricity, gas and water




provisions, do not support diversified flows of FDI. Nevertheless, from around 2010 the 
stocks in the service industries mentioned above have been growing, surpassing once 
again those of extractive industries and utilities.  
For comparison purposes, the following chart presents data of sectoral FDI inflows to 
Chile: 
 
Source: Investment Map, International Trade Centre 
Chile’s FTA with the U.S. was signed in 2003 and ratified in 2004, inflow data by sector 
for those years was not available. However, for the sake of trying to identify connections 
to factors other than the FTAs, this chart shows that 2009 and 2012 were not outstanding 
years for Chile, if the mining sector is not taken into account. Also, taking into account 
that this chart does not show all the smaller categories, which for Chile are more sizable 
than for Peru and Colombia, from 2008 to 2009 investments slowed down in response to 
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FIGURE 32. CHILE - FDI inflows by sector (millions of US$)
Mining Manufacturing industry Electricity, gas and water











Correlation with GDP, Government and Financial Soundness Indicators: 
Regarding the evolution of GDP, the following graphs show the evolution of GDP at 
purchasing power parity, and per capita. Population levels and growth rates for the 
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FIGURE 33. GDP PPP per capita








FIGURE 34. GDP PPP growth
Colombia Peru Chile Ecuador
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These graphs show how, over the period over study Peru has been able to reach a GDP 
than in PPP137 terms is very similar to that of Chile, but has moved further away from that 
of Ecuador. The later is specially true when measure in per capita terms. Coincidentally, 
Peru surpasses Ecuador in GDP ppp per capita terms, in 2010, a year after the FTA is 
                                                     
137 GDP PPP per capita is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity (PPP) rates and divided by total population. An international 
dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as a U.S. dollar has in the U.S.  
PPP is measured by finding the values (in U.S. dollars) of an equivalent basket of 









FIGURE 35. GDP (ppp, current international $)
Colombia Peru Chile Ecuador
TABLE 5. 
POPULATION    







40,988,909  1.45% 
 
48,653,419  0.88% 
Peru 
 
26,261,363  1.34% 
 
31,773,839  1.27% 
Chile 
 
15,444,969  1.19% 
 
17,909,754  0.83% 
Ecuador 
 
12,852,755  1.78% 
 
16,385,068  1.49% 




ratified. Looking at growth rates of GDP in PPP terms it is outstanding how Peru and 
Colombia have been able to keep growing at consistent positive rates, even in 2009 (after 
the financial crisis). In order to further inform the understanding of the evolution in per 
capita terms, the table below shows changes in population and population growth.  
 
Additionally, a relevant indicator to consider is Government Effectiveness as measured 
by the World Bank.  
 
Source: World Bank, Governance Indicators 
Here, it is telling how Peru’s indicator kept decreasing all the way to 2006, when the FTA 
was signed. The government performance in the years since then seem to be better 
perceived, although it does not quite reach the levels of 2000-2001, when the Fujimori 
era ended, and the Toledo administration began. Colombia’s indicator keeps moving to 
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Figure 36. Government Effectiveness
(-2.5 to 2.5 range - Survey based score)
Colombia Peru Chile Ecuador
FTAs signed PER COL
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dominated by the peace process negotiations, it would be difficult to infer any correlation 
with the FTA. 
Finally, looking a two of the indicators reported by the IMF for financial soundness: 
  
Source: IMF - FSI 
It is clear how Ecuador indices on the charts above are almost always higher than those of 
the countries with FTAs which includes commitments related to the financial sector. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that in the bank cost to income ratio chart all four countries 
exhibit almost identical trends from about 2012. This may be evidence that even if 
regulations and participation of FDI in the sector can promote better practices, much of 
the movements in the financial sector will be related to the global financial environment. 
Correlation with Labor Force and technology indicators: 








































































Figure 37. Bank regulatory capital 
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Source: International Labor Organization, ILOSTAT138 
Overall, the graphs above show that Colombia is moving to a greater level of labor force 
sophistication in terms of education, while Peru still is somewhat sluggish in improving 
this human resource factor, key to attracting more varied FDI and furthering moving from 
a primary to a tertiary export economy. Not included above is lower than basic education, 
which in the cases of Peru and Ecuador still fluctuated at levels around 10 to 20% of the 
total labor force during the last decade (for Chile and Colombia this indicator is in the 
single digits). Also, note how the participation of basic education was much higher at the 
beginning of the period for Colombia, and has been gradually replaced by higher levels 
of intermediate and advance education. Meanwhile, Peru’s percentages remained stable 
                                                      
138 Basic education includes primary and lower secondary; Intermediate education 
includes upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education; and Advanced 
includes short-cycle tertiary education, bachelors or equivalent, masters or equivalent, 
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Figure 40. Labor force with 







Figure 41. Labor force with 





during this period. It is interesting to see how Chile seems to have prioritized 
intermediate education, which include efforts to get students to complete high-school and 
get some technical education. Indeed, Chile undertook at sweeping educational reform in 
2008 (geared to increase the quality of grade school), and after a 2011 student protest, 
started to seriously consider free tuition for higher education. Such reform was finally 
implemented in 2016.139 
Looking at the evolution of unemployment rates, labor productivity and internet 
connectivity, the charts below show how the labor force has changed by some 
measurements in this period. For Colombia the decrease in unemployment has been 
considerable, while both countries have gain ground in labor productivity and internet 
connectivity. For Peru, there has been a slower pace in the growth of internet users after 
2009 (when the FTA was ratified), perhaps reflecting how the implementation process 
has demanded a different focus in modernization: 
                                                      
139 Emiliana Vegas “5 lessons from recent educational reforms in Chile” Brookings 
Institution, March 20, 2018 https://www.brookings.edu/research/5-lessons-from-recent-
educational-reforms-in-chile   
Jason Delisle and Andrés Bernasconi “Lessons from Chile’s Transition to Free College” 








Source: OECD and World Bank (WDI) 
 
D. Comparative Analysis of Institutional Differences 
The FDI effects of both FTAs begin with the negotiations that led to their specific 
wording and timing. Beyond their geographical proximity, what is interesting about both 
treaties is the simultaneity of negotiations. These processes did not take place in a 
vacuum. Context is important, so one should start by understanding the role of political 
strategy in the timing of the negotiations and implementation.  
From an international politics perspective, and in a context where many South American 







Figure 42. Unemployment, total (% of total 
labor force) (model ILO estimate)
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the least, suspicious of remaining too close to the U.S., it is interesting to analyze why 
Colombia and Peru decided to follow the open trade path– effectively linking themselves 
more closely with the U.S. and the market-oriented development paradigm. Arguably, the 
U.S. maybe turning to these FTAs as a policy tool aimed to get closer to Latin America 
once again – influencing their electorate to move away from leftist leaders (and providing 
a counterpoint to populists such as in Venezuela). 
Given the magnitude of bilateral trade flows with both countries involved, these FTAs are 
not especially important for the U.S. economy, even if they resonated heavily among 
labor leaders and those who believe they will lead to additional trade agreements. 
Consequently, various sectors within each country and in the U.S. lobbied in favor and 
against the FTAs, influencing changes in the text along the way. In consequence, these 
agreements—together with the Korea-U.S. FTA—were all subject to an executive-
congressional agreement on labor and environmental provisions that Ambassador Susan 
Schwab negotiated with the House Ways and Means Committee (the May 10th, 2007 
accord).  As a result, new provisions regarding adherence to international labor standards 
and specified environmental policies were added to both FTAs. This step was sufficient 
to get Peru’s FTA approved by a bipartisan congressional majority.  However, social 
conditions in Colombia were still unacceptable to labor leaders in the U.S., and many 
Democrats were reluctant on going forward because of the persistent assassination of 
Colombian union leaders.  Therefore, the negotiation rolled into the Obama 
administration, which mediated additional conditions, eventually leading to their 
approval by October 2011, again by bipartisan majorities. 
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Beyond the specific political discussions and the technical hurdles faced for their 
approval, the actual texts of these agreements have a lot in common. In the process of 
negotiation the U.S. applied a “template”, which includes a range of provisions that not 
only cover free trade in goods but also comprise openness to investment, intellectual 
property rights (IPR), and labor and environmental protection, among other areas. The 
U.S. prevailed on many of these issues because of its bargaining power compared to that 
of its counterparts. As a result, given the abundance of similar provisions in these 
agreements, any differences are all the worthier of study. The implications for future 
FTAs are multiple, because the prevalence of investment, IPR, labor and environmental 
provisions shared by both agreements has become the gold standard on FTA agreements. 
On the other hand, the pervasiveness of some sectors where these developing countries 
did not get more access to the U.S. markets is telling of what partner countries currently 
undergoing negotiations will need to at least try to overcome. 
In order to explain the dynamics taking place during the negotiations of both FTAs under 
study, a couple of relevant theoretical framework could be considered. The first one is 
Competitive Liberalization,140 which seeks to explain the current trend to pursue 
preferential/free trade agreements between countries, in the context of Globalization and 
highly-mobile investments, as a tool for creating incentives for partners.  Fred Bergsten 
developed the concept in 1996, in his analysis of negotiating incentives in the Asian 
Pacific setting. Since then, the concept took root, was adopted for different regions, and 
                                                      
140 Evenett, Simon and Meier, Michael, An Interim Assessment of the U.S. Trade Policy 
of 'Competitive Liberalization' (February 2007). University of St. Gallen Economics 




eventually became USTR Robert Zoellick’s core strategy of U.S. trade policy.141 In this 
context, competitive liberalization includes the following key characteristics:  
• Stimulating a competition among trading partners for access to U.S. markets: In 
the current setting, this can be interpreted as the prisoner’s dilemma situation where many 
developing countries find themselves compelled to pursue bilateral agreements, in the 
absence of a workable multilateral trade agreement. The latter kind would enhance the 
bargaining power of developing countries as a group, allowing them to obtain more 
favorable conditions. 
• Inclusion of provisions in trade agreements not directly related to market access: 
This applies to the investment, IPR, environmental and labor provisions included in both 
FTAs under study. These conditions are usually accepted by developing countries as 
necessary when facing U.S. negotiators. These subjects are usually sensitive and 
politically charged with local constituencies. Nevertheless, in the interconnected context 
of globalization, developing countries are starting to understand that these provisions are 
beneficial for their countries in the longer run.  
• Compared to past practices, greater role for foreign and security policy in U.S. 
trade policymaking: This characteristic of competitive Liberalization is relevant to both 
FTAs under study. As explained above, the agreements with Colombia and Peru emerged 
from the precedent counter-narcotics policies that granted them trade preferences in the 
first place. A second theoretical framework to consider in the analysis of the FTAs 
between U.S. and Colombia and Peru comes from political bargaining theory. From the 
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standpoint of the U.S., negotiations take on two levels: domestically with lobbies and 
Congress, and abroad with the trading partners. Theories of international bargaining and 
domestic politics (such as two-level politics/games, and strategic behavior) may be useful 
to explain the dynamics of the negotiation process for each of both agreements.  
Starting with the domestic politics perspective, while the U.S. FTAs with Peru and 
Colombia were signed within months of each other in 2006, the first one could move 
forward to be ratified by U.S. Congress by the end of the following year and the 
Colombian had to wait until 2012 to be implemented. For the latter, domestic politics, 
both within Colombia and the U.S., played a substantial role. In fact, while the Peruvian 
agreement moved swiftly through their domestic instances, Colombian courts took 
several months to establish that the agreements conformed to Colombian Political 
Constitution. Within the U.S., the Colombian agreement was a harder deal to push 
forward not only because of commercial interests, but also because of the concerns linked 
to accusations of human rights violations in the context of the warfare with Colombian 
guerrillas.  
From the international politics perspective, both the geostrategic position and the size of 
both partner countries under study helps to explain why the agreements were signed in 
the first place. Colombia and Peru have all been essential allies in the U.S. relations with 
Latin America in general (i.e. protection of hemispheric security), and in the fight against 
illegal drug trafficking in particular. Also, Genna (2010) analyzed how smaller 
economies, such as the ones under study, had more to lose by delaying the enactment of 
this kind of international agreements; in his view this is one the main reasons why such 
efforts with Mercosur or China have not succeeded.  
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Corporate attitudes and expectations: From an immediate political perspective, the 
degree of commitment and efficiency from each country to move the implementation 
process from paper to practice should be considered. Because of the great difference of 
scale between the U.S. and the partner countries in these agreements, it is reasonable to 
believe that the greatest challenge, in terms of adaptation, will fall on the Latin American 
institutions and societies. Given that implementation of these agreements is often pursued 
in stages, the incentives to move from one phase to the next might be mixed for the 
Peruvians and Colombians. On the one hand, given that the elected governments have 
risked much of their credibility by pursuing these FTAs, and thus they will be greatly 
invested in seeing through a successful process of implementation. On the other hand, it 
will be difficult in practice for officials to implement and abide by the new rules.  
Moreover, to the extent that new officials might be elected on an anti-FTA agenda, then 
the interest in an efficacious implementation might substantially slow down. This is 
indeed a cause of uncertainty because, if investors and exporters perceive that the long 
term business environment is not predictable, they may decide to limit, postpone or even 
back off their exposure to these Latin American markets. 
Colombia and Peru have similar qualities when it comes to analyzing the preparation for 
and implementation of their U.S. FTAs. Both receive significant investments coming to 
their oil and mining sectors. Because extraction industries are to large extent controlled 
by the government (underground natural resources are not considered private goods), 
these investments are subject to special regimes.  
Another similarity between Colombia and Peru is their extensive problems with 
Intellectual Property (IP) protection. For what is worth, this is an area that affects the 
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entertainment and pharmaceutical industry for the most part, which are more likely to be 
covered by the trade aspects of the agreements than by the direct investment elements. 
Nevertheless, other industries such as consumer manufacturing and retail products can be 
seriously affected by counterfeit and black market practices (examples: brand-clothing 
and electronics). These a problem area that Colombia and Peru share with many other 
developing countries. Therefore, how the implementation of the IP commitments is 
managed by both countries and how the U.S. respond to developments in this area will 
continue to be very informative for other developing countries seeking FTAs with the 
U.S. Although the general public in both Colombia and Peru is very tolerant of these 
practices, it is becoming increasingly clear to the more educated population and to the 
government that IP must be valued and protected in order to continue to support 
technological change. 
As of 2013,142 Colombia and Peru were implementing effective policies to attract foreign 
investment into their countries. Colombia had been granting 10-, 15- and 30-year income-
tax exemptions for investment in the forestry, electric generation power (biomass, solar 
and wind) and construction sectors, respectively. The Colombian congress was also 
preparing a law that would permit private and foreign investment in both public and 
private institutions in higher education. Similarly, Peru had been softening its restrictions 
in the international air passenger sector, by gradually raising the initial percentage 
allowance for foreign investor from no more than 49 percent of voting shares at the time 
of incorporation to 70 percent of voting shares after 6 months of incorporation. However, 
                                                      





Peru was introducing a new bill for a suspension of forestry concessions within the 
following two years. In the context of this dissertation, these efforts demonstrate that 
FTA are successful within the context of countries already committed to long term 
policies for attracting foreign investment. BITs, or the investment chapters of FTAs by 
themselves, in a vacuum, are not sufficient to improve the investment environment for 





E. 2017-18 FTA Recap: Exports and FDI 
Colombia: 
There are conflicting views regarding the evaluation of the FTA by the 
government, media and academia. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism 
believes it has been a resounding success, taking into account the shrinkage of the 
mineral-energy exports that was driven by diving oil prices. In May 2017, then Minister, 
María Claudia Lacouture, related how in the last five years non-mineral/energy exports to 
the U.S. grew 12.3%, and the number of businesses selling to the U.S. marked increased 
17.5% in the same period. Furthermore, according to the Ministry, between 2012 and 
2016 investments from the U.S. have had a key role for employment and new business 
generation in Colombia. According to the Colombian Central Bank, $11.8 billion have 
arrived from the U.S. in the last 5 years, through 115 projects, generating 22,518 jobs, a 
28% increase when compared to the previous five-year period. Lacouture explained these 
investments were directed to software and technology services, metal mechanics, 
agroindustry, pharmaceutics, investment funds, forestry, audiovisual production, 
engineering and construction materials.143 Some exports successes are in the shoe 
industry, make-up industry, and some clothing lines. Also, some processed foods such as 
yogurt, fresh cheese, dehydrated fruits, conserves, and cacao preparations have had 
positive changes during this period. In 2017, the five countries that invested the most in 
Colombia were the U.S. (more than $1.1 billion and 35 projects), Chile (more than $400 
                                                      





million and 5 projects), Spain (more than $296 million and 8 projects), Brazil ($236 
million and 6 projects) and China ($233 million and 7 projects).144 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Oil prices seem to be rebounding, which 
has translated in more oil-related exports and more hydrocarbon investments for 
Colombia during the last year or so, which are not related to the implementation of the 
FTA. The following graph shows the prices in U.S. dollars of a barrel of oil.145 Although 
the current prices are still low compared to what they were five years ago (the highest 
price in the last ten years was in 2008 when it was over $140), they seem to be on some 
sort of rebound, arguably from an OPEC-led production restriction and a depletion of 
American reserves. According to some analysts, a steady price of over $60 is required for 
companies to engage again at exploration and production levels similar to those before 
the price plummeted.146 It is very important now that Colombia keeps up their efforts in 
attracting a variety of FDI sectors, diversifying its exports and implementing the FTA 
with the U.S. 
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Figure 46. Oil Prices Trend 2013-2018 
 
Source: Bussinessinsider.com 
In this context, a study published by Rosario University of Bogota in August 2017 
indicated that the FTA with the U.S. was far from a success. This study reports that non-
mineral/energy export have only increased at an annual rate of 2.95% for the period 
2012-2016 (although with a better performance of 6.5% during the first semester of 
2017), which does not compensate adequately the sharp decrease of the mineral-energy 
sector exports in the same period.147 Furthermore, according to this assessment, the less 
than impressive export performance occurred with a favorable exchange rate, indicating 
the weaknesses in structural capacity and competitiveness. The concern is that the efforts 
for export diversification are not being taken with a deep commitment for a long-term 
change, which is a challenge that will be even bigger once and if the petroleum income 
starts coming steadily once more. 
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Also, in October of 2017, the Santos administration approved a law that 
compelled the government to evaluate all outstanding FTAs yearly, after the 
Constitutional Court mandated to do so. This development came after the Comptroller 
General performed an audit of the performance of the FTAs with the U.S. and the 
European Union, as implemented by the Ministry of Commerce, publishing the results in 
September or 2017.148 In particular, this report stated that products that did not comply 
with the technical specifications and quotas spelled in the FTA were being imported to 
Colombia, with all the benefits of the FTA. In addition, it found that the organisms 
created by the agreement to oversee its performance were doing very little, in spite of the 
efforts of the private sector and the budget allocated to these tasks.  
Indeed, according to some non-official reports, the Herfindahl Hirschman index, 
which measures economic concentration, shows that exports are more concentrated now 
than before signing the FTA. Several groups, including labor unions and some industry 
associations have organized to present a united front against the “official interpretation 
and statistics”, offering an “alternative information system” and denouncing what they 
see as big losses for the country.149 This is important because I highlights the fact that 
Colombia, compared to Peru, is a country where disaccording views might have a better 
chance to find a voice through a democratic channel. Therefore, some discontented 
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sectors view the Comptroller’s report and the new law mandated by the Constitutional 
Court as advancement towards a serious discussion of renegotiation of the FTAs.  
However, the future of these additional mechanisms is not certain at this point, 
given the June election of conservative candidate Ivan Duque. He is expected to follow in 
the steps of ex-President Uribe, under whom the U.S.-Colombia FTA was originally 
negotiated. Duque, who will take office in August 7, 2018 promised to re-evaluate the 
commitments contained in Santos Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, from an economic 
perspective, the elected president will continue in the path of modernization, and 
openness to trade and investment. 
Peru: 
In Peru the conditions are somewhat different. 2016 was an electoral year, and the 
new president, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) was a big promoter of the FTA with the 
U.S. Until very recently, it was accurate to believe that the country will continue in its 
path of supporting the FTA, led by the Presidency, but, in contrast to Colombia, with the 
acquiescence of all branches of power and without significant opposition from the private 
sector and industry groups. The labor unions were the most significant force expressing 
disagreement. In fact, the U.S. labor unions are pushing for an evaluation of the labor 
commitments in the Peru-U.S. FTA.  
President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski had great challenges ahead of him as he started his 5-
year term on July 26, 2016. Mr. Kuczynski defeated former President Fujimori’s 
daughter, Keiko Fujimori, by just 50,000 votes of the 18 million cast in June’s election. 
But her party, Popular Force, now has the power of veto over much of Kuczynski’s 
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policies. It holds 73 of 130 seats in the unicameral legislature.150 However, Kuczynski, a 
Wall Street veteran and former finance minister, just three months into his term 
persuaded the opposition-controlled Parliament to back his economic platform and started 
to crystalize financing for his infrastructure projects. In fact, Congress agreed on late 
September, 2016, to grant the administration powers to rule by decree for 90 days.  
The Peruvian economy was forecasted to grow 4.1% in 2017, and Kuczynski had vowed 
to reach 5% in 2018 and subsequent years, “through a combination of more robust private 
and public infrastructure investment, a lower value-added tax, and tax incentives and 
bank credits for small businesses—part of a bid to shrink the shadow economy. The 
administration also is seeking to remove bureaucratic obstacles that have held up work on 
airports, gas pipelines, and roads.”151 In addition, during a first and exploratory meeting 
with President Obama in November 19, 2016 both leaders affirmed the environmental 
and labor commitments under their FTA, highlighted the steps Peru is taking to combat 
illegal logging, and recognized the need for continued cooperation to strengthen 
protections for workers’ rights.152 Furthermore, the Peruvian investment promotion 
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agency, ProInversión, will be decentralized to reduce project time frames and make them 
more adapted to local needs.153  
In mid-December the Peruvian Congress passed a motion for vacancy against 
Kuczynski, which did not get enough votes. This was considered a political move 
promoted by the “Fujimorism”, but it is still a coup attempt of sorts from the Legislative. 
The reason for this move was his alleged with the Brazilian construction company 
Odebrecht,154 all part of the bigger case known as the “Lava Jato” (Car Wash).155 The 
accusation is that Westfield Capital, a firm that Kuczynski founded in 1992, contracted 
with Odebrecht between 2004 and 2007. However, he argues that during that time he had 
distanced himself from the firm while he has Minister of Economy for Alejandro Toledo, 
transferring his day-to-day authority in the business to a third party.156 
In addition, along with Mercedez Araoz, one of the vice-presidents and the 
premier in Peru, PPK began restructuring his cabinet, calling the “gabinete de la 
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reconciliacion.”157 All this was happening at a time when ex-president Alberto Fujimori 
was pardoned for humanitarian reasons from his hospital bed (a decision that started in 
congress but was ultimately PPK’s to make, and there have been rumors that it was part 
of an arrangement to let the vacancy motion go) and restored some of his privileges as 
ex-president, while his children are trying to rebuild his image and advance their own 
political ambitions. The International Human Rights community received this news with 
concern, as Fujimori was involved in lesser humanity actions during his presidency, on 
top of his well-known corruption scandal.158  
In March 21st, 2018 PPK resigned from the presidency, a day after the release of videos 
that showed key allies trying to buy the support of opposition lawmakers, and his first 
vice president, Martin Vizcarra, became President of Peru in March 22nd. Vizcarra swore 
in an entirely new Cabinet on April 2nd that was praised by the rightwing opposition as a 
way to reset the once rocky relations between the executive and legislative branches that 
helped bring down his predecessor. The new Cabinet, a mix of high-ranking civil 
servants, politicians and private sector specialists, is led by Prime Minister Cesar 
Villanueva, an opposition lawmaker who had led efforts to impeach PPK.159 While 
Vizcarra is expected to follow the policies set forth by the Kuczynski administration, this 
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development undeniable rocks investors and producers expectations, as it forces Vizcarra 
to create political alliances outside PPK’s already established supporters in order to 
maintain a sense of stability and continuity.  
Nevertheless, from the economic internationalization perspective, the momentum 
keeps going as Peru is expecting to sign a FTA with Australia this year, and is starting to 
look into an agreement with India.160 This is part of the serious commitment Peru has to 
free trade and a reflection of the lessons learned in the process of negotiating and 
implementing the FTA with the U.S. While, 2013 and 2014 were “slow years” from a 
trade policy point of view, the presidency is making its implementation a priority once 
again. All in all, after eight years of the FTA with the U.S. coming into effect, most 
Peruvians continue to believe its effects have been undeniably positive, as exports have 
increased, particularly non-traditional exports (agroindustry being the shining star).161 
 
Having looked at these recent developments in Peru and Colombia, the next and 
last section present the most important conclusions of the comparison between these two 
countries’ negotiation and implementation of the FTAs with the U.S. in regard to the 
effect on FDI and export diversification.  
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Peru and Colombia started this process seeking a long-term guarantee of free entry 
for at least the products covered by the ATPDEA, and by entering these FTAs they 
succeeded. The FTAs have been instrumental in increasing non-traditional exports and 
improving export diversification, and have also helped FDI inflows. The later was the 
result of the FTA’s boost to investors’ confidence, which results in new and more diverse 
FDI, because, by committing to the FTA’s Investment Chapter and to all other standards 
and practices demanded by the FTA, investors feel safer and forecast a better return to 
their investments 
In addition, Peru and Colombia exhibit two leadership and strategic behaviors that 
made the negotiation and implementation of these FTAs possible: The FTAs were 
priorities for the Presidency and the Ministries of Commerce, Investment and Tourism; 
and both governments engaged in continuous and structured consultation with the private 
sector and non-government agents. Regarding differences, while Colombia had in its 
favor the relative superior expertise of its negotiating team and institutional capacity, 
Peru was able to go through the process faster, effectively climbing the learning curve in 
a shorter period of time. 
Finally, the overall economic effect is difficult to discern, because of the many 
distorting factors, such as plummeting commodity prices and unfavorable exchange rates. 
However, both Peru and Colombia have managed to have positive and even promising 
economic growth rates. Inflation rates in Peru skyrocketed from the 1970s to the 1990s, 
but have remained in the single digits in the 2000s. In Colombia, historically, inflation 
rates have been below 15%, but they also have stayed within single digits in recent years. 
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Also, unemployment rates for both countries have reached record lows in recent years (in 
Colombia averaged 11.55% from 2001 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 17.87% in 
January of 2002 and a record low of 7.30 percent in November of 2015; in Peru averaged 
7.94% from 2001 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 13% in January of 2005 and a 
record low of 5.60% in December of 2012 ). Most social indicators have also improved 
during the period under study (including poverty levels, infant mortality, death rate, and 
other indicators of social protection). 
The impact of institutional elements particular to each country on these results is 
undeniable. This is a key finding of this study. Although both countries started in a 
common path in the negotiation of the FTA (to make permanent the provisions granted 
by the ATPDEA), their particular circumstances and differences in political commitment 
had an effect on how the FTA was negotiated and how it is being implemented.  
Broadly, Peruvians had more faith in the liberalization process, and even the 
opposition of indigenous groups and environmental activists was not enough to slow the 
agreement. For Colombia the process was unhurried and uphill. Among the reasons for 
the delay were the relative sophistication of the Colombian negotiation team and of the 
democracy as a whole. These are good for Colombia as a society, but turned out to be 
impediments in the negotiation. The U.S. had the bargaining power and yet the 
negotiating team from Colombia sought to make changes such as less restrictive demands 
in IP terms that were never likely to happen. Minority groups in Colombia seem to be 
better represented in Congress than in Peru, and the High Courts have more jurisdiction 
over all kinds of processes. Therefore, Colombia was more careful during the negotiation, 
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while Peru could go faster because they had fewer domestic constituencies to be 
accountable to during the negotiations.  
Colombia has been negatively affected by the downturn in oil prices, especially 
starting in 2013-2014, which was when the FTA positive effects were expected.  If 
Colombia had had the wisdom of finishing the negotiations concurrently with the 
Peruvians, then there would have been a possibility for them to build on it, prioritizing 
implementation, and effectively creating a buffer, supporting the economy in the 
response to changing oil prices. Especially given the depreciation of the peso, had 
Colombia been further along in implementing the agreement, it might have seen a greater 
expansion of non-traditional exports. 
For Peruvians, the relatively youth of its decentralized government has proved to be a 
liability so far. Although the laws supporting the FTA were passed in a timely manner, 
the practical application of many of them remains rudimentary. Additionally, resources of 
all kinds are limited and, even if the willingness to see institutional changes is there, the 
financial resources and human capital required are still restricted. The expectation is that 
as the economy continues to improve and expand to non-traditional exports, more 
resources will become available. The FTA might thus have further scope to provide 
benefits to Peru, or it could be that local governments will be a mechanism by which to 
give greater voice to opponents of liberalization. 
There are, however, many similarities between both countries. The executive branch 
of these two democratic economies have been highly committed to the liberalization 
process. Furthermore, Peru and Colombia have a long similar history of fighting illegal 
drug trafficking along with the U.S. Also, both countries bonds reached investment grade 
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when the FTA were implemented, which supports the argument that FTAs may be highly 
regarded as a seal of approval. Nevertheless, if a country is looking to attract FDI, FTAs 
are not a fool-proof tool for doing so, given the costs and impact they may have in the 
local economies. 
Lessons learned: 
Implications for other countries contemplating trade agreements are varied. However, 
they can be summarized as follows: 
Importance of Policy Continuity: The negotiation and implementation of FTAs may 
span longer than one administration, therefore these must be approached as a part of a 
long-term developmental framework 
 In spite of all the differences discussed in this study, for both Peru and Colombia the 
FTAs serve as continuation of liberalization processes that are a priority for the 
Executive, even after changing administrations. Also, both countries took the experience 
gained by negotiating their FTAs with the U.S. and applied it to subsequent trade 
agreements with other countries. So, these cases show that Executive commitment and 
continued practice-by-doing are a good starting point for countries wanting to 
successfully open their economies through FTAs, even if the implementation in the cases 
of Peru and Colombia is ongoing at a rate slower than ideal.  
Commitment to Structured Consultation with Private Sector and Non-Government 
Agents: Starting at the exploratory stages, and all through negotiation and 
implementation 
In addition, both Peruvian and Colombian governments made a point of including a 
variety of actors in the process (private sector, industry associations, labor unions, 
Universities, etc.). According to Baccarat et al. “trade policy reforms introduced by Peru 
in the 1990s have continued over several changes of president, whereas similar reforms in 
Argentina have been reversed. [This] cannot be explained by economic parameters such 
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as resource endowments or external shocks. The Peruvian case provides examples of 
successfully managing the politics of reform and the technical aspects of policy so as to 
establish transparent and participatory processes that weigh accurately the impact of trade 
policy on all affected domestic parties. The Argentine case demonstrates that the WTO 
legal system is not an effective restraint on a government that wants to revert to an import 
substitution regime.” 
Building of Institutional Capacity: With FTAs in mind, it is more important than ever 
to focus in the quality of Investment, Trade and Tourism ministries. Also, enhancing 
judiciary resources to deal with challenges such as arbitrations, as well as technical 
agencies to start working on meeting export license requirements. 
Colombia and Peru should continue to work on full implementation of the FTAs, 
which would only improve and increase their institutional capacity. Doing so requires a 
careful balance, because of the undeniable attention that their poverty-stricken 
populations still need. Keeping the efforts of the commerce and tourism ministries, as 
well as the export and investment promotion agencies, as top priorities is key. These 
entities, when properly supported, will keep working on advancing certifications and 
accreditations such as the phytosanitary licenses needed to export many additional goods. 
Infrastructure modernization should also be prioritized. It will not only make many 
export and investment processes simpler (like broader internet availability, needed by 
supervising officials to do their work efficiently), but would improve the opportunities 
and the quality of life of the broader population. Continued consulting with the private 
sector, academia, and other sector of the general public is paramount to maintain 
transparency and inclusiveness of the process, not to mention the long-term viability of 
liberalization policies.   
Learning-by-doing is a valid strategy if the timing is right, such as it was in the case of 
Peru. Seize the opportunity of a politically feasible moment 
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In top of the institutional challenges, Peru and Colombia entered the FTAs, and 
arguably their whole liberalization journey, without a detailed preparation to adequate 
their industry and a truly viable plan to compensate (and retrain) those who inevitable are 
hurt by these processes. Having said that, in today’s hyperconnected world, any country 
would be struggling to gain much by keeping its economy closed while hoping to be fully 
prepared for the challenge at some point.  
Trade Openness is one of several developmental frameworks. FTAs by themselves are 
only one tool in that kit, FTAs by themselves are not sufficient. This is why it is so 
important to go back to the basics of creating a solid foundation through infrastructure 
and education investments, and a pursue of political stability (including diminished 
corruption) 
Going back to the wider picture, it is always important to keep in mind that trade and 
investment agreements are only one more element in the toolkit available to developing 
countries. These agreements cannot take the place of sound economic policies and 
political stability. However, to the extent that these agreements prompt the governments 
of the partner countries to make better policy choices and make them accountable to the 
international public, they should be regarded as desirable tools, worthy of evaluation.  
The lessons learned from the Colombian and Peruvian experiences should prove 
valuable for other developing countries considering bilateral trade and investment 
agreements. In particular, and at the time of this writing, Sub-Saharan countries are 
facing the possibility that U.S. Congress will not renew existing Sub-Saharan trade 
benefits (under the terms of Africa Growth and Opportunity Act - AGOA) in 2025, 
putting these African countries in a position similar to that of Andean countries in the 





Appendix 1. Exploring the effects of the ATPA 
The ATPA was enacted in 1991 to encourage the Andean countries of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru to reduce drug-crop cultivation and production by 
authorizing the U.S. President to grant tariff preferences to qualifying Andean products in 
order to foster trade. The President’s authority to provide preferential treatment was 
initially provided for a 10-year period, and this authority was extended several times, 
sometimes retroactively. 
Bolivia was suspended as an ATPA beneficiary country effective December 15, 2008, for 
failure to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. Peru 
became ineligible for ATPA preferences with the implementation of the U.S.-Peru FTA 
effective January 1, 2011. The U.S.-Colombia FTA entered into force on May 15, 2012, 
at which time Colombia lost its ATPA beneficiary status. Ecuador ceased to receive 
ATPA trade benefits after the President’s authority to provide preferential treatment 
under ATPA expired on July 31, 2013. Close to the end of this period, Ecuador 
renounced to a possible extension of the ATPA, as it rejected pressures not to give 
political asylum to National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden.162 
From the American Apparel and Footwear Association (2008):163  
A win-win trade preference agreement, the ATPA stabilizes manufacturing and 
wholesale employment in all countries involved, while creating import opportunities that 
deliver a wider variety of goods at more affordable prices for all consumers. About $250 
million worth of U.S. cotton and textiles were exported to the four Andean countries of 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru last year. The finished products - made with these 
U.S. yarns, fabrics, fibers, cotton and other textile inputs - are then brought back to the 
U.S. duty-free under the ATPA.  







The U.S. cotton, textile and apparel industries are rallying for prompt renewal of the 
ATPA, as well as for full implementation of the recently approved U.S./ Peru Trade 
Promotion Agreement (TPA) and speedy approval pending U.S./ Colombia TPA. These 
two TPAs are urgently needed to transform the current one-way, temporary program into 
a permanent, comprehensive and reciprocal partnership. 
The ATPA did not appear to have had a negative impact on U.S. employment with the 
possible exception of some sectors of the cut flower industry.164 Also in 2011, the 
"Asparagus Revenue Market Loss Program" was implemented in the U.S. to compensate 
asparagus farmers for lost revenues, a direct result of cheap imported asparagus from the 
Andes region165.In fact, annual reports to the Congress by the U.S. Department of Labor 
(DOL) on the trade and employment effects of ATPA repeatedly concluded that 
“preferential tariff treatment under the provisions of the original ATPA and its 
subsequent amendments has neither had an adverse impact on, nor posed a significant 
threat to, overall levels of U.S. employment,”166 
As of 2008, the Ecuadorean government estimated that the American trade preferences 
for products including flowers, broccoli and mangoes supported about 350,000 jobs. 
Exports to the U.S. under the preferences supported 660,000 jobs in Colombia and 
874,000 jobs in Peru. If the benefits had been allowed to expire, hundreds of thousands of 
people might have lost their jobs and been tempted into the booming narcotics 
                                                      
164 http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/30/164345/us-flower-growers-fight-to-
survive.html 
165 “War on Peruvian Drugs Takes a Victim: U.S. Asparagus”, New York Times, April 
25,2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/national/25ASPA.html; and FSA fact 
sheet: http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/alap_2011_pfs.pdf 
166 TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE ANDEAN TRADE 
PREFERENCE ACT, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/atpa2013.pdf 
175 
 
industry.167 Some believed these preferences also played a role in cutting illegal 
immigration to the U. S.168 
Looking at how ATPA affected different sectors of the partner countries, the effect is not 
straightforward. Just in 2005, Colombia and Ecuador, the two regional crude oil 
exporting ATPA countries (allowed since the expansion of the ATPA to the ATPDEA in 
2002), together accounted for almost four-fifths of all U.S. imports under ATPA. Crude 
oil exploration and exploitation is not an economic activity that creates a large amount of 
direct jobs for local people. There are indeed a series of economic linkages, such as the 
construction of roads, the sudden prosperity of small towns next to the sites, and the 
distribution of royalties resulting from oil exploitation, which impact the lives of these 
rural people. Sometimes the effect is perverse as locals come to rely in this income, 
which eventually disappear as the source of oil dries up, abandoning whatever productive 
endeavors they pursued before.  
Under the ATPA Peru was a leading exporter of copper, naphtha and gold jewelry. Both 
mining of copper, and exploitation of naphtha are activities performed by large 
corporations, often foreign. Therefore are subject to many of the same conditions and 
results than crude oil related activities, explained above. Gold jewelry production is more 
of a niche activity, subject in practice to many of the same conditions than apparel, 
discussed below. 
                                                      
167 New York Times editorial March 2, 2008, “Game of Chicken in the Andes”, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/opinion/02sun3.html?_r=0 
168 Letter from Eliot L. Engel, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 





Also since 2002, textiles and apparel was another big source of income for local 
populations under the ATPA. This is an urban activity, which loosely followed the well-
known maquiladora model. The level of skill required for sewing trousers, t-shirts, shirts 
and underwear is low, and the conditions under which the work is completed can be less 
than ideal. Peru’s additional advantage was its exclusivity in sewing fabrics made locally 
of vicuña and alpaca, both exotic, and time-consuming and labor-intensive. Wages are 
meant to remain low, otherwise competitiveness is lost. However, to the extent that this 
job opportunity gave displaced populations a source of income that kept them out of 
harm’s way, it was likely welcomed and contested upon. Two key developments shaped 
the outlook of U.S.-ATPA country textile trade:169 (1) Andean firms’ continued efforts to 
expand full package production programs to enhance their competitiveness with China 
and other Asian suppliers since the elimination of quotas on January 1, 2005, and (2) the 
implementation of additional competitive strategies to take advantage of then-prospective 
U.S. free trade agreements with Peru [and] Colombia. 
Flowers were another big component of ATPA benefits, once again enjoyed mostly by 
Ecuador and Colombia. Growing and cutting flowers, as beautiful as they are, is far from 
a glamorous activity. The work conditions are harsh: greenhouses are hot and filled with 
chemicals that have ill health-effects. Payment for cutting flowers is low and often linked 
to the amount of flowers cut and the quality of the cut (bloom and stem length are strictly 
monitored, flowers that are not export-quality are not valued the same, often destined to 
the local market or discarded). Flower cultivation is limited to certain locations were 
                                                      
169 Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Drug 
Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution, Twelfth Report, 2005, 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3888.pdf, p. 43  
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conditions are ideal (volcanic soils, plenty of snowmelt from the Andes, and 12 hours a 
day of sunshine year-round). In addition to weather and soil quality, cut flowers need to 
be transported fast, so proximity to a major airport is key. In Colombia, this occurs in the 
savannah just outside the capital city, Bogota. Therefore, it would be wrong to consider it 
a widespread rural activity that reaches large population numbers. But again, it is a 
valued source of income for people who have few other choices. 
Under the ATPA, there were also investments of some fruits and vegetables, including 
asparagus (mentioned above) and avocados. Asparagus is a perennial crop requiring a 
major long-term investment, with the spears generally harvested in significant amounts 
three years after the original planting, and the plants remaining in production for many 
years thereafter. Peru, the only major asparagus producer in the region, is one of only a 
few countries in the world with the climatic advantage of being able to harvest fresh 
asparagus nearly all year long. Shifting large growing areas away from sugar cane to 
asparagus has resulted in the dramatic development of Peru’s asparagus industry in the 
past two decades.170 Avocados consumed in the U.S. have their origin in Mexico for the 
most part. The avocado produced in the Andean region is of a different kind, less oily and 
nutty, its flesh more firm and sweet (less ideal for guacamole, but with a great yield for 
salads and sandwiches). 
Finally, under the ATPA, Ecuador was a leading exporter of tuna, both in loins and 
airtight containers (including cans and pouches). Packing in flexible containers became a 
competitive advantage under the ATPA. 
 
                                                      
170 Ibid, p. 44 
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Appendix 2. Exploring NAFTA 
As a mirror of what might happen with the agreements with Colombia and Peru, it could 
be helpful to look at the NAFTA experience. NAFTA was the first free trade agreement 
with the U.S. to include a comprehensive investment chapter, as well as provisions on 
labor and the environment. When making comparisons, one should have in mind relevant 
issues of scale and longevity: NAFTA economies are larger, and the agreement was in 
place for much longer before comprehensive evaluations were published. With this 
caveat in mind, this literature might help as a template to figure out what is important and 
what direction to follow. Perhaps one of the most comprehensive evaluations is Hufbauer 
and Schott’s “NAFTA Revisited”, published by the Institute for International Economics. 
NAFTA created the world’s largest free trade area, measured both by population and 
economic output. It decreased tariffs, which not only reduces inflation by decreasing the 
costs of imports, but also increases productivity by simplifying exchanges. As a result, 
NAFTA has boosted trade between the U.S., Mexico and Canada, resulting in larger 
economic gains for all the parties involved. In particular, it has allowed for U.S.–Mexico 
industrial integration, most notably in automobile manufacturing. Through the 
application of the provisions in its investment chapter, NAFTA grants the ability for 
firms in member countries to bid on government contracts, which increases competition 
and frees up government resources. Furthermore, its investment provisions promote FDI, 
because investor rights are protected by international law, reducing investors' risk and 
guaranteeing the same legal rights of local investors. Above all, investors can make legal 
claims against local governments in cases of nationalization of their property and other 
contract failures. In general, additional FDI has been positive for U.S. and Canadian 
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investors because it gives them access to new opportunities and new markets, and good 
for the Mexican economy because of the creation of direct and indirect jobs, and 
technological spillovers. 
Nevertheless, NAFTA has remained controversial, both within certain sectors in the U.S. 
as well as from the stand of some who look at the agreement as providing insight into the 
impacts of future FTAs. Among the issues cited by those who see a “failed” NAFTA are: 
increased illegal immigration into the U.S., slow progress on environmental issues, 
growing income disparities (particularly within Mexico), weak growth in real wages in 
all three countries, and increased trafficking of illegal drugs from Mexico to the U.S. and 
Canada.171 It is possible that some of these issues would be the result of higher economic 
integration and not the result of how the agreement was crafted in particular. 
Nevertheless, understanding these shortcomings is relevant for analyzing the FTAs 
between the U.S. and Peru and Colombia. Even is the geographical distance is greater 
and the size of the partner economies is much smaller, the environmental and labor issues 
have been at the center of the discussion of both agreements, and immigration and drug 
trafficking issues continue to be crucial in the security dealings between both countries 
and the U.S. 
Hufbauer and Schott use an evaluation of the objectives set out in the NAFTA agreement 
itself as the standard to assess its successes and shortcomings. The four “yardsticks” 
relevant to this analysis comprise the following areas: trade and investment, employment 
and wages, dispute settlement, and labor and environment. In the subsequent paragraphs, 
each of these areas is presented, not necessarily citing the specific findings cited by 
                                                      
171 Hufbauer and Schott, p.4 
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Hufbauer and Schott, but rather highlighting what might be important for the analysis of 
the FTAs between the U.S. and Colombia and Peru.  
a. Trade and Investment 
Both trade and investment provisions are at the center of the analysis of both FTAs under 
study. As it has been explained in other sections, it is possible that the key benefits from 
these FTAs come from the FDI inflows resulting from the improved business condition 
within the partner countries. Nonetheless, even if many of the goods exported from these 
two developing economies to the U.S. already enjoyed tariffs that were quite low, some 
trade flows covered by these agreements were still the subject of high tariffs and 
considerable non-tariff barriers - agriculture in particular.  In fact, because agriculture 
remains a very sensitive issue to this day, NAFTA did not have a unified text on the 
subject, and in the case of both FTAs under study some goods were still excluded or 
subject to special schedules. 
Next on the list for the analysis of the FTAs are the effects of increased trade and trade 
diversion (rules of origin are considered a precursor of trade deflection). 
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Analysis of Issues of Trade diversion - Regional impact:  
Both FTAs are expected to have economic impact in their neighboring countries. If the 
trade provisions implemented in these agreements affect the markets of other countries in 
the region, it may be possible that the affected parties may react against any perverse 
effects and hinder the economic and political relationships between Colombia and Peru 
on one side and other Latin American countries on the other side (Venezuela, Ecuador 
and Bolivia, in particular).   
In general, trade diversion means that a free trade area diverts trade, away from a more 
efficient supplier outside the FTA, towards a less efficient supplier within the FTA. In the 
context of the Andean Pact and other regional and bilateral agreements, one should ask 
how these agreements affect the economies of their neighbors. If the effect is 
considerable, then its economic efficiency should be considered.172 
 
Moving away from the goods’ trade, the NAFTA experience shows that the liberalization 
of services should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Telecommunications and 
financial services are the two big service sectors that are relevant in the evaluation of 
both FTAs understudy. In both countries, Colombia and Peru, telecommunications 
contracts are still subject to special regimes, even if the access to outsiders has been 
greatly improved. Nevertheless, access to the Peruvian and Colombian financial markets 
by U.S. financial firms is one of the great opportunities provided by these FTAs. To what 
extent this is a positive outcome for the Peruvians and the Colombians remains to be 
seen. For sure, the general public will benefit for increased competition and a better 
quality of service. However, if a significant portion of the revenues generated by the 
financial sector no longer stays in the local economies, then the overall economic effect is 
mixed. 
                                                      
172 Although an extensive application of economic theory would be beyond the scope of 
the proposed dissertation topic, the theory of the second-best is worth mentioning at this 
point. According to it, in the presence of distortions or imperfections in a market, then the 




Furthermore, from the investment perspective, NAFTA seems to have achieved its 
objective regarding the increase of FDI flows. As it has been explained in other sections, 
this was without a doubt one of the main objectives of both FTAs under study. It would 
be interesting to consider how the improvements in the investment provisions (from 
NAFTA to the new FTAs) have aided the chances of increased FDI flows from the U.S. 
to Colombia and Peru.  
Lastly, another less obvious consequence of NAFTA has been the increase in remittances 
from Mexicans in the U.S. to their families in Mexico. Although this was directly the 
effect of increased migration of Mexican workers to the U.S., and no necessarily the 
effect of the NAFTA terms, the implementation of the agreement did have an indirect 
effect through the financial services liberalization, which made it commonplace to send 
electronic funds, in small and personal amounts, between the two countries. In the cases 
of Colombia and Peru the effect on remittances of the FTAs with the U.S. might be more 
substantial. In 2013, Colombia was the third ranked Latin American recipient of total 
remittances (Mexico was first, Guatemala was second), and Peru was the sixth after El 
Salvador and the Dominican Republic173. 
b. Employment & Wages 
Trade agreements do have meaningful impacts on labor markets. However, in practical 
terms, isolating the effects of one particular trade agreement on employment or even 
GDP growth is extremely difficult. How many jobs are created and/or lost by the terms of 
the agreement is always a big point of debate on both sides, so often ballpark numbers are 
thrown around in the discussion, mostly to persuade the public to lean towards one 
                                                      
173 Pew Research Center, http://www.pewhispanic.org/topics/remittances/ 
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outcome or the other. From an economic perspective, the level of employment is 
determined by macroeconomic policy in the short run, and supply-side factors such as 
population growth, and labor skills combined with workforce flexibility in the long run. 
Business cycles and technological change also play a role. That said, trade agreements do 
accelerate the process of “sifting and sorting” within affected economic sectors, 
manufacturing in particular. This occurs when the less productive agents are forced out of 
the market, freeing resources for the more productive ones. 
In the context of the negotiations of both FTAs under study, the resulting effect on U.S. 
jobs can be considered miniscule. Nonetheless, to the extent that these agreements impact 
some sectors more than others, jobs become an issue that shows up in lobbying activity. 
FTA opponents in the U.S. argue that competition from low-cost unskilled labor in the 
developing country will reduce real wages of unskilled American workers, and broaden 
the gap between skilled and unskilled workers.  
According to trade theory, for trade to be the explanation for changing relative wages, 
either between industries or between skill categories, relative product prices in the U.S. 
should  fall in import-competing sectors, especially those that employ large numbers of 
low-skilled labor.174 The contending view points out that the higher productivity of U.S. 
workers should offset the nominal cost advantage of cheap labor.175Labor productivity is 
the most important determinant of the national standard of living. From a bilateral trade 
perspective, Convergence theory states that FTAs should promote productivity in both 
                                                      
174 Hufbauer and Schott, p. 86. See the complete Stolper-Samuelson theorem explanation 
in their 1941 article “Protection and Real Wages” 
175 Ibid., pp. 84-85 
184 
 
countries, but especially in the smaller less productive country. When productivity grows, 
real wages follow. As a result of the rate of convergence of both countries, per capita 
income should increase. 
In the case of Colombia and Peru, because their unskilled workers tend to be mostly 
employed in the agricultural sector, and small farms in particular, it is possible that a 
significant amount of these workers could face unemployment in the short run, as cheaper 
agricultural products from the U.S. enter these markets 
A final issue of concern in employment effects comparison with NAFTA is the effect of 
“maquiladoras” on the local and U.S. economies. Strictly speaking, a maquiladora is a 
manufacturing operation in a free trade zone (FTZ), where factories import material and 
equipment on a duty-free and tariff-free basis for assembly, processing, or manufacturing 
and then export the assembled, processed and/or manufactured goods, sometimes back to 
the raw materials' country of origin. Although this was an area of debate for NAFTA, its 
importance has diminished since 2000, around the time much of this production moved to 
Asia, in particular to China.176 Nevertheless, in the case of both FTAs under study there 
was hope that a redesigned form of the maquiladora scheme (known now as “full-
package”177) could be implemented, particularly in Colombia, generating employment 
opportunities, predominantly in the textiles sector. 
                                                      
176 Critics of NAFTA contended that in the absence of maquiladoras the entire production 
process would take place in the U.S., generating or keeping more American jobs. The 
reality is that the entire process can always take place somewhere else and the final 
product can be imported, if the costs are low enough, which is exactly why these 
manufacturing operations moved to Asia. 
177 According to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the 
paradigm change from the simple assembling of garments to “full package” services 
(design, fabric sourcing, trims and logistics) requires additional skills and knowledge and 
therefore specialized training. Moreover, existing trade barriers are likely to be replaced 
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c. Dispute Settlement 
Ideally, FTAs will result in increased trade, and with that growth is almost certain that the 
number of trade disputes between the partner countries rises. Therefore, starting with 
NAFTA, FTAs with the U.S. include dispute resolution mechanisms. In the context of 
these FTAs, the following are the dimensions of dispute settlement to consider: investor-
state disputes over property rights; disputes in the financial sector; antidumping (AD) and 
countervailing duty (CVD) decisions; and, government-to-government consultation to 
resolve high-level disputes.  
Because the governments involved in both FTAs under study were not interested in 
creating dispute resolution mechanisms at the supranational level, which is considered by 
international law experts to be the ideal setting for effectiveness and credibility, rules 
about how decision-makers are chosen and for how long they serve, as well as questions 
of funding must be addressed. If the arbitrators are the same private law firms that 
represent the U.S. firms in similar instances, then there is a conflict of interest to 
consider. Also, the law of the place where these settlements take place is primordial for 
their outcome, so developing countries have much to gain if they can develop the 
institutions and infrastructure to be the hosts of such procedures.  
d. Labor and the Environment 
Opponents to FTAs in the U.S. often cite the exacerbation of already bad labor and 
environmental practices in developing countries as a reason to halt the agreements. This 
was not different with the cases of the FTAs with Colombia and Peru. They believe that 
                                                      




these pacts” will eventually translate into a convergence of labor practices towards the 
lower common denominator,”178 In NAFTA, one approach to dealing with controversial 
areas such as labor and environmental issues was by creating side pacts between the 
countries, parallel to the main agreement. Because these side pacts were not binding to 
the same extent the FTA was, some critics argue that this was a less-than-ideal strategy. 
However, due to the political weight of labor-related issues compared to environmental 
matters, NAFTA signers were more averse to concede authority over labor concerns to a 
supranational institution.  
For labor issues, the key areas of concern are freedom of association (labor unions), child 
labor, and migrant worker protection. Because of its poor record of worker rights 
protection, to pass the agreement through the U.S. Congress the Colombian government 
agreed to a Labor Action Plan (LAP), which includes a number of initial steps as well as 
yearly milestones to be reached and monitoring mechanisms. Although the application of 
the LAP was satisfactory on its initial stages, the Colombian efforts diminished as time 
went by. In the case of Peru, child labor issues were more problematic, but labor issues in 
general were not a cause for delaying the implementation of the agreement, and general 
provisions included within the text of the FTA itself were considered to be sufficient.  
Regarding the environmental side agreements, from a political perspective, the NAFTA 
side agreements were a big achievement, bringing discordant proposals together into one 
that included supranational institutions. Even if environmentalists believe the agreement 
fail to include tougher clauses, the fact remains that “without NAFTA, the Mexican 
government would have had less incentive to pass environmental legislation or to 
                                                      
178 Hufbauer & Schott, p. 90 
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improve its enforcement efforts.”179 Something very similar is happening with both FTAs 
under study. However, in these new agreements environmental clauses were mostly 
included directly into the text of the FTAs themselves. Nevertheless, one significant 
difference between these two countries and Mexico is that, because of their geographical 
position, Colombia and Peru have sizable tropical rain forests. Advocates of the Darien 
and Amazonian regions, and of their corresponding indigenous populations, denounce to 
this day what they see as environmental policy deficiencies of both trade agreements. 
Overall, Hufbauer and Schott found that “important NAFTA institutions lacked adequate 
mandates and funding; consequently they fall short of aspirations.”180 To what extent this 
will also be the case with the two cases under study shall be explored in more detail. 
  
                                                      
179 Ibid, p.177 
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Appendix 3. Economic Profiles and Analysis of the last two decades of trade 
relations 
Table 6. Colombian Total Exports (thousands of U.S. Dollars) 
 
Table 7. Colombian Total Imports (thousands of U.S. Dollars) 
 
Table 8. Peruvian Total Exports (thousands of U.S. Dollars) 
 





Imports CIF, exports FOB and balance: million U.S. dollars  
                                                      
181 http://comtrade.un.org/pb/ 
Category 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Food, beverages and Tobacco 2,149,927   2,240,516   2,763,964   3,533,486   3,766,380   4,467,277   5,266,913   4,731,892   4,446,709   5,722,109   5,250,767   5,186,607   5,814,520   5,505,452   5,411,292   
Agricultural Raw Materials 714,991      724,339      748,695      960,072      1,060,787   1,280,197   1,287,822   1,120,472   1,309,958   1,337,210   1,378,053   1,493,735   1,528,531   1,429,195   1,453,465   
Fuel, mineral lubricants & similar products 4,159,873   4,847,013   6,162,812   8,295,896   9,330,709   10,820,494 17,221,504 15,713,983 22,407,189 36,481,786 39,463,151 39,277,978 35,931,144 18,839,864 14,745,528 
Metals and minerals 188,897      718,630      769,693      796,350      854,005      1,021,088   1,635,940   2,051,290   2,708,599   3,441,197   4,038,697   2,871,527   2,113,280   1,541,280   1,912,014   
Manufacturing 4,429,429   4,377,171   6,023,093   7,095,633   8,335,749   11,355,242 11,476,535 8,857,805   8,753,929   9,949,021   9,966,791   9,955,071   9,393,544   8,363,794   7,529,142   
Merchandise and unclassified operations 682            6,974         14,595       50,249       532,572      402,722      114,597      22,743       27,990       12,957       18,737       29,658       4,809         991            10,592       
TOTAL 11,643,799 12,914,643 16,482,852 20,731,686 23,880,202 29,347,020 37,003,311 32,498,185 39,654,374 56,944,280 60,116,196 58,814,576 54,785,828 35,680,576 31,062,033 
Category 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Food, beverages and Tobacco 1,518,662   1,526,708   1,783,076   1,822,927   2,244,885   2,967,273   3,947,919   3,302,252   3,922,435   5,060,887   5,999,362   5,834,504   5,980,498   5,548,105   5,836,216   
Agricultural Raw Materials 290,278      336,909      338,178      342,909      424,065      454,071      518,573      403,036      551,007      648,432      530,263      504,441      516,681      453,130      416,471      
Fuel, mineral lubricants & similar products 193,071      242,550      267,840      547,495      682,635      909,898      1,806,500   1,235,370   2,078,852   3,852,472   5,676,494   6,384,142   7,544,769   5,131,811   3,831,140   
Metals and minerals 263,364      288,085      415,029      557,286      878,712      1,067,499   1,044,282   606,961      842,317      985,683      986,866      966,452      999,180      883,654      744,101      
Manufacturing 9,824,708   11,046,629 13,339,972 17,087,251 21,025,276 26,460,378 31,012,970 26,236,216 33,176,324 44,009,199 45,732,286 45,576,095 48,864,253 41,911,401 33,905,120 
Merchandise and unclassified operations 2                -             7                1                3                -             11              5                197            1,597         17              27              1,281         22,070       58,250       
TOTAL 12,090,085 13,440,881 16,144,102 20,357,869 25,255,576 31,859,119 38,330,255 31,783,840 40,571,132 54,558,270 58,925,288 59,265,661 63,906,662 53,950,171 44,791,298 
Category 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Food, beverages and Tobacco 1,784,853 1,809,203 2,441,143   3,158,752   3,458,103   3,794,358   4,847,457   4,476,151   5,519,743   7,258,257   7,118,572   6,474,385   7,456,856   7,070,071   7,278,445   
Agricultural Raw Materials 176,998    193,499    225,860      265,776      318,107      341,700      367,444      287,602      362,687      396,204      408,233      414,486      459,100      405,886      360,589      
Fuel, mineral lubricants & similar products 451,338    625,092    643,276      1,500,828   1,550,282   2,043,322   2,611,349   1,801,090   3,281,467   4,902,390   5,168,627   5,143,267   4,427,961   2,348,074   2,270,246   
Metals and minerals 3,782,725 4,593,367 6,753,808   10,146,201 14,597,815 17,244,108 18,376,568 16,049,421 21,629,864 27,352,047 25,782,808 22,772,143 18,728,711 18,129,710 21,259,708 
Manufacturing 1,272,757 1,483,603 1,970,504   2,614,639   2,739,521   3,296,698   4,043,550   3,133,764   3,741,697   4,778,013   5,084,216   4,694,269   4,587,542   3,949,978   3,782,081   
Merchandise and unclassified operations 27            18            6                3                1                4                57              34              10              93              81              40              12              4                3                
TOTAL 7,468,698 8,704,782 12,034,597 17,686,199 22,663,829 26,720,190 30,246,425 25,748,062 34,535,468 44,687,004 43,562,537 39,498,590 35,660,182 31,903,723 34,951,072 
Category 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Food, beverages and Tobacco 1,010,032 1,059,010 1,291,716   1,430,527   1,567,302   2,133,345   2,987,206   2,398,010   3,096,907   3,843,821   4,220,915   4,268,467   4,439,489   4,218,291   3,869,814   
Agricultural Raw Materials 138,025    154,461    198,264      223,013      230,961      330,809      430,174      299,224      500,334      656,074      578,568      542,047      523,316      453,705      373,952      
Fuel, mineral lubricants & similar products 1,033,587 1,457,423 1,856,359   2,437,988   2,914,540   3,753,806   5,476,839   3,052,220   4,256,122   5,989,667   6,086,829   6,687,477   5,995,212   3,919,977   3,599,574   
Metals and minerals 49,833      62,194      105,289      121,341      159,078      189,661      357,491      257,593      395,738      435,827      428,690      462,979      544,572      401,685      351,099      
Manufacturing 5,261,008 5,679,997 6,640,192   8,265,932   10,420,407 13,984,267 20,616,912 15,780,203 21,664,668 26,918,076 30,880,840 31,367,286 30,670,792 28,804,489 24,773,064 
Merchandise and unclassified operations -           78            44              86              28              16,950       3,517         100            74              68              88              163            54              133            63              
TOTAL 7,492,485 8,413,163 10,091,864 12,478,887 15,292,316 20,408,838 29,872,139 21,787,350 29,913,843 37,843,533 42,195,930 43,328,419 42,173,435 37,798,280 32,967,566 
2012 International 
Trade Statistics181 
Import Export Balance 
Colombia 58,633 59,573 941 
Peru 41,089 45,600 4,510 
2015 International 
Trade Statistics 
Import Export Balance 
Colombia 54,058 35,606 -18,451 
Peru 37,014 34,236 -2,778 
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Note that these amounts, when compared with total trade of the U.S. with all countries 
are extremely small. However, for Peru and Colombia, the U.S is their top trade partner. 
a. COLOMBIA182 
Top 5 Products 
exported by 
Colombia 
Crude Petroleum (38%), Coal Briquettes (17%), Refined 
Petroleum (7.3%),Gold (4.6%), and Coffee (4.6%) 
Top 5 Products 
imported by 
Colombia 
Refined Petroleum (7.1%), Planes, Helicopters, and/or 
Spacecraft (4.9%),Cars (3.9%), Delivery Trucks (2.7%), and Computers (2.6%) 
Top 5 Export 
destinations of 
Colombia 
United States (36%), Netherlands (5.3%), Chile (3.6%), China (3.3%), and 
Panama (3.3%) 
Top 5 Import 
origins 
of Colombia 
United States (25%), China (15%), Mexico (11%), Brazil (5.1%), 
and Germany(4.1%) 
Data from 2011 
 
Top 5 Products 
exported by 
Colombia 
Crude Petroleum (45.5%), Coal Briquettes (13.4%), Refined 
Petroleum (4.9%),Coffee (4.7%), and Gold (3.1%) 
Top 5 Products 
imported by 
Colombia 
Refined Petroleum (11.7%), Planes, Helicopters, and/or 
Spacecraft (4.2%),Cars (3.2%),Computers (3.2%), and Broadcasting 
Equipment (2.8%) 
Top 5 Export 
destinations of 
Colombia 
United States (26%), China (10%), Panama (6.4%),Spain (5.9%), 
and India (4.9%)  
Top 5 Import 
origins 
of Colombia 
United States (29%), China (19%), Mexico (8.5%), Germany(4.5%), 
and  Brazil (4%) 
Data for 2014 
Colombia was the United States' 20th largest goods export market in 2015. Exports to 
Colombia were $17 billion (decreasing 18% from 2014, but a total increase of 15.1% 
from 2011 -- pre-FTA – and 202% from 2005). Imports from Colombia totaled $14 
billion in 2015 (a 23% decrease from 2014, but up 59% from 2005, and down 39.2% 
since 2011 -- pre-FTA).183 
                                                      





U.S. exports to Colombia include mineral fuels, machinery, agricultural products 
(including corn, soybeans, wheat and rice), and organic chemicals. U.S. imports from 
Colombia include crude oil, gold, coffee, cut flowers, textiles, and bananas. 
Approximately 250 U.S. businesses conduct at least some operations in Colombia. U.S. 
direct investment stock in Colombia ($7.1 billion in 2014, a 3.9% decrease from 2013) is 
primarily concentrated in the mining, manufacturing, and finance/insurance sectors.  
b. PERU 
Top 5 Products 
exported by Peru 
Gold (21%), Copper Ore (16%), Refined Petroleum (6.0%), Refined 
Copper(5.9%), and Animal Meal and Pellets (4.0%) 
Top 5 Products 
imported by Peru 
Crude Petroleum (8.8%), Refined Petroleum (5.3%), Cars (3.3%), Delivery 
Trucks (3.1%), and Large Construction Vehicles (2.0%) 
Top 5 Export 
destinations of 
Peru 
China (15%), United States (13%), Switzerland (12%), Canada (9.1%), and 
Japan (4.6%) 
Top 5 Import 
origins of Peru 
United States (19%), China (16%), Brazil (6.2%), Argentina (4.9%), 
and Ecuador(4.6%) 
Data from 2011 
Top 5 Products 
exported by Peru 
Copper Ore (17.4%), Gold (14.6%),  Refined Petroleum (7.8%), Refined 
Copper(4.6%), and Animal Meal and Pellets (1.41%) 
Top 5 Products 
imported by Peru 
Refined Petroleum (7.1%), Crude Petroleum (6.5%),  Cars (4.2%), Broadcasting 
Equipment (2.7%), and Computers (2.3%) 
Top 5 Export 
destinations of Peru 
China (17.8%),United States(16%), Switzerland (7.2%), Canada (6.6%), and 
Brazil (4.1%) 
Top 5 Import 
origins of Peru 
China (20.9%), United States (20.8%),  Brazil (4.6%), Mexico (4.6%), 
and Ecuador(4.0%) 
Data from 2014 
During 2015, goods exports from the U.S. to Peru totaled $8.8 billion (an decrease of 
12% from 2014, but a increase of 282%, from 2005, and 42.5% from 2008 -- Pre-FTA), 
while imports amounted to $5.1 billion (a 17% decrease from 2014, also a decrease of 
12.8% from 2008 -- Pre-FTA). The top export categories were: Mineral fuel, machinery, 
electrical machinery, plastic and cereals (corn). The five largest import categories were: 
Precious metal and stones (gold), edible fruit and nuts (grapes, avocados), mineral fuels, 
knit apparel, and vegetables (asparagus), and U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Peru 
(stock) was $6.5 billion in 2014, a 20.9% increase from 2013. Most of it directed 
primarily to mining, manufacturing and nonbank holding companies.  
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Traditional Exports by Sector and sub-categories: 
 
Source: Peru – SUNAT (Statistics Division) 
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FIGURE 46. PERU - Traditional Exports, by main sectors
(thousands of U.S.$)
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FIGURE 47. PERU - Mining Exports
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Appendix 4. Foreign Investment Law Comparisons 




(Law 963 of 2005): Covers FDI from a threshold amount 
(7500 x monthly minimum wage) in the following sectors: 
tourism, industry, agriculture, forestry for export, mining, 
export processing zones, free zones for commercial and 
oil production, telecommunications, construction, 
infrastructure relating to ports and railways, electricity 
generation, irrigation, and efficient use of water resources. 
While it leaves the option open for other investments as a 
proved by a special committee, it expressly excludes 
portfolio investments. The time frame for such contracts is 
between 3 and 20 years, and a yearly fee equal to 1% of 
the value of the investment is required. Also, these 
contracts may provide for national arbitration under 
Colombia Law. 
Called the “Agreement with 
Contract-Law Status”, and 





Exceptions and restrictions in: television concessions and 
nationwide private television operators, radio 
broadcasting, movie production, maritime agencies, 
national airlines, and shipping. Colombian law regulates 
the number of foreign personnel in several professional 
areas, including architecture, engineering, law, and 
construction. For firms with more than 10 employees, no 
more than 10 percent of the general workforce and 20 
percent of specialists can be foreign nationals. 
Mass media, air and land 
transportation services, and 
private security and 
surveillance. Investments in 
border regions (within 50 




In August 2012, Colombia joined the Madrid Agreement 
Concerning the International Registration of Marks 
(Madrid Protocol). The Colombian government joined the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Trademark Law Treaty on January 13, 2012, which 
entered into force on April 12, 2013.  
The Office of the Superintendent of Industry and 
Commerce (SIC) and the National Copyright Directorate 
were granted new authorities in 2012 to adjudicate IPR 
cases previously handled by courts 
Recent legal code 
amendments creating 
stricter penalties for some 












Appendix 6. Dissertation Survey 
 
Subject: Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the U.S. and Colombia and Peru: 
Effects of Investment Chapters on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
Instrument provided by: Monica Lombana – PhD Candidate School of Public Policy 
University of Maryland  
 
Respondent: PLEASE ENTER NAME 
 
1. Were you a participant during the negotiation process of either of these agreements? 
If yes, could you share your role and dates of your participation? 
 
2. What is your general impression of the outcome of the negotiation of the FTA(s)? 
 
3. Have you had a role in the implementation of either of these agreements? If yes, 
could you share some details? 
 
4. From your personal perspective, what positive effect(s) in Colombia/Peru have taken 
place because of the FTA? 
 
5. From your personal perspective, what negative effect(s) in Colombia/Peru have taken 
place because of the FTA(s)? 
 
6. Are you aware of any relationship between the negotiation/implementation of the 
FTA(s) and the inflows of FDI to Colombia/Peru? If so, please elaborate. 
 
7. From your point of view, what is the future of the FTA(s) in the next 5-10 years? 
 
8. How do you feel the framework put forward by the negotiation/implementation of the 
FTA(s) influenced similar agreements between Colombia/Peru and other countries? 
 
9. How do you feel the framework put forward by the negotiation/implementation of the 
FTA(s) influenced similar agreements between other countries and the U.S.? 
 
10. Any other comments/ideas would you like to share at this time? 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey. I am looking forward 
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